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INTRODUCTION

This is a revision of the original Search and Seizure Survey published in The University of Puget Sound Law Review
volume 9, number 1 (Fall 1985). That work was the culmination of my efforts, successive law clerks, legal externs, and the
members of the University of Puget Sound Law Review. In
the years before that volume was published it was apparent
there was no single source that the Washington lawyer, judge,
or law enforcement officer could turn to as a common beginning point for research on the Washington law of search and
seizure. As a result, well-intentioned participants in the criminal justice process were making mistakes that could have been
avoided with such research.
Hopefully, the initial volume served in a small way the
purposes for which it was intended. Continual revision of the
law and new cases interpreting the Washington State Constitution and the United States Constitution have made an update
imperative. The editorial staff of the University of Puget
Sound Law Review, its members, and Professors George Nock
and John Strait have all given much time and effort to update
the case comments and statutory references, which are current
through May 1988. In addition, all references to W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
have been updated.
Significant changes in the law of search and seizure have
occurred during the three years since the original work was
published in 1985. The most important of these changes are in
the area of the Washington State Supreme Court's interpretation of the Washington Constitution. The court has continued
to recognize that the language in our constitution can provide
broader protection to individuals than that provided in the
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United States Constitution. An example is Washington Constitution article I, section 7, which provides that "[n]o person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law." A series of cases since 1985 continue to recognize that this language provides greater protection to individual privacy interest than the fourth amendment.
See, e.g., State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986);
State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986).
In Gunwall, the court developed nonexclusive criteria to
use as interpreting principles of our state constitution. In addition to the textual language itself, the court identified the history of the state constitution and common law as important
interpretive aids. In addition, the court recognized Washington's laws, including statutes, as a source to identify issues of
interest to Washington citizens. Matters of particular state or
local concern were also noted as aids to the courts in determining whether there is a need for national uniformity or whether
that need is outweighed by state policy considerations. Moreover, Gunwall recognized that the differences in the text of
the Washington State and the federal constitutional provisions
could indicate that the state founders intended a meaning different from that of the federal bill of rights. In State v.
Wethered, 110 Wash. 2d 466, - P.2d - (1988), the court indicated that in matters where the court was urged to examine
state constitutional grounds failure to discuss at a minimum
the six criteria mentioned in Gunwall would result in the
court's refusal to do so, inasmuch as it would consider the issue
insufficiently argued by the parties.
This Survey, as did the first Survey, summarizes the predominant treatment of search and seizure issues under the
fourth amendment and under article I, section 7 to the extent
that this state provision is interpreted differently from the federal. The Survey focuses primarily on substantive search and
seizure law in the criminal context; it omits discussion of many
procedural issues such as retroactivity.
CHAPTER 1: TRIGGERING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7: DEFINING SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES

This chapter addresses three questions: (1) "What is a
search?"; (2) "What is a seizure of the person?"; and (3) "What
is a seizure of property?"
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These questions represent the threshold inquiry in any
search or seizure problem. Unless a true search or seizure has
occurred within the meaning of the federal and state constitutions, constitutional protections are not triggered. This chapter
will first discuss when a search has occurred, be it in the form
of entry into a home or the taking a blood sample. The chapter will then discuss when a seizure of the person has occurred,
be it an arrest or investigatory stop. The chapter will conclude
with a discussion of when, for constitutional purposes, personal
property has been seized.
1.0 Defining "Search"pre-Katz" "Constitutionally
ProtectedAreas"
Prior to 1967, the United States Supreme Court defined
the applicability of fourth amendment protections in terms of
"constitutionally protected areas." Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967). The fourth
amendment guarantees applied only to those searches that
intruded into one of the "protected areas" enumerated within
the fourth amendment: "persons" (including the bodies and
clothing of individuals); "houses" (including apartments, hotel
rooms, garages, business offices, stores, and warehouses);
"papers" (such as letters); and "effects" (such as automobiles).
See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 2.1(a), at 302-03 (2d ed. 1987)
[hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE]; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349
(1974).
In Katz, the Court rejected the rigid "constitutionally protected area" test.
The correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally protected area." . . . [Tihe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection .... But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.
389 U.S. at 350-52, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 581-82, 88 S. Ct. at 510-11
(citations omitted). Katz thus defined the scope of search protections as the individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy."
The nature of this new test and the degree of continued vital-
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ity of the old "constitutionally protected areas" test will be
examined in the following sections. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 2.1(b), at 303.
1.1

Defining "Search" post-Katz: The "Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy"

In a concurring opinion in Katz, which has since come to
be accepted as the Katz test, Justice Harlan explained that the
Katz holding extends search and seizure protections to all situations in which a defendant has a "reasonable expectation of
privacy." 389 U.S. at 360, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 587, 88 S. Ct. at 516
(Harlan, J., concurring); see 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 3.2(b), at 567. A reasonable expectation of privacy is measured by a "twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 389 U.S. at 361, 19 L. Ed. 2d at 588, 88
S. Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Although "a man's home is, for most purposes, a place
where he expects privacy,... objects, activities, or statements
that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited." State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wash. App. 592, 595, 675
P.2d 631, 633 (citation omitted) (legitimate expectation of privacy means more than subjective expectation of not being discovered; defendants' claimed privacy expectation in home not
reasonable when defendants positioned themselves in front of
picture window with lights on and drapes open), review
denied, 101 Wash. 2d 1013 (1984); see also Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 226, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2580
(1979). The reasonable expectation of privacy has also been
analyzed by questioning whether the incriminating evidence
was seen or heard from a place accessible to people who are
not unusually inquisitive. United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d
131 (2d Cir. 1980) (ascertainment of which objects or activities
in defendant's apartment could have been seen by naked eye
from adjacent apartment is necessary to determine reasonable
expectation of privacy in objects or activities).
The expectation of privacy must also be one "which the
law recognizes as 'legitimate.'" Rakas v. fIlinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143-44 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 401-02, 99 S. Ct. 421, 430-31 (1978).
A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off
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season may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which the law recognizes as
'legitimate.' . . . Legitimation of expectations of privacy by
law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment,
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted
by society.
Id.
Consequently, when a police investigative device is capable
of detecting only the presence of unlawful articles, the use of
the device does not constitute a search. United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 707, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 121, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-45
(1983) (a canine sniff of luggage, when the canine is trained to
detect only contraband, is not a search within meaning of
fourth amendment); see also State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App.
813, 818, 598 P.2d 421, 424 (1979), review denied, 93 Wash. 2d
1008 (1980). Similarly, unlawful sexual activity in a public toilet stall, even though the stall door is closed, carries no legitimate expectation of privacy. Hartman v. Virginia, 48
U.S.L.W. 3078 (Va. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 825 (1979). In
addition, the fourth amendment provides no protection against
a government agent recording a person's conversation with the
agent. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733,
99 S. Ct. 1465 (1979).
In determining whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable, the United States Supreme Court has looked to the
intention of the framers of the fourth amendment. See, e.g.,
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 54647, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2481-82 (1977). The Court has also considered "an individual's possessory interest in the place searched"
and "the uses to which the individual has put a location," see,
e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697,
704-05, 80 S. Ct. 725, 733 (1960), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619, 100 S.
Ct. 20 (1980), as well as our "societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion," see, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63
L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980) (homes especially protected). See generally Walinksi & Tucker, Expectations of Privacy: Fourth Amendment Legitimacy Through State Law, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1981).
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1.2 Defining "Search"post-Katz: Continuing Vitality of
"ConstitutionallyProtectedAreas"
Although the concept of "constitutionally protected areas"
does not "serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth
Amendment problem," Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9, 19 L. Ed. 2d at
582, 88 S. Ct. at 511, the concept retains considerable authority.
A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL, & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR
THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 1-219 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter TRIAL MANUAL].
Katz's new focus upon protection of "people, not places"
and of justifiable expectations of privacy... apparently
expands but does not exhaust the Fourth Amendment's protection, for . . . [the fourth amendment] protects certain
kinds of property interests-reflected in the constitutional
phrases houses, papers, and effects,-independently of any
relation that these may have to the privacy of their owner's
...

"person

....

Id. (emphasis in original).
The United States Supreme Court has referred to "constitutionally protected areas" since Katz and has given special
deference to the areas specifically enumerated within the
fourth amendment. For example, the fourth amendment prohibits police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual
entry into a suspect's home, absent exigent circumstances, to
effect a routine felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in
a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more
clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous
physical dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that
finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms:
"The right of the people to be secure in their... houses...
shall not be violated." That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that "[a]t the very core [of the fourth
amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable Government
intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 5
L. Ed. 2d 734, 81 S. Ct. 679 (1961). In terms that apply
equally to seizures of property and seizures of persons, the
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to
the house.
Id.

Houses,

then,

are

"constitutionally

protected

areas"
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because, as under the pre-Katz analysis, "houses" are specifically enumerated within the fourth amendment. The Rakas/
Katz analysis of "legitimate expectation of privacy" supplements but does not weaken the enhanced protection given the
home as a "constitutionally protected area." Note that
Silverman v. United States, cited in Payton, was decided during the heart of the pre-Katz era of "constitutionally protected
areas" analysis. See also State v. Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426,
429, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (1985); State v. Jordan, 29 Wash. App. 924,
928-29, 631 P.2d 989, 991-92 (1981) (Police observation of drugs
through section of window that inadvertently was left uncovered constituted search requiring warrant; although similar
"search" of hotel room had been upheld in State v. Brown, 9
Wash. App. 937, 942, 515 P.2d 1008, 1012 (1973), Jordan was distinguished by greater expectation of privacy in home as compared with motel or place of business.).
1.3 Specific Applications of Post-Katz Analysis
1.3(a)

Residential Premises

As described above, an individual has a privacy interest in
the interior of his or her home. See Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 583, 589-90, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 652-53, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381-82
(1980); 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.3(b), at 386. A
search of a home can occur even when the government officers
do not themselves enter the home. If the officers are able to
monitor persons, objects, or activities within the home that
would not be observable in ordinary circumstances, a search
has occured. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 82 L. Ed.
2d 530, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (search occurs, triggering the
fourth amendment, when the government monitors an electronic device to determine whether a particular article or person is in an individual's home at a particular time); Clinton v.
Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 12 L. Ed. 2d 213, 84 S. Ct. 1186 (1964)
(fourth amendment implicated when microphone simply
"stuck in" partition wall of apartment adjoining defendant's
apartment even when microphone did not physically intrude
into defendant's apartment).
The privacy interest in a home is not confined to houses,
but extends to other types of residences. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 861, 84 S. Ct. 889, 893
(1964) (hotel rooms); State v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527
P.2d 1303, 1308 (1974) (apartments), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004
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(1975); Californiav. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 105
S. Ct. 2066 (1985) (mobile home). There is a decreased privacy
interest when several persons or families occupy premises in
common rather than individually, e.g., tenants sharing common living quarters but separate bedrooms. State v. Alexander,
41 Wash. App. 152, 155-56, 704 P.2d 618, 620 (1985) (community
living rule). And the expectation of privacy in residential
premises may persist even when a home is fire-damaged and
arson is suspected. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292, 78
L. Ed. 2d 477, 486, 104 S. Ct. 641, 648 (1984).
A person may relinquish the privacy interest in an activity
or object in the home by making the activity or object observable to persons outside. State v. Drumhiller,36 Wash. App. 592,
675 P.2d 631 (defendants had no reasonable privacy interest in
their activity in home when they positioned themselves in
front of picture window with lights on and drapes open),
review denied, 101 Wash. 2d 1012 (1984). But a person does not
relinquish his or her privacy interests in the home by opening
the door in response to a police officer's knock. State v.
Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89, 91 (1985). However, persons may waive their right to privacy by willingly
admitting a visitor, e.g., an undercover police officer, into the
premises to conduct an illegal transaction. State v. Dalton, 43
Wash. App. 279, 284-285, 716 P.2d 940, 944 (Student-invited
officer into a college dormitory to conduct an illegal drug
transaction. The warrantless entry was upheld as non-intrusive since the police were invited in and took nothing except
what would have been taken by a willing purchaser.), review
denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1010 (1986).
A person using the home telephone has no privacy interest
in the phone numbers dialed, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
745-46, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 230, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2582 (1979), nor do
they have a privacy interest in the contents of a phone call
when a recording machine's speaker makes incoming calls
audible to anyone present in the room. United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1100 (1984).
The Washington Constitution, however, provides broader
protection to a telephone user's privacy interests. State v.
Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (specifically
overruling Bixler v. Hille, 80 Wash. 2d 68, 497 P.2d 594 (1972)
and declining to follow Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 61 L.
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Ed. 2d 220, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979)). The Gunwall court found
that a home telephone customer's privacy rights under article
I, section 7 were violated when the police, without valid legal
process, obtained by means of pen register or other device, a
record of the local and long distance telephone numbers dialed
on the customer's telephone. The court also considered
whether the police may obtain telephone toll records. The
court held that toll records could only be secured under
"authority of law" which includes legal process such as a
search warrant or subpeona. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 69, 720
P.2d at 816.
Courts in some jurisdictions have held that common hallways of multiple-dwelling buildings that are accessible to the
public are not protected areas. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 2.3(b), at 388. When the building is secure and not accessible
to the public, the courts are split. Compare United States v.
Carriger,541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976) (A federal agent may not
slip into a locked apartment building that can only be opened
by a key or security device by holding the door when workers
exit. While a tenant may permit entrance to other tenants and
guests, she does not expect, and probably will not permit, trespassers.) with United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814 (8th Cir.
1977) (fact that officer was a technical trespasser was of no
consequence since defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in hallways). See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 2.3(b), at 386-90.
Finally, the privacy interest in one's home extends to situations in which the occupant is not a criminal suspect. The
fourth amendment is triggered when an officer enters a person's home to search for someone who does not live there. See
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213-14, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38,
46, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1648 (1981). Thus, the fourth amendment is
triggered when a housing inspector enters to conduct an
administrative search. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967).
1.3(b)

Related Structures: The Curtilage

The "curtilage" of residential premises consists of "all
buildings in close proximity to a dwelling which are continually used for carrying on domestic employment; or such place
as is necessary and convenient to a dwelling, and is habitually
used for family purposes." United States v. Potts, 297 F.2d 68,
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69 (6th Cir. 1961). Prior to Katz, the curtilage served as the
controlling standard of an individual's privacy interest: structures within the curtilage were protected and structures
outside the curtilage were not. See 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 2.3(d), at 403-04. In the aftermath of Katz, lower
courts and commentators have favored constitutional protection for structures located within the curtilage on the grounds
that residents have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such
areas. See id. § 2.3(d), at 404 n.20.
The Supreme Court has recently identified four factors
that should be reviewed in determining the extent of a residence's curtilage: "[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be
curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an
enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to
which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to
protect the area from observation by people passing by."
United States v. Dunn, - U.S. -, -, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326, 334-35,
107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987). The Dunn Court expressly
declined to adopt a "bright-line rule" that the curtilage extend
no further than the nearest fence surrounding a fenced house.
Rather, the court is to use the factors identified above as a tool
in determining whether the area in question is so intimately
tied to the home as to fall within "the home's 'umbrella' of
Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at -, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 335,
107 S. Ct. at 1139.
There is no greater expectation of privacy in structures
located and viewed from outside the curtilage, however, than
those viewed from a public place. United States v. Dunn, U.S., 94 L. Ed. 2d 326, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987). In Dunn, the
Court held that police officers standing in an open field could
look into the defendant's barn, even if the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the barn. See also 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.3(d), at 403.
Washington courts have not recognized a privacy interest
in those areas of the curtilage that are impliedly open to the
public. See State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 902, 632 P.2d 44, 47
(1981) (usual access routes to a house); see also State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d 263, 268, 616 P.2d 649, 651 (1980) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in driveway that is exposed to view
from street and is conventional means of access to house), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 958 (1981); see supra § 1.3(a). The court will,
however, consider a combination of factors including the prox-
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imity of the area to the residence, whether it is set off by physical features and whether it is for the exclusive use of the
resident. State v. Niedergang, 43 Wash. App. 656, 719 P.2d 576
(1986) (car parked in cul-de-sac not within curtilage).
1.3(c)

Adjoining Lands and "Open Fields"

Certain lands adjacent to a dwelling fall within the privacy
protection surrounding the residence.
"The protection
afforded by the fourth amendment, insofar as houses are concerned, has never been restricted to the interior of the house,
but has been extended to open areas immediately adjacent
thereto." Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir.
1968) (reasonable expectation of privacy extends to backyard
of lodge); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 80
L. Ed. 2d 214, 224, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984) (individual may
have legitimate expectation of privacy in "area immediately
surrounding the home"). The applicability of federal search
and seizure protections to areas immediately surrounding the
home is determined by the Katz test of reasonable expectation
of privacy. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.3(f), at 410-11.
Adjoining lands that are used as normal access routes by
the general public are only "semi-private" and therefore do not
always enjoy fourth amendment protections. Air Pollution
Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865, 40
L. Ed. 2d 607, 611, 94 S. Ct. 2114, 2115-16 (1974); United States
v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 826 (1975); State v. Corbett, 15 Or. App. 470, 475, 516 P.2d
487, 490 (1973). Thus, fourth amendment protections will not
apply to a police investigation that is restricted to places where
visitors could be expected to go. E.g., State v. Daugherty, 94
Wash. 2d 263, 268, 616 P.2d 649, 651 (1980) (public portions of
driveway), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 958 (1981); State v. Coburne,
10 Wash. App. 298, 314, 518 P.2d 747, 757 (1973) (apartment
building common parking lot); see also United States v.
Magana, 512 F.2d at 1171 (public portions of driveway); Bicar
v. Gray, 380 F. Supp. 804, 806 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (porches); People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 2d 80, 84-85, 460 P.2d 129, 131, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 457, 459 (1969) (walkways).
On the other hand, when the police enter onto adjoining
lands that are not used as an access area by the general public,
the fourth amendment guarantees do apply. See, e.g., Fixel v.
lWainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1974) (backyard behind
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four-unit apartment building, not used as common passageway
by tenants, is protected); Norman v. State, 134 Ga. App. 767,
768, 216 S.E.2d 644, 645 (1975) (truck located under trees in
small meadow behind house and not on farm access route considered within curtilage). But see State v. Niedergang, 43
Wash. App. 656, 719 P.2d 576 (1986) (car parked in common
area near suspect's dwelling not considered within curtilage).
Under the old "constitutionally protected areas" analysis,
the privacy protections of the fourth amendment did not apply
at all to "open fields." Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59,
68 L. Ed. 898, 900, 44 S. Ct. 445, 446 (1924). Consequently, a
defendant could not invoke constitutional privacy protections
with respect to police intrusions onto open fields, wooded
areas, vacant lots in urban areas, open beaches, reservoirs, or
open waters. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.4(a), at
426.
The "open fields" doctrine has been reaffirmed under the
Katz analysis on the grounds that an expectation of privacy in
open fields is unreasonable. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 179, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 224, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741 (1984)
("open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate
activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance"). Moreover, a person in
possession of land falling within the purview of the open fields
doctrine cannot create a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the area by taking steps to conceal activities such as posting no
trespassing signs or erecting fences around the secluded areas.
Id. at 182, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 227, 104 S. Ct. at 1743 (issue is
whether "government's intrusion infringes upon the personal
and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment"). See
also Doe v. Dring, 2 M. & S. 448 (1814) (discussing prior cases);
2 Blackstone, Commentaries 16, 384-85.
Even land within the curtilage may only be protected from
certain types of surveillance. Thus, aerial surveillance is not
precluded merely because precautions have been taken against
ground surveillance. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 90 L.
Ed. 2d 210, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986) (aerial surveillance of marijuana growing in fenced backyard does not implicate fourth
amendment; officer's observations merely from public vantage
point). If highly sophisticated equipment is used in conducting
the surveillance, however, the fourth amendment may be
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implicated. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,
238, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226, 238, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1826 i1986).
In addition, the fact that police commit a common law
trespass while observing an object or activity in open fields
does not render the intrusion a search under the federal constitution. Oliver. 466 U.S. at 183, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 227-28, 104 S.
Ct. at 1743-44. Thus, an intrusion may be onto the land itself
as well as by aerial sur-eillance and still not be considered a
search. See id. at 177, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 224-25, 104 S. Ct. at 1741.
Under the Washington Constitution, aerial surveillance at
certain altitudes without the aid of enhancement devices does
not constitute a search. State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d 361, 693
P.2d 81 (1985) (aerial surveillance of defendant's property, at
altitude of 3400 feet and without aid of visual enhancement
devices, does not constitute search, even though surveillance
was conducted with aim of discovering marijuana plants); State
v. -Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 514, 688 P.2d 151, 155 (1984)
(observation of defendant's marijuana plants at altitude of 1500
feet with unaided eye not search).
The relevant inquiry under article I, section 7, however, is
not whether the observed object was in a "protected place" or
whether the defendant had a legitimate and subjective expectation of privacy in the observed location; rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether "the State unreasonably intruded into
the defendant's 'private affairs'." Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 510,
688 P.2d at 1205 (1980); see also State v. Cockrell, I n2 Wash. 2d
561, 689 P.2d 32 (1984); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 178,
622 P.2d 1199, 1205 (1980); Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
331, 334 (1985). The nature of the property may be a factor in
determining what constitutes "private affairs," but the fact
that the location of the search is an open field is not conclusive. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 513, 688 P.2d at 155.
Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court has suggested
that even when an individual has no subjective expectation of
privacy, an intrusion may nevertheless constitute a search.
"[M]erely because it is generally known that the technology
exists to enable police to view private activities from an otherwise nonintrusive vantage point, it does not follow that these
activities are without protection." Id. (dictum). The focus is on
"those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held,
and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental tres-
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pass absent a warrant." Id. at 511, 688 P.2d at 154. See State v.
Cord, 103 Wash. 2d 361, 365, 693 P.2d 81, 84 (1985); see also
State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 903, 632 P.2d 44, 47 (1981).
Note that in both Cord and Myrick the police used no visual
enhancement devices; in addition, their vantage points for
observing the contraband were lawful. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d at
365, 693 P.2d at 84; Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 514, 688 P.2d at 155.
Cf. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. at 183, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 227,
104 S. Ct. at 1743-44 (police committed common law trespass to
view defendant's property). For citations to aerial surveillance
cases in other jurisdictions, see Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 511,
688 P.2d at 154. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1979); Comment,
Aerial Surveillance: A Plane View of the FourthAmendment,
18 GONZ. L. REV. 307 (1982-83).
Although article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution generally provides greater protection against governmental intrusion than the fourth amendment, it will not
protect against a lawful intrusion into an open field that was
not posted by the owners. State v. Hanson, 42 Wash. App. 755,
714 P.2d 309 (search warrant for marijuana fields obtained by
use of photos and testimony of officer taken from a "plain
view" vantage point), aff'd, 107 Wash. 2d 331, 728 P.2d 593
(1986). Similarly, "storage areas" that are visible to the naked
eye will not be protected by either state or federal provisions
against search and seizure. State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398,
717 P.2d 722 (1986), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 328
(1986); United States v. Pruitt, 464 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972)
(police search of boxes hidden in trees covered with underbrush; defendant could not reasonably expect to keep anybody
who discovered boxes from looking into them).
1.3(d)

Business and Commercial Premises

The fourth amendment privacy protections extend to most
business and commercial premises. Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226, 235, 106 S.Ct.
1819, 1825 (1986); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 305, 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978) (OSHA inspector's entry into
nonpublic working areas of electrical and plumbing business
constitutes search); Mancusi v. DeForte,392 U.S. 364, 367-70, 20
L. Ed. 2d 1154, 1158-60, 88 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (1968) (union official has reasonable expectation of privacy in office, even when
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office shared with other union officials,; we alsf. See t,.City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 54i-346, 18 L. Ez ?d 943. ;,;47-48 "7S. Ct.
1737, 1740-41 (1967) -,sai iy violations;. _;nlike ..rivae homes.
however, the legislature may autnorize ,arranai-.ss cmiinistrative searches of commercial property without violating the
fourth amendment. If the legislative authorizeiton does not
contain rules gove .-rung the procedure the inspectors must follow, however, then generd fourth amendment restrictions will
apply. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99. 69 L. Ed. 2d
262, 268-69, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 2538 (1981). A few businesses, however, such as those dealing with liquor and firearms, historically have been so extensively regulated that there is no need
for a warrant. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 312, 98
S. Ct. at 1821.
The nature of the place as either a personal residence or
business may also affect the determination of whether an area
is curtilage or open field. Dow Chemical Co. V. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 90 L. Ed. 2d 226, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). Those portions of business and commercial premises that are open to the
public for inspection of wares, however, are not as private as
nonpublic premises. "[A]s an ordinary matter law enforcement
officials may accept a general public invitation to enter commercial premises for purposes not related to the trade conducted thereupon ...." United States v. Berrett, 513 F.2d 154,
156 (1st Cir. 1975). Thus, the warrantless entry into the public
lobby of a motel or restaurant for the purpose of serving an
madministrative subpeona is permitted although the "administrative subpeona itself [does] not authorize either entry or
inspection of [the] premises. ." Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc.,
464 U.S. 408, 413, 78 L. Ed. 2d 567, 572, 104 S. Ct. 769, 772-73
(1984) (An employer may not insist upon judicial warrant as
condition precedent to valid administrative subpeona unless
government inspectors seek nonconsensual entry "into area
not open to the public.").
Courts have generally upheld police investigative entries
into bus terminals, pool halls, bars, restaurants, and general
stores such as furniture stores and variety stores. 1 LAFAvE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.4(b), at 430. But "[t]he 'implied invitation for customers to come in,'... extends only to those times
when the premises are in fact 'open to the public'; the mere
fact that certain premises are open to the public at certain
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times does not justify entry by the police on other occasions."
Id.
Although a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in
commercial premises, the warrant requirements for administrative searches of commercial premises may differ from those
for searches in general. See infra § 6.4(b). See also 1 LAFAvE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.4(b), at 431.
1.3(e)

Automobiles and Other Motor Vehicles

Constitutional protections against unreasonable searches
apply to automobiles and other motor vehicles. California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
"[A]utomobiles are 'effects' under the Fourth Amendment, and
searches and seizures of automobiles are therefore subject to
the constitutional standard of reasonableness." United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 548-49, 97 S. Ct.
2476, 2484 (1977).
At the same time, "the configuration, use, and regulation
of automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of
privacy that exists with respect to differently situated property." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235,
243, 99 S' Ct. 2586, 2591 (1979) (citations omitted). Thus, a person does not have as great an expectation of privacy in a vehicle as in a home. Californiav. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 85 L. Ed.
2d 406, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985). Although a citizen's reasonable
expectation of privacy may be less in an automobile than in a
residence, "[a] citizen does not surrender all the protections of
the fourth amendment by entering an automobile." New York
v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 89 L. Ed. 2d 81, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986).
Even when a vehicle is used as a home, however, its owner has
a lesser expectation of privacy in the vehicle if the vehicle is
readily mobile and licensed to operate on public streets. Carney, 471 U.S. at 393, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 413-14, 105 S. Ct. at 2069-70
(mobile home in public lot treated as vehicle).
The lesser expectation of privacy in a vehicle does not
automatically extend to closed containers within the vehicle.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 549, 97 S. Ct. at
2484. On the other hand, when an electronic beeper is placed
within a container and officers use a radio transmitter to monitor the container's movement, no reasonable expectation of
privacy is invaded to the extent that the container is transported in a vehicle on public roads. United States v. Knotts,
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460 U.S. 276, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55, 103 S. Ct. 1081 "1983)..
United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530. 104 S. Ct. 3296
(1984) (monitoring electronic beeper while o!3ect containing
beeper is inside home violates privacy interests in home). See
infra §§ 3.9(c), 5.21-5.23. See also 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 2.5(a)-(d), at 443-58.
1.3(f)

Personal Characteristics

The fourth amendment protects the right of the people to
be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and
seizures. This section examines the question of how that right
protects the search or seizure of personal characteristics, such
as fingerprints and blood samples.
Personal characteristics such as facial features and voice
tone, which are continually exposed to the public, generally
are not protected by the fourth amendment because an individual has no reasonable expectation that these characteristics
will remain private.
In Katz v. United States.... we said that the Fourth

Amendment provides no protection for what "a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office.... ." The physical characteristics of a person's voice,
its tone and manner, as opposed to the content of a specific
conversation, are constantly exposed to the public. Like a
man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is
repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can have
a reasonable expectation that others will not know the
sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect
that his face will be a mystery to the world.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67, 79, 93
S. Ct. 764, 771 (1973) (subpoena of voice exemplars infringes no
fourth amendment interest); People v. Whitaker, 64 N.Y.2d
347, 486 N.Y.S.2d 895, 476 N.E.2d 294 (no expectation of privacy
in facial features, thus no violation when defendant who is
held for another crime is placed in a lineup and identified as
the perpetrator of another crime), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830
(1985).
In contrast to the seizure of voice exemplars and facial
characteristics, the taking of a blood sample is a search within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 16 L. Ed. 2d 980, 918, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834
(1966); State v. Wetherell, 82 Wash. 2d 865, 871, 514 P.2d 1069,
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1073 (1973); State v. Osborne, 18 Wash. App. 318, 321, 569 P.2d
1176, 1180 (1977). The police have probable cause to believe
that a person's blood sample will provide evidence of criminal
activity justifying the seizure if the facts and circumstances
known to the officers warrant their belief that the person is
intoxicated and has committed a crime of which intoxication is
an element. State -,. Komoto, 40 Wash. App. 200, 697 P.2d 1025,
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985). See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 2.6(a), at 459-63. Similarly, constitutional protections apply when officers take scrapings from an individual's
fingernails, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900,
905, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 2003 (1973), or take an individual's fingerprints, Hayes v. Florida,470 U.S. 811, 814, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705, 709,
105 S. Ct. 1643, 1648 (1985). The line drawn between facial
characteristics and voice exemplars, on the one hand, and
blood samples or fingernail scrapings, on the other, may be
explained by the fact that the evidentiary value of the former
is immediately perceivable. 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 2.6(a), at 462. Cf. United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 63 L.
Ed. 2d 141, 100 S. Ct. 874 (1980) (handwriting exemplars not
protected).
It should be noted that although drawing blood constitutes
a seizure, the defendant unknowingly may have consented to
the procedure. For example, a person who drives a motor
vehicle may give implied consent to the administration of
blood tests in certain circumstances. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.20.308 (1987). See State v. Judge, 100 Wash. 2d 706, 710, 675
P.2d 219, 224 (1984) (driver gives implied consent to blood testing when arrested for negligent homicide or when unconscious
while being arrested for driving while intoxicated).
1.3(g)

Personal Effects and Papers

The fourth amendment expressly protects the right of privacy in "papers... and effects.. ."
Although litigation concerning the search, seizure and use of the content of private
papers frequently centers on the fifth amendment bar against
self-incrimination, see, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463, 473, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 638, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2745 (1975);
United States v. Howell, 466 F. Supp. 835, 838 (D. Or. 1979), the
fourth amendment can act as an additional bar because of the
protection accorded "papers" and "effects." LaFave and other
commentators have argued that even when the seizure and use
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of private papers is consistent with the fifth amendment, the
fourth amendment poses an absolute bar against the use of the
highly private content of such papers. 1 LAF.kvE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 2.6(d), at 494-95; Note, Formalism, Legal Realism,
and ConstitutionallyProtected Privacy Under the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 989 (1977); see Couch.
v. United States, a09 U.S. 322, 350, 34 L. Ed. 2d 548, 566, 93 S.
Ct. 611, 626 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Diaries and personal letters that record only their author's personal thoughts
lie at the heart of our sense of privacy."); see also Walter v.
United States, 447 U.S. 649, 65 L. Ed. 2d 410, 100 S. Ct. 2395
(1980).
Papers and effects are protected even when they are not in
the home. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8, 53 L. Ed.
2d 538, 546, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2482 (1977). For example, the contents of a film not released to the public continue to be protected even after the government is in lawful possession of the
film. Walter, 447 U.S. at 654, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 416, 100 S. Ct. at
2400. On the other hand, the legitimate expectation of privacy
disappears when papers and effects are made available to the
public. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370,
377, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1985) ("The officer's action in entering the bookstore and examining the wares that were intentionally exposed to all . . . did not infringe a legitimate
expectation of privacy."). The contents of a film are protected
even when the government is in lawful possession of the film,
but only provided the film has not been made available to the
public. Walter, 447 U.S. at 654, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 416, 100 S. Ct. at
2400.
A reasonable expectation of privacy does not continue in
personal effects if the individual's relinquishment of the effects
occurred under circumstances indicating that the individual
retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in the invaded
place. United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1986)
(defendant's flight from scene of burning automobile, without
any visible effort to retrieve the car or its contents in reasonable time, established that the defendant's expectation of privacy was unreasonable). See also 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 2.6(b), at 466-67. For example, the fourth amendment guarantees do not apply to an object thrown from a moving car, United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976), or to any object left
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behind in a place accessible to the general public, United States
v. Smith, 293 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1972). But the guarantees do
apply when a taxicab passenger drops an object to the floor of
the cab, Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1688, 80
S. Ct. 1431 (1960), or when an individual carries an object covered with a blanket into the hallway of a building and sets the
object down while he makes a telephone call at a phone
located twenty to thirty feet away, United States v. Boswell,
347 A.2d 270 (D.C. App. 1975). For a detailed discussion of the
case law on the expectation of privacy in abandoned personal
effects, see 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.6(b).
The Supreme Court has recently held that the fourth
amendment does not preclude the warrantless search and
seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a
residence. California v. Greenwood, - U.S. -, - L. Ed. 2d -,
108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988). See also 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,

§ 2.6(c). At least one state has held on state constitutional
grounds, however, that police inspection of trash is a search.
State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 662, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276-1277
(1985):
People reasonably believe that police will not indiscriminately rummage through their trash bags to discover their
personal effects. Business records, bills, correspondence,
magazines, tax records, and other telltale refuse can reveal
much about a person's activities, associations and beliefs. If
we were to hold otherwise, police could search everyone's
trash bags and on their property without any reason and
thereby learn of their activities, associations and beliefs.

This issue has not yet been reviewed under the Washington
State Constitution.
A reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the contents
of first-class mail and of sealed packages. United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984);
United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 25 L. Ed. 2d 282,
90 S. Ct. 1029 (1970); State v. Morgan, 32 Wash. App. 764, 650
P.2d 228 (1982), overruled on other grounds, State v. Bishop, 43
Wash. App. 17, 714 P.2d 1199 (1986).
Placing a beeper inside an object does not in and of itself
constitute a search. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 530, 539-40, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3301-02 (1984). Monitoring
the beeper and thereby tracking the object may constitute a
search of the location but not of the object. Id. at 722, 82 L. Ed.
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2d at 549, 104 S. Ct. at 3307 (tracking of ether container into
home infringes privacy interest in home); cf. United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983)
(monitoring beeper in chloroform container invaded no reasonable expectation of privacy because monitoring occurred only
while container was taken from store and transported in automobile on public highways and did not occur when container
was moved into residence).
A person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in items in plain view. Thus, in United States v. Falcon,
766 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985), the court held that it was proper
for the agents to play plaintiff's audio tape that was in plain
view. Although the defendant had marked the tape "confidential, do not play," his expectation that the tape was safe from
(consensual) inspection was unreasonable because the tape was
not locked away, hidden, or sealed. Once the agents were justified in seizing the tape, no additional authority was needed to
play it. Id. at 1476. The Supreme Court, however, has held that
an officer may not take action unrelated to the objectives of an
authorized intrusion to "expose to view concealed portions of
the object." Thus, there is a distinction between "'looking' at a
suspicious object in plain view and 'moving' it even a few
inches." Arizona v. Hicks, - U.S. -, -, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347, 354,
107 S.Ct. 1140, 1152 (1987). The court's ruling in Falcon may be
questionable in light of Hicks.
1.3(h)

Special Environments: Prisons, Schools, Borders, and
Other Public Facilities

The court will use an objective, "reasonable man" standard, rather than a subjective standard, to determine whether
a person's expectation of privacy in special environments is
reasonable and thus protected. State v. Berber, 48 Wash. App.
583, 740 P.2d 863, review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1014 (1987). In
Berber, the Washington Supreme Court applied the federal test
for determining whether a legitimate expectation of privacy is
violated. Id. at 588, 740 P.2d at 867. The federal test is first,
whether there is a subjective expectation of privacy and, second, whether society recognizes the expectation as legitimate.
Under the first prong, the court found that the defendant had
a subjective expectation of privacy in the use of public urinal
facilities. The court found that under the second prong, however, the defendant's expectation of privacy was not one which
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society was prepared to recognize as legitimate. In Berber, the
location of the toilet in a public place, its lack of any real
enclosure, the openness of the view from the general restroom,
and its use for an illegal purpose contributed to a diminished
expectation of privacy. Id. at 591, 740 P.2d at 869. See 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,

§ 2.4(c), at 438-39.

Prisoners are not accorded the same expectations of privacy in their cells and effects as citizens generally enjoy in
their homes and effects. Hudson v. Palmer,468 U.S. 517, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 393, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) (5-4 decision). Students in
public schools and persons at or near borders may also have
reduced expectations of privacy. See generally infra §§ 6.1
(schools), 6.2(a) (prisons), and 6.3 (borders).
1.4 Defining Seizures of the Person
A person may be "seized" for purposes of the fourth
amendment even when he or she is not arrested. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). A
seizure occurs "whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away.. .

."

Id. at 16, 20 L.

Ed. 2d at 903, 88 S. Ct. at 1877; see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47,
50, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 361, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640 (1978).
The test for a seizure is an objective one: a seizure occurs
when law enforcement officers give "a show of official authority such that 'a reasonable person would have believed he was
not free to leave.'" Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 75 L.
Ed. 2d 229, 239, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1983) (plurality opinion)
(citation omitted); see also Michigan v. Chesternut, - U.S. -,
-

L. Ed. 2d -,

108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988) (police did not seize flee-

ing individual by catching up and driving alongside him for
short distance without any show of authority or command to
stop). An officer's request for identification, or other information relating to one's identity, is unlikely to be viewed as an
unlawful seizure unless additional circumstances are present.
See I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 104 S. Ct.
1758 (1984); State v. Belanger, 36 Wash. App. 818, 677 P.2d 781
(1984); State v. Crespo Aranguren, 42 Wash. App. 452, 711 P.2d
1096 (1985) (police acted properly in stopping the defendants to
ask if they had come from the area of reported vandalism, and
used "permissive" language in requesting that they talk with
him). The fact that a person is unconscious, however, does not
mean that he or she is not seized. See Seattle v. Sage, 11 Wash.
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App. 481, 484-85, 523 P.2d 942, 945 (1974). See generally 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.1(a). For a discussion of the
level of proof needed to make seizures of the person, see infra
§§ 2.1 (arrest) and 2.9(b) (Terry stop).
1.4(a)

Consensual Encounters

A consensual encounter with an officer does not trigger
the fourth amendment, even when the individual has been
approached by, and is aware of the officer's identity as, an
officer. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 75 L. Ed. 2d 299,
236, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1982); see State v. Bockman, 37 Wash.
App. 474, 682 P.2d 925 (1984); State v. Belanger, 36 Wash. App.
818, 677 P.2d 781 (1984). Factors reviewed by the court in determining whether the scope of a Terry stop, infra 2.9(b),
has
been exceeded, and whether an arrest has occured, are the
degree to which the physical intrusion restrains the suspect's
liberty, the duration of the detention, and whether the detention was related to the initial stop. State v. Williams, 102
Wash. 2d 733, 740, 689 P.2d 1065, 1069 (1984).
The degree of intrusion must also be appropriate with
regard to the type of crime under investigation, and the probable dangerousness of the suspect. State v. Wheeler, 108 Wash.
2d 230, 235, 737 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1987). In Williams, the court
specifically overruled State v. Byers, 88 Wash. 2d 1, 559 P.2d
1334 (1977), which held that "The amendment is triggered,
however, when an individual is not free to leave an officer's
presence and is aware that his or her liberty is restrained, even
when the officer couches the forcible stop in terms of a
request." Byers, 88 Wash. 2d at 6 n.5, 559 P.2d at 1136. Thus,
the Williams court held that neither the fourth amendment
nor article I, section 7 was implicated by the suspect being
handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. The "free to go" standard has not been abandoned under federal law. Michigan v.
Chestnut, - U.S. -, - L. Ed. 2d -, 108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988). In
LN.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 104 S.Ct. 1758
(1984), the Supreme Court held that questioning by law
enforcement officers remains consensual until a reasonable
person would believe that he or she could not leave the presence of the officers or until he or she refuses to respond to
their inquiries and the police take further action. Id. at 216, 80
L. Ed. 2d at 255, 104 S. Ct. at 1763 (1984) (INS agents moving
systematically through factory inquiring about workers' citi-
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zenship while other INS agents stationed at exits did not constitute seizure either of workforce or of individual workers).
See also Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165, 105
S. Ct. 308 (1984). See generally irkfra § 5.10 (discussing what
constitutes consent).
Police action does not exceed the proper purpose and
scope of a Terry stop (see supra § 1.4, infra § 2.9(b)) when the
purpose of the stop is directly related to detaining and investigating the defendant in connection with a robbery. State v.
Thornton, 41 Wash. App. 506, 705 P.2d 271 (1985), review
denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1022 (1985). While an unfounded hunch is
insufficient to justify a stop, the police may reasonably act on
circumstances that appear incriminating to the officer based on
his past experience. State v. Samsel, 39 Wash. App. 564, 694
P.2d 670 (1985). For post-Terry analysis, see generally 3
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.1(c).
1.4(b)

Seizures in Vehicles

A seizure of a person in an automobile occurs as soon as an
officer in a police car switches on the flashing light. State v.
Owens, 39 Wash. App. 130, 692 P.2d 850 (1984), review denied,
103 Wash. 2d 1020 (1985); State v. Stroud, 30 Wash. App. 392,
394-96, 634 P.2d 316, 318 (1981), review denied, 96 Wash. 2d
1025 (1982); see United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 83 L. Ed.
2d 604, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979). A seizure also occurs
when an officer stops automobiles pursuant to a systematic
"spot check" for drivers' licenses or vehicle registration, State
v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985), or for
"sobriety checks," Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, - P.2d
(1988).
The use of roadblocks to detect crime or apprehend violators may require more evidence that a crime has occurred than
when a particular vehicle is stopped. Conversely, the courts
will generally require less evidence of probable cause to show
that a particular vehicle was properly stopped pursuant to the
roadblock. See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 9.5(c). See
also supra 1.3(e), and infra 5.21.
1.4(c)

Seizures in Homes

The fourth amendment is triggered even though a person
is detained in his or her own home. Michigan v. Summers, 452
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U.S. 692, 696, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 345, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2590-91
(1981); see State v. Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 693 P.2d 89
(1985). See also supra § 1.3(a).
1.4(d)

Civil Offenses

The fourth amendment is triggered by a seizure of the person even though seizure pertains to civil, and not criminal,
offenses. See State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 514-15, 537 P.2d
268, 274 (1975).
1.5 Defining Seizures of Property
The fourth amendment protects a person's possessory
interest in effects as well as his or her privacy interest. See
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 120,
103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 (1983). A seizure of property "occurs
when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in that property." United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 94, 104 S. Ct. 1652,
1656 (1984). Put differently, an object is seized for purposes of
the fourth amendment when government agents exercise
"dominion and control" over the object. Id. at 120, 80 L. Ed. 2d
at 99, 104 S. Ct. at 1660. Impoundment of a room thus constitutes a seizure under the fourth amendment. State v. Ng, 104
Wash. 2d 763, 713 P.2d 63 (1985) (citing Segura v. United States,
468 U.S. 796, 82 L. Ed. 2d 595, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984)).
In some circumstances interference with an individual's
possessory interests may also implicate an individual's liberty
interests. Place, 462 U.S. at 708, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 122, 103 S. Ct.
at 2645 (seizure of luggage at airport "can effectively restrain
the person since he is subjected to the possible disruption of
his travel plans in order to remain with his luggage or to
arrange for its return"); see also 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 9.6, at 61.
1.6 Standing to Raise Search and Seizure Claims
Traditionally, a criminal defendant alleging an infringement of fourth amendment rights first had to show "standing"
to raise the claim. The defendant's burden was to demonstrate
that the interest in the outcome of the controversy stemmed
from a violation of his or her rights rather than from the violation of the rights of some third party. 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 11.3, at 280.
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The Supreme Court created an exception to this rule for a
defendant charged with an offense involving possession of
property as an element when the defendant challenged the
search or seizure of the property. Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725 (1960). The defendant in
such a case has "automatic standing." Id.
In 1978, the Court merged the concept of standing into
fourth amendment privacy analysis. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 138-40, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 397-99, 99 S. Ct. 421, 427-29 (1978).
Under the new analysis, a defendant may challenge a search or
seizure only when he or she possesses a personal privacy interest in the area searched or the property seized. United States
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619, 623-24, 100 S. Ct.
2547, 2549 (1980); see State v. Hayden, 28 Wash. App. 935, 93841, 627 P.2d 973, 975-77 (1981) (search and seizure of stolen
purse upheld after defendant permitted officers to view purse
in glove compartment of automobile because defendant had no
personal privacy interest in stolen purse). For example, when
an individual has no expectation of privacy in "checks and
deposit slips retained by [the] bank," he or she may not object
to their seizure. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732, 65
L. Ed. 2d 468, 474, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2444 (1980). A defendant
may not object to the admission of evidence, as a violation of
the fourth amendment, when the evidence "was seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court." Payner, 447
U.S. at 735, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 476, 100 S. Ct. at 2446.
Although the Rakas concept of "personal" privacy interest
is relatively new, the Court has given some indication of the
situations in which a defendant does or does not have such an
interest. Generally, an individual "who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude."
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 401, 99 S. Ct. at 431;
see also State v. Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d 537, 688 P.2d 859 (1984).
But, although
property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in
determining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights have been violated ....

property rights are neither the

beginning nor the end of [the] inquiry .... [A]n illegal search
only violates the rights of those who have "a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the invaded place."
Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91-92, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 628, 100 S. Ct. at 2553
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(unlawful possession of stolen goods stored in apartment of
another does not confer on thieves a reasonable expectation of
privacy as to interior of apartment). A person who resides in
an apartment with the permission of the lessee and who has a
key to the apartment may assert a privacy interest in the interior of the apartment. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141-42, 58 L. Ed.
2d at 399-400, 99 S. Ct. at 429-30 (citing Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725 (1960)).
A mere passenger in a motor vehicle may not assert a personal privacy interest in the interior of the vehicle, Rakas, 439
U.S. at 148-50, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 404-05, 99 S. Ct. at 433-34,
whereas a person who is driving the vehicle with the owner's
permission may. United States v. Lopez, 474 F. Supp. 943, 946
(D.C. Cal. 1979). See generally Comment, Possession and Presumptions: The Plight of the Passenger Under the Fourth
Amendment, 48 FoRD. L. REV. 1027 (1980). An employee who
maintains a separate office secured by a locked door may assert
a privacy interest in that office. Ortega v. O'Connor, 764 F.2d
703 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct.
1492 (1987). In Ortega, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
relied on the absence of a general inspection policy permitting
access by other employees to the defendant's office to distinguish other decisions in which the court found no expectation
of privacy in the workplace. Ortega, 764 F.2d at 706. On
appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's privacy
analysis, but applied a reasonableness standard, rather than a
probable cause standard for public employees. Ortega, 107 S.
Ct. at 1499.
In merging standing into privacy analysis, the Court abandoned the concept of automatic standing. United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980).
Hence, although the fourth amendment no longer governs
searches of stolen goods, it does apply to searches of legally
possessed items discovered in the search of stolen goods. For
example, there is a protected privacy interest in closed boxes
contained in a stolen car. See People v. Dalton, 24 Cal. 3d 850,
855, 598 P.2d 467, 470, 157 Cal. Rptr. 497, 500 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). Similarly, defendants who claimed
that a stolen footlocker belonged to their brother established a
possessory interest as bailees sufficient to have standing under
Rakas. State v. Grundy, 25 Wash. App. 411, 416, 607 P.2d 1235,
1237 (1980). But a defendant may not claim an expectation of
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privacy in the interior of an acquaintance's purse into which he
has placed his belongings. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
106, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 642, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2562 (1980). For an
examination of the impact Salvucci may have on an accused's
rights, see Note, United States v. Salvucci, The Problematic
Absence of Automatic Standing, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1045
(1981).
Unlike the fourth amendment, article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution invests a defendant with automatic
standing to seek the suppression of contraband when the possession of the contraband is an element of the offense charged.
See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 179, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206
(1980) (four justices upholding the rule on basis of state constitution). See also State v. Belieu, 50 Wash. App. 834, 751 P.2d
321 (1988); State v. Johnson, 38 Wash. App. 793, 690 P.2d 591
(1984). Thus, although "automatic standing" is no longer recognized under the fourth amendment, it has retained its validity under the state constitution. In order to invoke this
exception to the general standing requirements, however, two
requirements must be met. First, possession must be an "essential" element of the offense for which the defendant is
charged, and second, the defendant must be in possession of
the seized property at the time of the contested search. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d at 181, 622 P.2d at 1206-07; Belieu, 50 Wash.
App. at 838, 751 P.2d at 323.
The Washington Supreme Court has gone beyond Rakas
on the basis of state statute. Thus, in State v. Williams, 94
Wash. 2d 531, 544, 617 P.2d 1012, 1020 (1980), a defendant was
accorded standing to challenge the use of a co-defendant's conversation that had been recorded in violation of the Washington Privacy Act. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030 (1987). Cf.
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176,
187-88, 89 S. Ct. 891, 966-68 (1969).
The state may not raise the issue of lack of standing for
the first time on its appeal of a suppression order. State v.
Grundy, 25 Wash. App. at 415, 607 P.2d at 1237 (1980) (distinguishing Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224, 33 L. Ed. 2d 308,
92 S. Ct. 2284 (1972), when standing was raised on appeal by
the government as respondent).
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STANDARDS OF PROOF

2.0 Nature of ProbableCause: Introduction
This chapter examines the concept of probable cause as it
relates to searches and seizures conducted with or without a
warrant. The first part of the chapter discusses the nature of
the standard; subsequent sections discuss specific types of
information considered in determining whether probable cause
has been shown. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
the types of searches and seizures for which probable cause is
not the standard employed.
The fourth amendment provides that "no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The probable cause requirement is a compromise between the
competing interests of enforcing the law and protecting the
individual's right to privacy. Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890-91, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1311 (1949).
Police officers must have probable cause even for searches and
seizures in which no warrant is required. In the case of a valid
warrantless search or seizure, police may make the initial
determination of whether probable cause exists. The grounds
for the search or seizure, however, must be strong enough to
obtain a warrant. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479-81, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 450-51, 83 S. Ct. 407, 413-14 (1963). For a
warrant to be issued, a magistrate must make the probable
cause determination. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.1,
at 542-43.
Both an officer's decision and a magistrate's warrant
authorization are subject to judicial review. In addition, when
a suspect is arrested without a warrant, he or she may not be
detained for an extended period of time without a judicial
determination of probable cause. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 124-25, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 71, 95 S. Ct. 854, 868-69 (1975).

The probable cause requirement may be satisfied even
when police make a reasonable mistake of fact. State v.
Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 908, 632 P.2d 44, 50 (1981) (warrant
valid even though officer misidentified tomato plant as marijuana). But when police make a mistake of law and incorrectly
believe that certain conduct is unlawful, a search or seizure
based upon that belief is invalid. State v. Melrose, 2 Wash.
App. 824, 828, 470 P.2d 552, 555 (1970).
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For an extensive analysis of the nature of probable cause,
see 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, §§ 3.1-3.2.
2.1

ProbableCause Standard: Arrest Versus Search

The probable cause test requires the same amount of evidence for both arrests and searches. Probable cause for a
search, however, does not necessarily justify an arrest; conversely, probable cause for an arrest does not necessarily justify a search. For a search, the officer must have probable
cause to believe that the items sought are connected with criminal activity and will be found in the place to be searched. For
an arrest, the officer must have probable cause to believe that
an offense has been or is being committed and that the person
to be arrested committed the offense. See, e.g., State v. Gluck,
83 Wash. 2d 424, 426-27, 518 P.2d 703, 706 (1974) (police officers'
knowledge that burglary had been committed and that suspect's automobile had been seen leaving scene of burglary sufficient to establish probable cause for arrest).
2.2

Probable Cause Standard: Characteristics
2.2(a)

Objective Test

The probable cause standard is an objective one. Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 147, 85 S. Ct. 223, 228
(1964). An officer's good faith is not enough, and an officer's
belief that probable cause was not present is also not determinative. See State v. Vanzant, 14 Wash. App. 679, 681, 544 P.2d
786, 788 (1975); cf. State v. Cottrell, 86 Wash. 2d 130, 542 P.2d
771 (1975); State v. Todd, 78 Wash. 2d 362, 474 P.2d 542 (1970)
(officer must have real belief).
The probable cause standard is determined with reference
to a reasonable person with the expertise and experience of
the officer in question. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
897-88, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623, 629, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 2589 (1975) (border
patrol officers are entitled to draw inferences in light of their
prior experience with aliens and smugglers). Thus, an officer's
particular expertise is critical. See State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d
329, 352, 610 P.2d 869, 883 (ability to identify marijuana), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980); State v. Compton, 13 Wash. App.
863, 866, 538 P.2d 861, 862 (1975) (ability to smell and recognize
marijuana). The basis of the officer's knowledge and the relevance of the knowledge to the particular case must be articulated so that the magistrate may make an independent
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determination of probable cause. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 3.2(d). See generally infra §§ 2.4, 2.5, and 2.7.
The affidavit establishing probable cause for a search warrant must set forth sufficient facts to lead a reasonable person
to conclude that there is a probability that the defendant is
involved in criminal activity. State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d 361,
365-66, 693 P.2d 81, 85 (1985) (police officer with 13 years substantial drug identification experience). There must, therefore,
be "reasonable grounds for suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a man of ordinary caution to believe evidence of a crime can be found on the
premises to be searched." State v. Hansen, 42 Wash. App. 755,
760, 714 P.2d 309, 313 (probable cause established where affiant
had been a law officer for 27 years, had recently graduated
from the Drug Enforcement Administration's marijuana eradication school, and had arrested people for possession of marijuana while the marijuana was in the plant stage and in dried
or processed seed and stems stage), aff'd, 107 Wash. 2d 331, 728
P.2d 593 (1986). See LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 3.2(b).
2.2(b)

Probability

Probable cause is a quantum of evidence "less than ...
would justify ... conviction," yet "more than bare suspicion."
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 93 L. Ed. 1879,
1890, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-11 (1949). To make an arrest, the
officer need not have facts sufficient to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt but only reasonable grounds for suspicion,
coupled with evidence of circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious and disinterested person in
believing that the suspect is guilty. State v. Scott, 93 Wash. 2d
7, 11-12, 604 P.2d 943, 944 (officers possessing description of car
used in robbery, and license number of similar car used in robbery involving similar modus operandi, had probable cause to
arrest persons at address where car parked), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 920 (1980); see State v. Baxter, 68 Wash. 2d 416, 420-21, 413
P.2d 638, 641 (1966) (officers who observed appellant at 4:00
a.m. walking near store had probable cause to arrest when
they observed him notice the officers, drop things he was carrying, and quickly run away).
One commentator has suggested that a "more probable
than not" standard is unnecessary when the police know that a
crime has been committed but have more than one suspect, yet
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necessary when the police have a suspect but are unsure
whether a crime has been committed. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 3.2(e), at 590-92; see State v. Hammond, 24 Wash.
App. 596, 600, 603 P.2d 377, 379 (1979) (officer smelling marijuana on bus containing more than one person does not have
probable cause to arrest any individual). For a suggestion of
when less than 50 percent probability should suffice to justify
the search of a particular place or the seizure of a particular
object, see 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.2(e).
2.2(c)

Individualized Suspicion

Police have probable cause to arrest an individual only if
they possess reasonable grounds to believe that particular individual has committed the crime. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,
62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979); State v. Smith, 102 Wash.
2d 449, 454, 688 P.2d 146, 149 (1984) ("The mere fact that petitioner fit the description of a brown-haired, white male, 5 feet
10 inches tall, weighing 145 pounds, is insufficient to meet the
Sanders test of reasonable, articulable grounds to believe that
the suspect is the intended arrestee." (citing Sanders v. United
States, 339 A.2d 373, 379 (D.C. App. 1975)); State v. Broadnax,
98 Wash. 2d 289, 293-94, 654 P.2d 96, 100-01 (1982); see State v.
Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 645, 611 P.2d 771, 774 (1980). See also
State v. Ranglitsch, 40 Wash. App. 771, 780, 700 P.2d 382, 388
(1985) (police officer's personal belief that habitual drug users
keep drugs and paraphernalia in their residence insufficient to
establish probable cause to search known user's residence). If
the police are unable to single out the suspect, probable cause
may not be present. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 480, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 451, 83 S. Ct. 407, 414 (1963).
Several exceptions, however, exist. Individualized suspicion is not a prerequisite to a constitutional seizure if the
seizure is carried out pursuant to a plan embodying neutral criteria that circumscribes the conduct of individual police
officers. State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225
(1985); Seattle v. Messiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 458-59, - P.2d -,
(1988). A warrantless search without individualized suspicion may also be upheld if the officers reasonably believe a felony has recently been committed. State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash.
App. 185, 190-91, 605 P.2d 1279, 1283 (roadblock in which police
stopped all cars exiting a ferry was upheld when the police had
probable cause to believe that persons suspected of committing
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a violent felony were on board), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843
(1980). Individualized suspicion is not required for some
administrative searches as well. See generally infra § 6.4(b),

(c).
2.3 Information Considered" In General
A court reviewing a probable cause determination considers only the information that was available to the magistrate at
the time that the warrant was issued or to the officer at the
time of the arrest or search. See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 481-82, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 451, 83 S. Ct. 407, 414
(1963). Probable cause must be based on facts and not on mere
conclusions. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-13, 12 L. Ed. 2d
723, 727, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1512-13 (1964). In addition, probable
cause must exist at the actual time of arrest or search; it may
not be stale. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 904, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 677, 686, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3410-11 (1984); State v. Higby,
26 Wash. App. 457, 461, 613 P.2d 1192, 1205 (1980) (information
about sale of marijuana occurring two weeks earlier could not
support present search); cf. State v. Smith, 39 Wash. App. 642,
651,- 694 P.2d 660, 665-66 (1984) (evidence of 100-150 three- to
four-foot marijuana plants and extensive marijuana-growth
operation on defendant's property not stale after one month),
review denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1034 (1985).
Affidavits for search warrants must be tested in a common
sense, rather than a hypertechnical manner, as Iong as the
basic Aguilar/Spinelli requirements are met. See infra § 2.5;
State v. Chasengnou, 43 Wash. App. 379, 385, 717 P.2d 288, 292
(1986) (presence of opium in a private residence raises a legitimate inference that opium may be present throughout the
premises; that persons probably use opium on the premises;
that paraphernalia for use might be present on the premises;
and that packaging materials might be found on the premises
that would indicate opium receipt methods). "The support for
issuance of a search warrant is thus sufficient if, on reading the
affidavits, an ordinary person would understand that a violation existed and was continuing at the time of the application."
State v. Fisher,96 Wash. 2d 962, 965, 639 P.2d 743, 745 (quoting
State v. Cay, 7 Wash. App. 631, 637, 501 P.2d 603, 607 (1972)),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982). See also State v. Freeman, 47
Wash. App. 870, 873, 737 P.2d 704, 707 (discussing standard of
review), review denied, 108 Wash. 2d 1032 (1987).
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The state has the burden of establishing the factual basis
for the search or arrest and must present sufficient facts to
enable the court to make an independent determination of
probable cause. State v. McCord, 19 Wash. App. 250, 254-55, 576
P.2d 892, 895 (1978) (no probable cause when officers stopped
vehicle without factual basis, even though officers found illegally transported cedar wood in back of truck when driver consented to search); see also State v. Patterson, 83 Wash. 2d 49,
69, 515 P.2d 496, 508 (1973) (Utter, J., dissenting) (affidavit supporting the search warrant was based entirely on reports of
unidentified informants and hearsay, and therefore the magistrate issuing the warrant had no basis on which to independently determine probable cause).
Information need not be admissible at trial in order to support probable cause. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
173, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1889, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1309 (1949) (evidence
rules often based on danger of misuse by jury rather than on
lack of probative value of information). See State v. Osborne,
18 Wash. App. 318, 322, 569 P.2d 1176, 1180 (1977) (marital privilege does not apply to information supporting issuance of
search warrant). See generally infra § 7.3.
"[A] search warrant [will] not [be] rendered totally invalid
if the affidavit contains sufficient facts to establish probable
cause independent of the illegally obtained information." State
v. Coates, 107 Wash. 2d 882, 887, 735 P.2d 64, 67 (1987).
2.3(a)

Hearsay

Hearsay may be considered if there is a substantial basis
for crediting it. State v. Luellen, 17 Wash. App. 91, 562 P.2d 253
(1977); see generally infra § 2.5. Thus, in making a probable
cause determination for issuance of a search warrant, a magistrate may rely upon a police officer's affidavit or other testimony that relays hearsay information based on a fellow
officer's personal knowledge. State v. Lodge, 42 Wash. App.
380, 386, 711 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1985), review denied, 105 Wash. 2d
1021 (1986).
Although the Washington Supreme Court has not
addressed the question of multiple hearsay, a court of appeals
decision indicates that multiple hearsay may be considered if
the requirements are met for each person in the chain of information. State v. Laursen, 14 Wash. App. 692, 695, 544 P.2d 127,
129 (1975); see State v. Vanzant, 14 Wash. App. 679, 683, 544
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P.2d 786, 789 (1975) (information passed to second detective by
detective with personal knowledge of informant's reliability
sufficient to establish probable cause for arrest); see generally 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.2(d), at 580 n.100.
2.3(b)

Prior Arrests, Prior Convictions, and Reputation

A magistrate or police officer making a probable cause
determination may consider prior arrests and convictions that
have probative value to the specific probable cause inquiry.
Brinegar,338 U.S. at 172, 93 L. Ed. at 1888-89, 69 S. Ct. at 1309;
Little v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2d 353, 357, 413 P.2d 15, 18 (1960)
(probable cause for narcotics arrest found on basis of cumulative facts, including defendant's previous four- to five-year narcotics use), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 96 (1966); State v. Sterling, 43
Wash. App. 846, 851, 719 P.2d 1357, 1359 (occupant's prior conviction for narcotics violations on two separate occasions can be
factor in determining probable cause for a search warrant),
review denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1017 (1986). Without additional
evidence, a prior record of the same type of criminal conduct is
insufficient to establish probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 97, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 147, 85 S. Ct. 223, 228 (1964); State v.
Hobart, 94 Wash. 2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429, 434 (1980) (prior
arrest for narcotics possession not a sufficient basis for probable cause to search without warrant). But prior acts may
establish probable cause when the modus operandi is similar
and distinctive. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.2(d), at
581.
A general assertion of criminal reputation has been considered insufficient to establish probable cause. Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 644, 89 S. Ct. 584, 589
(1969); but see United States v. Harris,403 U.S. 573, 583, 29 L.
Ed. 2d 723, 733, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2081-82 (1971) (plurality opinion). Specific facts leading to a conclusion that a suspect has a
bad reputation may be considered. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE,

§ 3.2(d).
2.3(c)

Increased Power Consumption

Standing alone, an increase in power use does not constitute sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant. State
v. McPherson, 40 Wash. App. 298, 301, 698 P.2d 563, 564 (1985)
(200 to 300 percent increase in power consumption not sufficient to establish probable cause). When the increase in power
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consumption is combined with other factors, however, the
increase may be considered in determining whether probable
cause exists. State v. Sterling, 43 Wash. App. 846, 851-52, 719
P.2d 1357, 1360 (400 to 500 percent increase in power usage
combined with other suspicious facts that gave credence to an
anonymous tip sufficient to determine that probable cause
existed for search warrant), review denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1017
(1986). See also State v. Huft, 106 Wash. 2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d
838, 840 (1986) ("[T]here are too many possible reasons for
increased electrical use to allow a search warrant to be issued
based on increased consumption,").
2.4 First-handObservation
Because the existence of probable cause depends on particular facts, it is impossible to broadly define when an officer's
observations amount to probable cause. Nevertheless, several
common fact patterns permit some generalization.
2.4(a)

Particular Crimes: Stolen Property

Suspicious conduct suggesting that property is stolen does
not always establish probable cause. For example, when
officers saw two men park a car in an alley, load it with cartons, drive away, and later return and repeat their conduct, the
officers did not have probable cause to believe that the cartons
contained stolen property. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
103, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 139, 80 S.Ct. 168, 171-72 (1959).
In a Washington case, officers stopped a vehicle after
learning that its owner had an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. The police then saw an unpadded, unsecured television in the open trunk. A passenger in the car claimed
ownership of the set, but was unable to identify the brand.
The court held that the police had reasonable cause to believe
the television was stolen. State v. Glasper, 84 Wash. 2d 17, 21,
523 P.2d 937, 940 (1974); see also State v. Sinclair, 11 Wash.
App. 523, 532, 523 P.2d 1209, 1215 (1974). See generally 2
LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.6(a).
2.4(b)

Particular Crimes: Illegal Substances

Odor may establish probable cause. E.g., United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 104 S.Ct. 3296 (1984); State
v. Huckaby, 15 Wash. App. 280, 549 P.2d 35 (1976); State v.
Compton, 13 Wash. App. 863, 864-65, 538 P.2d 861, 861-62 (1975)
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(officer who recognized smell of marijuana emanating from
properly stopped car had probable cause to search suspect for
controlled substances). A view of what is suspected to be contraband but may also be an innocent substance will not amount
to probable cause absent additional suspicious circumstances.
See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 15 Or. App. 76, 79, 514 P.2d 1363, 1365
(1973).
An officer who relies on sight or odor must have a sufficient basis, grounded in expertise and experience, for believing
that the substance is contraband. See State v. Cord, 103 Wash.
2d 361, 692 P.2d 81 (1985); State v. Pristell, 3 Wash. App. 962,
965, 478 P.2d 743, 745 (1970) (narcotics officer observing vial
containing beige-white powder had probable cause to arrest
suspect for possession of heroin). The officer's expertise and
experience must appear in the record. State v. Matlock, 27
Wash. App. 152, 156, 616 P.2d 684, 687 (1980) (affidavit that
stated marijuana plants were observed will establish probable
cause if affidavit also avers that affiant had skill to identify
such plants on sight).
Police may also use specially trained narcotics dogs to
establish probable cause. See, e.g., State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash.
App. 813, 598 P.2d 421 (1979), review denied, 93 Wash. 2d 1008
(1980).
A search violative of article I, section 7 or the fourth
amendment does not occur when a canine sniffs an object from
an area in which the defendant does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The canine sniff must be minimally
intrusive. State v. Boyce, 44 Wash. App. 724, 730, 723 P.2d 28,
31 (1986) (a canine sniff of the air outside a safety deposit box
was not a search when the officers had permission to be in the
vault area and the sniff was minimally intrusive).
If article I, section 7 or the fourth amendment is implicated, however, odor may establish probable cause justifying a
search. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 551 (10th
Cir. 1985) (officer's identification of an ether-like odor, which
officer associated with the transport of bulk cocaine, was sufficient to cause a prudent and trained officer to reasonably
believe that a crime was being committed). See 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.6(b).
2.4(c)

Association: Persons and Places

Mere association with a person whom the police have
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grounds to arrest does not constitute probable cause for arrest
of the companion. United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 587, 92
L. Ed. 210, 216, 68 S. Ct. 222, 225 (1948) (search of car passenger
unjustified when driver arrested for possession of counterfeit
gasoline ration coupons). Similarly, companionship with an
offender at the time of the latter's criminal conduct does not
establish probable cause for arrest of the companion when
facts do not suggest that the companion participated in the
conduct. See State v. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838, 841, 613 P.2d
525, 527 (1980). Thus, mere proximity to others suspected of
criminal activity does not in itself establish probable cause to
search the associate. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 62 L.
Ed. 2d 238, 245, 100 S. Ct. 338, 342 (1979).
However, when a person is continually present at a place
where criminal activity is openly and repeatedly conducted
there may be probable cause to arrest. Ker v. California,374
U.S. 23, 37, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 740, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1631-32 (1963)
(probable cause existed to arrest wife of narcotics dealer when
couple's apartment had been used as base for drug operations);
cf State v. Cabigas, 3 Wash. App. 740, 744, 477 P.2d 648, 649
(1970) (affidavit failed to establish connection between defendant and drugs). Various hypothetical situations are presented
in 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.6(c).
A high crime rate in a particular area may be considered
in determining the existence of probable cause. See Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1891, 69 S. Ct.
1302, 1311 (1949) (probable cause exists to stop known bootlegger in area of his usual operations). But an individual's presence in a high crime area is not sufficient by itself. See Brown
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979);
State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 642, 611 P.2d 771, 774 (1980)
(police must have independent cause to question passengers of
a car stopped for a traffic violation in a high crime area). See
generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.6(g).
2.4(d)

Furtive Gestures and Flight

A suspect's furtive gestures or flight, taken alone, cannot
establish probable cause; they may, however, be a factor in
determining whether probable cause exists. See Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 41, 66, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 937, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1904
(1968) (probable cause existed when strangers tiptoed from
apartment and fled from police officer); State v. Baxter, 68
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Wash. 2d 416, 421, 413 P.2d 638, 642 (1966) (probable cause
existed when defendant dropped his possessions and ran from
police after emerging from a business at 4:00 a.m.); State v.
Lampman, 45 Wash. App. 228, 235, 724 P.2d 1092, 1096 (1986)
(probable cause existed when probationer fled from probation
officer, and probation officer knew of probationer's drug problem, and prohibition against possession or use of drugs was a
condition of probation); cf. State v. Bockman, 37 Wash. App.
474, 682 P.2d 925 (1984) (suspect's subsequent retreat did not
defeat proper arrest begun in public place). The action must
be reasonably interpreted as either furtive or flight. See People
v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1970). For an extensive analysis of furtive gestures by occupants of stopped vehicles, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 3.6(d) and (e).
2.4(e)

Response to Questioning

When combined with other circumstances, a suspect's
response to police questioning can give rise to probable cause.
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623, 629,
95 S. Ct. 2585, 2589 (1975) (dicta) (border patrol may consider
defendant's responses to questioning as part of facts and circumstances in their determination of probable cause); State v.
Fricks, 91 Wash. 2d 391, 399, 588 P.2d 1328, 1333 (1979) (defendant co-conspirators' dubious alibis properly considered when
officer had independent cause to suspect co-conspirators); State
v. Byrd, 25 Wash. App. 282, 286, 607 P.2d 321, 324 (1980) (in
establishing probable cause for arrest, officer entitled to consider defendant's nervous admissions, and defendant's close
proximity in time and place to crime).
A suspect's failure or refusal to answer an officer's questions, however, may not be taken into account. State v. White,
97 Wash. 2d 92, 106, 640 P.2d 1061, 1069 (1982). Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 53 n.3, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 363, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641
(1979); see generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.6(f).

Similarly, a suspect's silence after Miranda warnings have
been given may not be considered in determining probable
cause, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 98, 96 S.
Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976), nor may the suspect's failure to challenge
the officer's actions be considered, United States v. DiRe, 332
U.S. 581, 594, 92 L. Ed. 210, 219, 68 S. Ct. 222, 228 (1948)
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(officers could not infer probable cause from suspect's failure
to protest arrest or to proclaim innocence).
2.5

Informationfrom an Informant: In General

An enormous quantity of case law exists on the question of
when information from a police informant--often a criminalmay be used as a basis for probable cause. In the past, information from an informant could establish probable cause only
when the facts available to the police satisfied the two-prong
Aguilar-Spinelli test. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
415-16, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 643, 89 S. Ct. 584, 589 (1969); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 729, 84 S. Ct. 1509,
1514 (1964). See LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 3.3.
Under the "basis of knowledge" prong of the test, facts
must be revealed that enable the person making the probable
cause determination to decide whether the informant had a
basis for the allegation of criminal conduct. Under the "veracity" prong, facts must be presented so that the magistrate can
determine either the inherent credibility of the informant or
the reliability of the informant on the particular occasion.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-16, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637,
643, 89 S. Ct. 584, 589 (1969); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432,
435, 688 P.2d 136, 138-39 (1984). So long as each link in the
chain of information satisfies the two-prong test, multiple
hearsay may be considered. United States v. Carmichael, 489
F.2d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 1973) State v. Morehouse, 41 Wash. App.
334, 336, 704 P.2d 168, 169, review denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1020
(1985); cf. State v. Luellen, 17 Wash. App. 91, 92, 562 P.2d 253,
256 (1977).
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court replaced the
Aguilar-Spinelli test with a totality of the circumstances
approach for determining when an informant's tip may establish probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 527, 543, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328 (1983); see Massachusetts v.
Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732, 80 L. Ed. 2d 721, 727, 104 S. Ct. 2085,
2087 (1984). The Washington Supreme Court, however, has
held that article I, section 7 of the state constitution requires
adherence to the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test. The trial
court may not use the "totality of the circumstances" test of
Gates. State v. Huft, 106 Wash. 2d 206, 209-210, 720 P.2d 838,
840 (1986); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 443, 688 P.2d 136,
143 (1984); State v. Adame, 39 Wash. App. 574, 576, 694 P.2d
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676, 678 (1985). For a discussion of Gates and its impact on
search and seizure law, see 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 3.3(a), at 618-27; Moylan, Illinois v. Gates: What It Did and
Did Not Do, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 93 (Mar./Apr. 1984).
2.5(a)

Satisfying the "Basis of Knowledge" Prong by
Personal Knowledge

The best way to satisfy the "basis of knowledge" prong is
to show that the informant based his or her information on
personal knowledge. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 12 L.
Ed. 2d 723, 729, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1514 (1964); State v. Wolken, 103
Wash. 2d 823, 827, 700 P.2d 319, 321 (1985); State v. Jackson, 102
Wash. 2d 432, 437, 688 P.2d 136, 140 (1984). For example, an
informant's statement that he had observed the defendant selling narcotics will satisfy the basis of knowledge prong. McCray
v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62, 66, 87 S. Ct. 1056,
1059 (1967). But see 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.3(a), at
613-15 (criticizing McCray for failing to require a showing that
the informant knew the substance was a narcotic). The basis
of an informant's knowledge may also be established by hearsay. See Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d at 437, 688 P.2d at 140 (dictum).
Similarly, an informant's statement from which the court may
infer the informant's first-hand knowledge of criminal activity
will satisfy this prong. State v. Anderson, 41 Wash. App. 85, 95,
702 P.2d 481, 489 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d
745, 733 P.2d 517 (1987). Innocuous facts indicating that the
informant has personal knowledge of the defendant, however,
are insufficient to satisfy this prong, without allegations establishing the informant's personal knowledge of the criminal act.
State v. Huft, 106 Wash. 2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 838, 840 (1986).
Under article I, section 7, a deficiency in the basis of
knowledge prong may be remedied by "independent police
investigatory work that corroborates the tip to such an extent
that it supports the missing [element] .... ." Id. at 438, 688 P.2d
at 140; see also State v. Adame, 39 Wash. App. 574, 577, 694 P.2d
676, 678 (1985). Thus, the credibility of an informant may be
established by police verification of the informant's statement
of detailed criminal activity not generally known or readily
available to the casual inquirer. State v. Anderson, 41 Wash.
App. 85, 94-95, 702 P.2d 481, 489 (1985), rev'd on other grounds,
107 Wash. 2d 745, 733 P.2d 517 (1987). The corroborated information must itself suggest criminal activity. "Merely verifying
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'innocuous details', commonly known facts or easily predictable events should not suffice to remedy [the] deficiency ....
State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 438, 688 P.2d 136, 140 (1984)
(citations omitted). See also State v. Catmon, 9 Wash. App.
741, 745-46, 515 P.2d 530, 534 (1973) (dicta). See generally 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.3(f), at 564. See also 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, §§ 3.3(d), (e), (f) at 659-697.
2.5(b)

Satisfying "Veracity" Prong by Past Performance

The veracity prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test may be
met if the affidavit supporting the search warrant contains sufficient facts from which a magistrate can independently determine the veracity of the informant. State v. Paradiso,43 Wash.
App. 1, 6, 714 P.2d 1193, 1196, review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1023
(1986); State v. Anderson, 41 Wash. App. 85, 95, 702 P.2d 481,
489 (1985) (in determining the credibility of an informant for
purposes of securing a search warrant, the recitation that the
informant passed a polygraph test does not presumptively validate the search warrant), rev'd on other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d
745, 733 P.2d 517 (1987). A mere conclusion that the informant
is a "credible person" is insufficient; reasons for believing the
informant to be credible must be presented. Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. at 112, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 727, 84 S. Ct. at 1512; State v.
Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984).
The fact that an informant's past information has led to
convictions is a sufficient showing of reliability. E.g., United
States ex rel. Hurley v. Delaware,365 F. Supp. 282, 286 (D. Del.
1973); State v. Freeman, 47 Wash. App. 870, 873, 737 P.2d 704,
707 (affidavit alleged that informant had previously provided
information which led to subsequent arrest), review denied,
108 Wash. 2d 1032 (1987); State v. Adame, 37 Wash. App. 94, 678
P.2d 1299 (1984). An informant's reliability may also be established if the informant has previously provided information
that while not resulting in a conviction, was proven to be reliable. State v. Wolken, 103 Wash. 2d 823, 827, 700 P.2d 319, 321
(1985) (affidavit alleged that informant provided reliable information in another jurisdiction); State v. Fisher, 96 Wash. 2d
962, 965, 639 P.2d 743, 746 (informant used successfully on prior
occasion to make a controlled purchase of narcotics), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982); State v. Harris,44 Wash. App. 401,
406, 722 P.2d 867, 870 (1986); State v. Frye, 26 Wash. App. 276,
279, 613 P.2d 152, 155 (1980) (court upheld a warrant based on
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an affidavit that merely stated that the informants had previously supplied information leading to arrests and recovery of
contraband). But see Fisher,96 Wash. 2d at 968, 639 P.2d at 747
(Utter, J., dissenting). See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 3.3(b).
Courts have held that an informant who assists in an
arrest is credible. The arrest does not need to be lawful, and
the facts learned following the arrest do not have to verify the
informant's tip. Some courts have read Aguilar to hold that
general statements alleging past reliability of the defendant
are sufficient. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.3(b), at
628-29 (criticizing such decisions for relying on allegations too
general to show credibility).
In the absence of circumstances showing unreliability, an
officer need not have personal knowledge of the informant's
track record but may rely on information from fellow officers.
State v. Vanzant, 14 Wash. App. 679, 681-82, 544 P.2d 786, 788
(1975). See infra § 2.7(b).
2.5(c)

Satisfying the "Veracity" Prong by Admissions Against
Interest and by Motive

When an informant cannot be shown to be generally credible, police may establish the informant's reliability on the particular occasion. For example, an admission against penal
interest may indicate truthfulness. United States v. Harris,403
U.S. 573, 583-84, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723, 733-34, 91 S. Ct. 2975, 2081-82
(1971); State v. Lair, 95 Wash. 2d 706, 711, 630 P.2d 427, 430-31
(1981). See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.3(c), at 644
n.140. The declaration must be made without knowledge that
the information is being conveyed to a police officer; under
such circumstances there is no motive to lie. State v. Gunwall,
106 Wash. 2d 54, 72, 720 P.2d 808, 818 (1986) (informant sold
cocaine to undercover police officer and disclosed source). A
statement against penal interest made to a citizen is considered
just as reliable, if not more so, than one made to the police.
Lair, 95 Wash. 2d at 711, 630 P.2d at 430.
Reliability may also be established by showing that the
informant had a strong motive to assist the police. See State v.
Bean, 89 Wash. 2d 467, 572 P.2d 1102 (1978). In Bean, the
informant had been arrested on a drug offense and cooperated
with police in return for a favorable recommendation at sentencing. The informant set up an illegal drug purchase; the
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police accompanied the informant to the arranged purchase,
but arrested the defendant before the purchase occurred. The
informant's tip was held to be reliable partly because of his
strong motive to help the police. Id. at 471, 572 P.2d at 1104; see
State v. Smith, 39 Wash. App. 642, 647-48, 694 P.2d 660, 663
(1984) (veracity prong satisfied by informant's strong motive to
provide accurate information; officials offered informant
reduction in charge from felony to misdemeanor in unrelated
matter), review denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1034 (1985); see also
United States v. Harris,403 U.S. 573, 600, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723, 743,
91 S. Ct. 2075, 2090 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 1 LAFAvE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.3(c).
2.6

Citizen Informants-Victim/Witness Informants:
In General
The Aguilar-Spinelli test also applies to the use of information from a citizen informant, such as a victim or witness.
Again, multiple hearsay is acceptable, so long as each instance
meets the two-prong test. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson,
479 F.2d 936, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1973) (A service station employee
notified police after learning through telephone call to American Express office that defendant was attempting to use a stolen credit card. The hearsay report from the citizen-informant
was considered reliable because it was not likely to be colored
by self-interest and was volunteered by an identified party; the
American Express report was considered reliable for reasons
analogous to the business records exception to the hearsay
rule.). See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.4.
2.6(a)

Satisfying the "Basis of Knowledge" Prong
The basis of the citizen-informant's knowledge must be
established. See State v. Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d 43, 47-48, 621 P.2d
1272, 1275 (1980). In most cases, no issue is presented because
the citizen is an eyewitness. However, when the facts have
come from someone who is not an eyewitness, or when the
information given required some expertise, such as the ability
to identify the odor of marijuana, the basis of the informant's

knowledge must be demonstrated. See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 3.4(b), at 730-31.
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2.6(b) Satisfying the "Veracity" Prong by Partial
Corroboration of Informant's Tip and by SelfVerifying Detail

In other jurisdictions, the veracity of a citizen informant is
presumed, and corroboration of the information held unnecessary. See, e.g., Allison v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 14, 21, 214 N.W.2d 437,
441-42, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1071 (1974). Commentators favor
this view if the witnesses had no motive to falsify. See 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.4(a), at 721.
The presumption of reliability attaches only to the citizeninformant, and some courts have indicated that the state has
the burden of showing that an informant deserves citizen status. See, e.g., People v. Herdan, 42 Cal. App. 3d 300, 305-06, 116
Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1978) (Informant provided police officers
with prearranged signal that narcotics were present within the
defendant's vehicle, but because the state failed to distinguish
the informant as a citizen-informant, rather then as paid
informant, reliability could not be inferred, and information
given to police officers did not constitute probable cause.)
(questioned, People v. Lopez, 163 Cal. App. 3d 602, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1985)). If the burden is not met, the requirements
for criminal informants must be shown. See generally 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.4(a).
Washington courts, however, require a showing of reliability for citizen-informants. See State v. Woodall, 100 Wash. 2d
74, 77, 666 P.2d 364, 366 (1983); State v. Fisher,96 Wash. 2d 962,
965, 639 P.2d 743, 745, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1137 (1982). The
requisite showing of reliability is relaxed, however. State v.
Huft, 106 Wash. 2d 206, 211, 720 P.2d 838, 841 (1986).
Although details provided by an informant may establish
the requisite basis of the informant's knowledge, Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 89 S. Ct. 584
(1969), they will not establish the informant's veracity when
the details are consistent with innocent or lawful behavior.
State v. Chatmon, 9 Wash. App. 741, 746-47, 515 P.2d 530, 535
(1973). Thus, when an anonymous informant told police that a
person of the defendant's description riding in a car of a particular description and license number was carrying marijuana,
police corroboration that such a person was in such a car did
not establish the informant's reliability. Id. at 746-47, 515 P.2d
at 535. The corroborated details must themselves create a rea-
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sonable inference that the law is being violated. Id. Cf. State
v. Leullen, 17 Wash. App. 91, 562 P.2d 253 (1977).
When a citizen-informant is fully identified to the magistrate, however, "intrinsic indicia of the informant's reliability
may be found in his detailed description of the underlying circumstances of the crime observed or about which he had
knowledge." State v. Northness, 20 Wash. App. 551, 557, 582
P.2d 546, 549 (1978) (informant gave details of location of marijuana in her own apartment but belonging to a roommate;
details sufficient to establish reliability). See also State v.
Stock, 44 Wash. App. 467, 470, 722 P.2d 1330, 1332 (1986). Consequently, when an affidavit that contains the name and
address of a citizen-informant states that the informant had
personally witnessed a crime, and describes the underlying circumstances with specificity, "no independent corroboration is
required." Northness, 20 Wash. App. at 557-58, 582 P.2d at 550
(citations omitted).
Finally, the veracity prong may require a lesser showing in
exigent situations. "Where eyewitnesses to crime summon the
police, and the exigencies are such (as in the case of violent
crime and the imminent possibility of escape) that ascertainment of the identity and background of the informants would
be unreasonable, the 'reliability' requirement might be further
relaxed." Northness, 20 Wash. App. at 555, 582 P.2d at 548
(citations omitted). See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.3(e),
at 674-75.
2.6(c)

Sufficiency of Information Supplied

Factors that have been considered in determining whether
sufficient information has been provided include: (1) the particularity of the description of the offender or the vehicle;
(2) the size of the area in which the perpetrator might be
found; (3) the number of persons in the area; (4) the direction
of flight; (5) the activity or condition of the person arrested;
and (6) the knowledge that the person or his vehicle has been
involved in other similar criminal activity. See 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.4(c), at 739-40.
When a citizen can identify a suspect by name or by photograph, the information is sufficient to establish probable cause.
The use of photo identification, however, is subject to challenge on certain deficiencies. Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 384-86, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247, 1253-54, 88 S. Ct. 967, 971-72
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(1968) (initial misidentification of suspect could be retained in
witness' memory).
Washington cases discussing particular fact patterns
include: State v. Palmer,73 Wash. 2d 462, 464, 438 P.2d 876, 878
(finding probable cause for arrest 45 minutes after robbery victim identified automobile by make, year, color, dirty white top,
and clothes hanging in rear, and described suspect by hair
color and attire), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968); State v.
Kohler, 70 Wash. 2d 599, 605, 424 P.2d 656, 660 (1967) (finding
probable cause when two witnesses provided police with
descriptions of vehicle, clothing, and build of suspects, and
when probability of two similar cars traveling within limited
area of Seattle at 12:30 a.m. was slight), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1038 (1968); State v. Baker, 68 Wash. 2d 517, 520, 413 P.2d 965,
967-68 (1966) (finding probable cause when robbery victims
identified make, color, and license number of suspect vehicle);
State v. McClung, 66 Wash. 2d 654, 656-57, 660, 404 P.2d 460,
461-62 (1965) (finding probable cause when robbery victims
described suspects, patterns of two crimes similar, and anonymous caller identified vehicle used in narcotic sales by year,
color, make, and license number and gave description of suspects), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966); State v. Johnson, 64
Wash. 2d 613, 615, 393 P.2d 284, 285-86 (1964) (finding probable
cause when citizen gave detailed description of defendants and
direction of flight); State v. Thompson, 58 Wash. 2d 598, 601-03,
364 P.2d 527, 528-30 (1961) (finding probable cause when citizen
gave description of defendant's appearance and physical condition and when defendant was found in close proximity to sites
of crime), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 945 (1962); State v. Hutton, 7
Wash. App. 726, 734-35, 502 P.2d 1037, 1042-43 (1972) (officer's
mere knowledge of defendant's prior charge for possession of
marijuana insufficient to establish probable cause).
2.7 Police as Informants
2.7(a)

Satisfying the "Veracity" and "Basis
of Knowledge" Prongs

As with citizen-informants under federal law, the veracity
of police informants may be presumed. See United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 110, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 691, 85 S. Ct. 741,
747 (1965); see also United States v. Various Gambling Devices,
478 F.2d 1194, 1200 (5th Cir. 1973) (FBI agent's personal observations assumed to be reliable). But see State v. Vanzant, 14
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Wash. App. 679, 681, 544 P.2d 786, 788 (1975) ("[P]robable cause
may rest upon hearsay received from an informant if a reasonable person could conclude that, first, the present information
is reliable; and second, the informant himself is reliable.").
Generally, there must be a showing that the officer had a
basis for his or her knowledge. In limited, complex situations,
however, when setting forth the grounds for belief would be
difficult, conclusory allegations will suffice. Jaben v. United
States, 381 U.S. 214, 224-25, 14 L. Ed. 2d 345, 353, 85 S. Ct. 1365,
1371 (1965) (in tax evasion case, affidavit need not independently document or spell out every factual allegation because
reconstruction of taxpayer's income from various sources could
not be alleged concisely in complaint).
2.7(b)

Multiple Hearsay

An arresting officer need not have personal knowledge of
the facts establishing probable cause but may rely on another
officer's assessment. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 28
L. Ed. 2d 306, 313, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 1035 (1971) ("fellow officer
rule"). The validity of an arrest, however, will depend on
whether probable cause in fact existed. Id. at 568-69, 28 L. Ed.
2d at 313, 91 S. Ct. at 1036; cf. United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985) (Officer making
Terry stop may rely on information provided by neighboring
police department: "effective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to another[,] and ... officers,
who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to crossexamine their fellow officers about the foundation for the
transmitted information.") (quoting United States v. Robinson,
536 F.2d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir. 1976)); but see Commonwealth v.
Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 1225, 315 N.E.2d 530 (1974) (police
may not assume that officer issuing radio communication had
reliable information). For a discussion of the application of
Whiteley, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.5(b), at 5.
Although determining probable cause on the basis of collective information in an agency is generally permissible, the
chain of communication from one officer to another must be
shown. See State v. Johnson, 12 Wash. App. 309, 310, 529 P.2d
873, 874 (1974); see generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,

§ 3.5(c).
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2.8 Informationfrom Anonymous or Unknown Informants:
Satisfying the "Veracity" Prong
Information from an anonymous informant may not, by
itself, support probable cause. Bantam v. Washington, 163
Wash. 598, 601 P.2d 861, 862 (1931). A named but unknown
informant is not presumed reliable. See State v. Sieler, 95
Wash. 2d 43, 48, 621 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980) (reliability of named
but unknown telephone informant not significantly different
from anonymous telephone informant). Some courts examine
why the police do not know the citizen's identity and look for
other circumstances that may indicate veracity. See, e.g., State
v. Chatmon, 9 Wash. App. 741, 748, 515 P.2d 530, 535 (1973)
(reliability of a citizen informant may be established by an
interview with police if the informant satisfies an officer that
he or she is a "prudent" person and has no motive to falsify).
Thus, "[w]here eyewitnesses to crime summon police, and the
exigencies are such.., that ascertainment of the identity and
background of the informants would be unreasonable, the 'reliability' requirement might be further relaxed." Chatmon, 9
Wash. App. at 748 n.4, 515 P.2d at 535. See generally 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 3.4(a), at 722-23. An affiant's assertion
that an unnamed informant is an "upstanding citizen with no
criminal record," however, may not establish probable cause.
State v. Franklin, 49 Wash. App. 106, 109, 741 P.2d 83, 85-86
(1987). In Franklin,the officers' opinion and generic recitation
was insufficient to raise the requisite inference of credibility.
2.9

Special Searches and Seizures Requiring Greater or
Lesser Levels of Proof
2.9(a)

Administrative Searches

When a search is conducted for administrative, regulatory,
or other purposes for which criminal prosecution is not the
principal goal, a level of proof other than individualized probable cause may be used. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967). Two levels or
types of proof will satisfy the requirements for an administrative warrant: (1) specific evidence providing reasonable
grounds for believing that an administrative violation exists,
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305,
316, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1824 (1978); or (2) "reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an area inspection
[that] are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling."
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Camara, 387 U.S. at 538, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 941, 87 S. Ct. at 1736.
Administrative standards for housing code inspections, for
example, may be based on factors such as "the passage of time,
the nature of the building[,] ... or the condition of the entire
area, but . . . will not necessarily depend upon specific knowl-

edge of the condition of [a] particular dwelling." Id. An otherwise proper administrative inspection is not unconstitutional
because the ultimate purpose of the regulatory statute pursuant to which the search is done-the deterrent of criminal
behavior-is the same as that of penal laws, with the result
that the inspection may disclose violations not only of the regulatory statute but also of the penal statutes. New York v.
Burger, - U.S. -, 86 L. Ed. 2d 601, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
The Washington Supreme Court has required administrative search programs, such as spot checks of automobiles for
registration or vehicle violations, to be based on more than the
purpose of detecting offenders; the government must furnish
evidence "that indicates that the [program] is a sufficiently
productive mechanism to justify the intrusion." State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 437, 706 P.2d 225, 226 (1985). See also
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 1154, -

P.2d

-

(1988).

For a discussion of administrative searches in general, see
infra § 6.4.
2.9(b)

Terry Stops and Frisks

A search or seizure that is relatively nonintrusive, such as
a brief investigatory stop or patdown for weapons, may be
based on less than probable cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). The level of proof required
for such intrusion is a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 45 L.
Ed. 2d 607, 616-17, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2580 (1975). The standard
requires that "the police officer.. . be able to point to specific
and articulable facts" supporting the suspicion or belief. Terry,
392 U.S. at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. See also
State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
For an officer to frisk a suspect who has been stopped as a
result of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer
must have
reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable
cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need
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not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed;, the
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or
that of others was in danger.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909, 88 S. Ct. at 1883.
For a further discussion of Terry stops and frisks, see

iLtra § 4.5.
A suspect may be detained in his or her home on less than
probable cause when police are executing a search warrant for
contraband. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed.
2d 340, 351, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595 (1981). Similarly, police may
frisk a person present at the execution of a search warrant if
they have a reasonable belief that the person is armed. Ybarra
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 246, 100 S. Ct.
338, 343 (1979). See infra § 5.18(b).
A police officer may seize a weapon observed in the suspect's property when stopping and detaining a suspect to investigate a crime if circumstances give rise to reasonable grounds
for believing that the suspect is dangerous and that he may
gain access to the weapon. An overt threatening gesture is not
a condition precedent to seizure. State v. Perez, 41 Wash. App.
481, 486, 704 P.2d 625, 628 (1985).
2.9(c)

Intrusions Into the Body

Probable cause alone is not sufficient to permit police to
conduct a search involving an intrusion into a suspect's body.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908,
919, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835 (1966). In addition to establishing
probable cause, police must show that the desired evidence will
clearly be discovered by the intrusion and that the evidence is
important to the government's case. See Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753, 761-62, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662, 670-71, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1617
(1985); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 919, 86 S. Ct.
at 1835. Thus, if the facts and circumstances taken together
are sufficient to "warrant a man of reasonable caution" to
believe the suspect had been drinking, probable cause to suspect that a person's blood sample will provide evidence of
criminal activity is established. State v. Komoto, 40 Wash. App.
200, 210, 697 P.2d 1025, 1037, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1.985).
Even when these requirements have been satisfied, reasonable medical means and equipment must be used. Schmer-
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ber, 384 U.S. at 771, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 86 S. Ct. at 1836. See
generally infra § 3.13(b).
2.9(d)

Special Environments: Schools, Prisons, and Borders

The levels of proof required for searches and seizures in
schools, in detention facilities, and at borders are discussed
infra ch. 6.
CHAPTER 3: SEARCH WARRANTS

3.0

Introduction: Fourth Amendment Requirementsfor
Search Warrants

The fourth amendment provides that
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST amend. IV. This provision was enacted partly in
response to the evils of the use of general warrants in England
and writs of assistance in the colonies. See Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27, 29 L. Ed. 746, 749-50, 6 S. Ct. 524,
530 (1886); State v. Fields, 85 Wash. 2d 126, 128, 530 P.2d 284,
288 (1975). This chapter focuses on the interpretation of the
fourth amendment's requirements for a valid search warrant
and its execution.
Searches and seizures must generally be made pursuant to
a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
106, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 687, 85 S. Ct. 741, 744 (1965). There are,
however, a number of situations when searches and seizures
may be made without warrants-even when it would be feasible to obtain them-and some circumstances when warrants
alone are insufficient. See infra §§ 3.3(a)-(d). For the most
part, the standards discussed below apply to arrest as well as
search warrants. Issues pertaining specifically to arrests are
discussed in Chapter 4.
3.1

Types of Items That May Be Searched and Seized

Warrants may be issued not only for contraband or instrumentalities of crime, but also for "mere evidence." When the
state seeks a warrant for evidence, it must show cause to
believe that the evidence will aid in apprehending or convicting the suspect. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967). See CRR
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2.3(b); JCRR 2.10(b). Warrants may be issued for evidence containing incriminating statements; the fifth amendment protects
a person only from producing evidence, not from its production
by others. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473, 49 L. Ed.
2d 627, 638, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2745 (1976).
3.2

Who May Issue Warrants: Neutral and Detached
MagistrateRequirements

One aspect of the protection provided by a warrant is the
determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of by a police officer. Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369
(1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment... is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.
In criminal matters, a district court's territorial jurisdiction is the boundaries of the county. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 3.66.060 (1987). Thus, upon probable cause, a district court
judge may issue a warrant for the search and seizure of controlled substances outside the court's district, but within the
county, without the approval of the prosecutor. State v.
Uhthoff, 45 Wash. App. 261, 724 P.2d 1103 (1986); WASH. REV.
CODE §.
69.50.509 (1987).
A district court may issue a warrant relating to the case
even after an information is filed in superior court. State v.
Stock, 44 Wash. App. 467, 722 P.2d 1330 (1986); WASH. REV.
CODE § 69.50.509 (1987). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, §§ 4.2(a)-(f).
3.2(a)

Qualifications of a "Magistrate"

Constitutional provisions, statutes, and court rules identify
the requirements for qualification as a magistrate. The fourth
amendment does not require that a magistrate be a lawyer so
long as he or she is capable of determining whether probable
cause exists. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 32 L. Ed.
2d 783, 92 S. Ct. 2119 (1972) (nonlawyer municipal court clerk
permitted to issue arrest warrants); State v. Porter,88 Wash. 2d
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512, 515, 563 P.2d 829, 830-31 (1977); but see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
& SEIZURE, § 4.2(c), at 36 (because search warrants are more

complex than arrest warrants, the use of nonlawyers to issue
search warrants should be constitutionally suspect).
Even when the person issuing the warrant is a magistrate
in title, he or she must make an independent probable cause
determination and may not simply rubber-stamp warrants.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 728-29, 84
S. Ct. 1509, 1514 (1964); State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 537
P.2d 268 (1975).
States may impose more stringent requirements than the
fourth amendment. Washington limits the power to issue warrants to magistrates, WASH. REV. CODE § 2.20.010 (1987), identified as supreme court, court of appeals, superior court, and
district court judges, as well as "all municipal officers authorized to exercise the powers and perform the duties of district
judges." WASH. REV. CODE § 2.20.020 (1987). Case law has specifically included court commissioners. See Porter,88 Wash. 2d
at 514, 563 P.2d at 830; but see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 4.2(c).
3.2(b)

Neutrality

A magistrate who is capable of determining probable cause
may nevertheless be disqualified from issuing a warrant for
failing to meet the "neutral" requirement. Thus, a state officer
who acts as prosecutor or investigator in a case is automatically
disqualified from acting as a magistrate in the same case. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S. 443, 450, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 573,
91 S. Ct. 2022, 2029 (1971). An unsalaried magistrate who
receives a fee for each search warrant issued is not considered
neutral. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 250, 50 L. Ed. 2d
444, 448, 97 S. Ct. 546, 548 (1977) (pecuniary interest in issuing
warrants compared with denying them renders magistrate not
neutral and not detached). An administrative "warrant"
signed by the parole officer conducting the search is invalid;
Hocker v. Woody, 95 Wash. 2d 822, 825-26, 631 P.2d 372, 375
(1981). Similarly, the magistrate's involvement in the execution of a warrant may constitute non-neutrality. Lo-Ji Sales,
Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920, 928-29,
99 S. Ct. 2319, 2324 (1979) (judge who accompanied police on
raid of pornographic bookstore was not neutral and detached
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when he added new materials observed there to previously
signed search warrant).
On the other hand, the per se rule of Coolidge was held
not to apply to a case in which the pro tempore judge issuing
the warrant was also a prosecutor but was not involved in the
prosecution of that particular case. State v. Hill, 17 Wash. App.
678, 683, 564 P.2d 841, 943 (1977). A search warrant has been
upheld, however, although the issuing judicial officer was
aware from the affidavit that he might be a witness against the
defendant. State v. Smith, 16 Wash. App. 425, 428, 558 P.2d 265,
268 (1976). But see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.2(b), at
156 n.31 (questioning the reasoning in Smith).
Washington has also refused to apply the Coolidge rule of
per se disqualification to a judge who issued a search warrant
in a case that was before him on special inquiry. State v. Neslund, 103 Wash. 2d 79, 88, 690 P.2d 1153, 1158-59 (1984). In Neslund, the judge had been appointed to investigate suspected
criminal activity of the defendant and one of the defendant's
brothers. During the special inquiry proceedings, the judge
asked another brother some questions; he did not, however,
question other witnesses or discuss the investigation or the
brother's testimony with anyone else involved in the investigation. The court did not per se disqualify the judge from issuing
warrants authorizing a search of the defendant's premises and
the seizure of particular items of the defendant's personal
property, but based its holding in part on the fact that the warrants were not issued in subsequent court proceedings "arising" from the inquiry. Id. at 82-83, 690 P.2d at 1156. Cf. WASH.
REV. CODE § 10.27.180 (1987) (special inquiry judges disqualified from participating in subsequent court proceedings arising
from special inquiry).
A magistrate's initial probable cause determination is not a
final order. Principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata do
not preclude the government from presenting the same evidence to a second judicial officer so long as the government
notifies the second officer that the application was previously
denied. The presentation of the same evidence to a second
magistrate is not tantamount to forum shopping unless the
government visits numerous magistrates before convincing one
to issue the disputed warrant. United States v. Savides, 658 F.
Supp. 1399 (N.D. Ill. 1987). See also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 4.2(e). Cf. United States v. Davis, 346 F. Supp. 435
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(S.D. Ill. 1972) (magistrate-shopping to obtain a warrant after
one has been denied by another magistrate has been
condemned).
3.2(c)

Burden of Proof

Unless a magistrate is disqualified under the per se rule of
Coolidge, the defendant bears the burden of proving a magistrate's lack of neutrality. State v. Hill, 17 Wash. App. 678, 683,
564 P.2d 841, 843 (1977).
3.3
3.3(a)

Content of the Warrant

Oath or Affirmation; Multiple Affidavits

The oath or affirmation clause of the fourth amendment
requires that the person presenting the supporting affidavit
swear to the information the affidavit contains. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. The Washington Supreme Court has upheld a warrant, however, when the affidavit was not sworn to, but was
signed in the presence of the magistrate. State v. Douglas, 71
Wash. 2d 303, 309-310, 428 P.2d 535, 539 (1967). Lower courts
have split on the question of whether a fictitious name affidavit is defective. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.3(f), at
53-99.
3.3(b)

Information Considered

The information establishing probable cause may not be
stale at the time it is presented to the judge. "It is not enough
...
to set forth that criminal activity occurred at some prior
time. The facts or circumstances must support the reasonable
probability that the criminal activity was occurring at or about
the time the warrant was issued." State v. Higby, 26 Wash.
App. 457, 460, 613 P.2d 1192, 1194 (1980) (one sale of small
amount of marijuana did not provide probable cause to search
two weeks later); see also State v. Petty, 48 Wash. App. 615, 740
P.2d 879 (1987); State v. Anderson, 41 Wash. App. 85, 702 P.2d
481 (1985) (evidence must be sufficient to support magistrate's
decision that evidence sought is still on the person or premises
to be searched), rev'd on other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d 745, 733
P.2d 517 (1987); cf. supra § 2.3.
The fact that a valid warrant could have been obtained
had the affiant provided sufficient information to the magistrate will not validate a warrant issued in the absence of that
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information. Thus, an otherwise insufficient affidavit cannot be
rehabilitated by a later production of information that the affiant had possessed but did not disclose to the magistrate when
seeking the warrant. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565-66,
28 L. Ed. 2d 306, 311-12, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 1035-36 (1971); cf. Seattle
v. Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 627 P.2d 159 (1981) (affidavit in
support of administrative warrant not sufficient when it
alleged comprehensive inspection program but failed to
describe program); but see State v. Smith, 16 Wash. App. 425,
428, 558 P.2d 265, 268 (1976) (warrant valid so long as it could
have been properly issued).
On the other hand, the Washington Supreme Court has
ruled that when a warrant is facially valid and an omission is
neither intentional nor made with a reckless disregard for the
truth, the warrant can be valid even though it is based upon an
affidavit containing an omission. State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d
361, 367, 693 P.2d 81, 85 (1985). In Cord, the court held that
although an affidavit in support of a search warrant failed to
state the altitude at which the officer allegedly observed marijuana plants, the affidavit otherwise provided a sufficient basis
for the issuing judge to conclude that a crime probably had
been committed. But see Cord, 103 Wash. 2d at 371, 693 P.2d at
87 (Williams, C.J., dissenting) (when aerial views are means
utilized to show probable cause, affidavit must reveal altitude
from which identification made; court can thus guard against
issuance of warrants following unreasonably low, intrusive
searches and make sure officers do not engage in unreasonably
high views of questionable reliability).
An affidavit must set forth the underlying facts; conclusory information, sworn to by the prosecutor, cannot establish probable cause. See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5,
71 L. Ed. 505, 47 S.Ct. 250 (1927); cf. State v. Klinker, 85 Wash.
2d 509, 537 P.2d 268 (1975). At the same time, however,
[a]ffidavits for search warrants must be tested in a commonsense manner rather than hypertechnically as long as the
basic Aguilar/Spinelli requirements are met ....
'The support for issuance of a search warrant is sufficient if, on read-

ing the affidavits, an ordinary a person would understand
that a violation existed and was continuing at the time of the
application.'
State v. Fisher,96 Wash. 2d 962, 965, 639 P.2d 743, 745 (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1i37 (1982).
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Evidence from a prior warrantless search under an exception to general search and seizure rules may be used by the
issuing magistrate in determining probable cause. A magistrate may also rely on hearsay statements from a police
officer's affidavits. State v. Chasengnou, 43 Wash. App. 379, 717
P.2d 288 (1986). See supra § 2.7(b).
3.3(c)

Oral Testimony and Oral Warrants

In Washington, a search warrant may be based on a single
affidavit, several affidavits or oral testimony. CRR 2.3(c);
JCRR 2.10(c). The judge must record a summary of any additional evidence upon which the warrant is based. CRR 2.3(c);
see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.3(b).
Some states, including Washington, permit oral search
warrants in which an affiant makes a sworn telephonic statement to a judge. CRR 2.3(c); JCRR 2.10(c). See State v. Ringer,
100 Wash. 2d 686, 701, 674 P.2d 1240, 1249 (1983), overruled on
other grounds, State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436
(1986). For a discussion of various objections to this procedure,
see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.3(c).
3.3(d)

Administrative Warrants

An administrative warrant may be based either on specific
evidence of an existing violation or on a general inspection program based on reasonable legislative or administrative standards that are derived from neutral sources. Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 98 S. Ct. 1816
(1978); Seattle v. Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 84, 627 P.2d 159, 16162 (1981). See generally infra § 6.4.
3.4 ParticularDescription of Place to be Searched
3.4(a)

General Considerations

By requiring a particular description of the place to be
searched, the fourth amendment furthers two purposes: (1) it
limits the risk that a search will be conducted in the wrong
location, and (2) it helps in determining whether probable
cause is present. The description must be such that the officer
executing the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended. Steele v. United States, 267
U.S. 498, 503, 69 L.Ed. 757, 760, 45 S. Ct. 414, 416 (1925); State v.
Smith, 39 Wash. App. 642, 648, 694 P.2d 660, 664 (1984), review
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denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1034 (1985); State v. Cockrell, 102 Wash.
2d 561, 570, 689 P.2d 32, 37 (1984). Carelessness on the part of
the officers executing the warrant does not render the warrant
insufficient. Id. at 570, 689 P.2d at 37 (area search revealed
marijuana gardens and officers executed the warrant improperly even though defendant's property was included in the affidavit because officers spotted marijuana growing there). See
also State v. Fisher,96 Wash. 2d 962, 639 P.2d 743, cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1137 (1982).
If a warrant is invalid for failure to specifically describe
the place to be searched, the search cannot be upheld on the
ground that there was a probable cause determination by a
magistrate; the evidence seized, however, may sometimes be
admissible. See generally infra § 7.2. Furthermore, if a warrant separately and distinctly describes two targets and it
thereafter is determined that probable cause existed for issuance of the warrant as to one but not to the other, the warrant
may be treated as severable and upheld as to the one target.
State v. Halverson, 21 Wash. App. 35, 37, 584 P.2d 408, 409
(1978); see 2 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.6(f).
The initial determination of whether a description is adequate is made with reference to the warrant itself. The affidavit and other incorporated documents may be considered if
they are attached to the warrant. A description may appear
adequate on its face, but upon execution be found to be ambiguous or to contain errors. Whether such a warrant will be
deemed sufficient depends on whether other information is
available that permits the officer to identify the intended
premises. See State v. Rood, 18 Wash. App. 740, 744-45, 573 P.2d
1325, 1327-28 (1977).
Three types of information may be considered in determining a warrant's adequacy: (1) other physical descriptions
of
the premises contained in the warrant or the attached affidavit; (2) information based on the officer's personal knowledge
of the location or its occupants; and (3) the officer's personal
observations at the time of execution. Id. at 744-45, 573 P.2d at
1328. See also State v. Smith, 39 Wash. App. 642, 649, 694 P.2d
660, 664 (1984) (search warrant identifying place to be searched
as 2415 Carl Road, Sumas, Washington, rather than correct
address of 2415 Carl Road, Everson, Washington, was such that
police officer could, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify place intended); State v. Cohen, 19 Wash. App. 600, 604, 576

480

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 11:411

P.2d 933, 936 (1978) (requiring only reasonable particularity);
see generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, §§ 4.5(a)-(e). Earlier Washington cases include State v. Andrich, 135 Wash. 609,
612, 238 P. 638, 639 (1925) (warrant's error in house number
immaterial when officer knew where accused lived and
searched correct house), and State v. Davis, 165 Wash. 652, 654,
5 P.2d 1035, 1036 (1931) (warrant sufficient although incorrect
street name given; name given was popularly known, and no
one could have been misled).
3.4(b)

Particular Searches: Places

In urban areas, places are usually identified by a street
address. The address is unnecessary, however, if other facts
make it clear that a particular place is intended. State v. Trasvina, 16 Wash. App. 519, 523, 557 P.2d 368, 370 (1976) (warrant
describing premises as two-story, white frame house located
directly behind particular address sufficient when no evidence
presented that more than one house met description, or that
premises failed to conform to description except for incorrect
address); see State v. Chisholm, 7 Wash. App. 279, 283, 499 P.2d
81, 84 (1972) (warrant that failed to specify street location was
sufficiently clear when officers could identify premises with
reasonable certainty and when reason for failure to specify
street was included in affidavit for warrant). Rural areas may
be described by a legal description of the property. See State v.
Cohen, 19 Wash. App. 600, 603, 576 P.2d 933, 935 (1978).
When a warrant contains errors, the burden is upon the
party challenging the warrant to show that the errors could
have resulted in a search of the wrong premises. State v.
Fisher, 96 Wash. 2d 962, 967, 639 P.2d 743, 746 (1982); see State
v. Smith, 39 Wash. App. 642, 649, 694 P.2d 660, 664 (1984)
(although town wrongly identified in warrant, search upheld
when defendant made no showing that similar address existed
that could have been mistakenly searched or even that street
of the same name existed in wrongly identified town), review
denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1034 (1985).
Generally, unless there is probable cause to search all living units of a multiple occupancy building, the description
must single out a particular sub-unit. People v. Avery, 173
Colo. 315, 478 P.2d 310 (1970). But if the building looks like a
single occupancy structure from the outside, and the officers
have no reason to know that it is a multiple unit structure, the
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warrant is not defective for failing to specify a sub-unit.
Chisholm, 7 Wash. App. at 272, 499 P.2d at 81. Another exception, the "community living unit" rule, will generally apply
where several people occupy the entire premises in common,
but have separate bedrooms. Under the "community living
unit" rule, a single warrant describing the entire premises is
valid and justifies a search of the entire premises. State v. Alexander, 41 Wash. App. 152, 704 P.2d 618 (1985). Additional
exceptions to the general rule are outlined in United States v.
Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1983). Thus, a warrant may
authorize a search of an entire street address while reciting
probable cause as to only a portion of the premises if the premises are occupied in common rather than individually, if a
multi-unit building is used as a single entity, if the defendant
was in control of the whole premises, or if the entire premises
are suspect. Id. at 1008. See 2 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 4.5(b).
Although search warrants for vehicles are uncommon
because of the many exceptions allowing warrantless searches,
see infra § 5.21, such warrants are governed by the same principles discussed above. See State v. Cohen, 19 Wash. App. at
604, 576 P.2d at 936; 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.5(b).
3.4(c)

Particular Searches: Persons

Search warrants may be issued for persons, as well as for
places, if there is probable cause to believe that a specific individual has evidence on his or her person. When a search warrant is issued for a person, the general rule requiring
particularity applies. State v. Rollie M, 41 Wash. App. 55, 701
P.2d 1123 (1985) (warrant insufficient authorizing search of
person found in a general vicinity); State v. Douglas S., 42
Wash. App. 138, 709 P.2d 817 (1985) (warrant insufficient if it
does not have a description of person to be searched). See 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.5(e).
For a discussion of when a search warrant for premises
authorizes the search of persons not named in the warrant, see
infra § 3.8(a). Frequently, when a search warrant for premises
is executed, the police have probable cause to arrest persons
present, and a warrantless search is justified as incident to the
arrest. See infra § 5.1.
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3.5 ParticularDescriptionof Things to be Seized
Because the facts in each case differ greatly, the issue of
whether a warrant describes the things to be seized with sufficient particularity is generally determined without reference
to the fact patterns of prior cases. See State v. Helmka, 86
Wash. 2d 91, 542 P.2d 115 (1975). Instead, courts look to the
purposes of the "particular description" requirement: (1) to
prevent general exploratory searches; (2) to protect against
seizure of objects on the mistaken assumption that they fall
within the warrant; and (3) to ensure that probable cause is
present. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 72 L. Ed.
231, 48 S. Ct. 74 (1927). Although the description need not be
detailed, a search warrant must so circumscribe an officer's
actions that the reviewing court is able to determine that the
search was based on probable cause and particular descriptions.
United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1984); see State v. Weaver, 38 Wash. App.
17, 22, 683 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1984) (although cardboard box bearing defendant's name would not generally be considered
"paper," police could seize box because obvious purpose of warrant was seizure not only of controlled substances, but also of
evidence enabling state to demonstrate defendant's dominion
and control over premises). See also State v. Reid, 38 Wash.
App. 203, 212, 687 P.2d 861, 867 (1984) (phrase "any other evidence of homicide" specifically limited the warrant to the
crime under investigation; specific items listed, such as shotgun
and shotgun shells, provided additional guidelines for the
officers conducting search); State v. Lingo, 32 Wash. App. 638,
641, 649 P.2d 130, 132 (1982) (warrant not constitutionally
defective when it limits the officer's discretion on the items to
be seized); but see Weaver, 38 Wash. App. at 24, 683 P.2d at
1140 (Ringold, J., dissenting) (because the box with defendant's
name was not seized to show dominion and control, but solely
to carry contraband that had been uncovered during the warrant search, majority's "dominion and control" argument is
merely post hoc attempt to justify seizure, and cocaine later
found in the box should have been suppressed). See generally
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, §§ 4.6(a)-(f).
3.5(a)

General Rules

Some general principles can be gleaned from the cases to
indicate when a warrant is sufficiently definite to allow the
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executing officer to identify the property with reasonable
certainty:
(1) More ambiguity is tolerated when the police have
acquired the most complete description that reasonably could
be expected. State v. Withers, 8 Wash. App. 123, 504 P.2d 1151
(1972).
(2) A more general description will suffice when the
nature of the items is such that they do not have more specific
characteristics.
(3) A less precise description is adequate for controlled
substances. State v. Cowles, 14 Wash. App. 14, 19, 538 P.2d 840,
844 (1975) (When affidavit states that narcotics and, specifically, marijuana was observed, search warrant authorizing
seizure of "controlled substances" is "reasonable and practical
under the circumstances and thus satisf[ies] the constitutional
requirement of 'particularity.' ").
(4) Failure to provide all available descriptive facts is not
fatal when the omitted facts could not have assisted the officer
in a more circumscribed search. State v. Salinas, 18 Wash.
App. 455, 569 P.2d 75 (1977).
(5) An error is not fatal if the officer was able to determine what was intended from the other facts provided. State
v. Cohen, 19 Wash. App. at 604, 576 P.2d at 936.
(6) Greater care is required when the property sought is
generally in lawful use.
(7) A more specific description is required when other,
similar objects are likely to be found at the particular place.
(8) More care is required when the consequences of a
mistaken seizure of articles is substantial as, for example,
when the articles are personal papers. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 4.6(a), at 238-41.
3.5(b)

Circumstances Requiring Greater Scrutiny

Search warrants for documents and for telephone conversations require greater scrutiny because of the potential for
intrusion into personal privacy. Andresen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976). At the same
time, the Court has upheld a search warrant that listed specific
documents pertaining to a particular crime but then added the
catch-all phrase, "together with other fruits, instrumentalities,
and evidence of crime." Id. at 479, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 642, 96 S. Ct.
at 2748. The search was constitutional because the catch-all
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phrase was to be read as authorizing a search only for evidence
relating to the defined crime. Id. at 480-82, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 64243, 96 S. Ct. at 2748-49. See State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App. 535,
541, 581 P.2d 172, 175 (1978) (dicta) (citing Andresen as authority for proposition that each item seized need not have been
specified in the warrant as long as it related to the crime
charged); cf. State v. Smith, 16 Wash. App. 425, 428, 558 P.2d
265, 268 (1976) (warrants upheld for search of defendant's
home and office for documents, cancelled checks, bank statements, and correspondence relating to guardianship accounts
when defendant charged with grand larceny by misappropriation of guardianship funds). But see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 4.6(d), at 251-54 (Andresen should not be read as
approval for loose descriptions because the Court was influenced by the fact that the description was as specific as possible.). When a search is for particular contents of documents,
the invasion of privacy can be minimized by impounding the
documents and then imposing conditions on a further search.
See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.6(d), at 253 n.85.
Evidence must be described with greater particularity
when the search is of a news-gathering organization. See
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564, 56 L. Ed. 2d 525,
541, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1981 (1978). Warrants for books, pictures,
films, or recordings require "scrupulous exactitude" because of
the first amendment interests involved. Stanford v. Texas, 379
U.S. 476, 485, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431, 437, 85 S. Ct. 506, 511 (1965). In
addition, the officers executing the search warrant are constitutionally prohibited from using their own discretion to determine whether materials are unlawful. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New
York, 442 U.S. 319, 325, 60 L. Ed. 2d 920, 927-28, 99 S. Ct. 2319,
2324 (1979). These strict requirements, however, do not apply
to papers that are seized for reasons other than their unlawful
content. For example, when a warrant authorizes a search for
papers that will provide dominion or control over premises, the
warrant need not specify particular papers. State v. Legas, 20
Wash. App. 535, 540-41, 581 P.2d 172, 175 (1978).
Circumstances indicating that an individual has taken precautions to ensure privacy, may cause greater scrutiny. In
State v. Butterworth, 48 Wash. App. 152, 737 P.2d 1297 (1987),
the police located the defendant's residence by requesting his
address from the telephone company. The court noted that the
listing was unpublished, indicating that the defendant specifi-
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cally requested privacy regarding his address and phone
number. Since the defendant had taken precautions regarding
his privacy, the police were required to obtain a warrant or
subpeona prior to seizing the information.
3.6 Execution of the Warrant: Time of Execution
Washington is one of several states that by court rule
require that warrants are to be executed within a certain time
period. The warrant "shall command the officer to search,
within a specified period of time not to exceed 10 days . .. ."
CRR 2.3(c). Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.509 (1987) (three day

limit for execution of search warrant for controlled substances). A delay in execution may render a warrant invalid if
probable cause no longer exists at the time the warrant is executed. State v. Higby, 26 Wash. App. 457, 460, 613 P.2d 1192,
1194 (1980).

See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,

§ 4.7(a)
Unlike other states, Washington does not restrict the execution of warrants to daytime hours. CRR 2.3(c) (warrant may
be served at any time of day). See State v. Smith, 15 Wash.
App. 716, 719-20, 552 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1976) (nighttime search is
not unreasonable). The United States Supreme Court has not
decided whether the fourth amendment requires additional
justification for nighttime search warrants. But see Gooding v.
United States, 416 U.S. 430, 461, 40 L. Ed. 2d 250, 276, 94 S. Ct.
1780, 1795 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of
the restriction upon nighttime searches was to limit such intrusions to those instances where there is 'some justification for
it.' "). See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.7(b), at 266-67 nn.
32-34 (constitutionality of a nighttime search depends upon
whether it was necessary to make the search at that time).
A search warrant may be executed even when the occupants are not present. See, e.g., United States v. Gervato, 474
F.2d 40, 44 (3d Cir. 1973) (presence of occupant while search
warrant is being executed is neither a common law nor constitutional requirement), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); see also
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.7(c).
3.7 Entry Without Notice or by Force: "Knock and
Announce" Requirement
Absent exigent circumstances, officers executing a warrant
must give notice of their authority and purpose prior to entry
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onto private premises. See Ker v. California,374 U.S. 23, 40, 10
L. Ed. 2d 726, 742, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1633 (1963). This "knock and
announce" or "knock and wait" requirement applies to the
execution of both arrest and search warrants. Id.; State v.
Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38 (1984). The Supreme
Court has not decided whether the Constitution compels the
requirement, although the requirement is a long-established
common law rule. Id. See infra §§ 5.16-5.19 for a discussion of
exigent circumstances.
Many states, including Washington, have codified the
"knock and announce" requirement. Washington law provides:
"To make an arrest in criminal actions, the officer may break
open any outer or inner door, or windows of a dwelling house
or other building or any other enclosure, if, after notice of his
office and purpose, he be refused admittance." WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.31.040 (1987). Although the statute expressly refers
to arrests, it applies to the execution of search warrants as
well. State v. Young, 76 Wash. 2d 212, 217, 455 P.2d 595, 598
(1969).
The purposes of the knock and announce rule are as follows: (1) to reduce the potential for violence; (2) to prevent the
physical destruction of property; and (3) to protect privacy. See
United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); State v. Dugger, 12
Wash. App. 74, 78, 528 P.2d 274, 276 (1974). An officer's actions
are judged by a standard of reasonableness, in light of the purposes supporting the knock and announce rule and the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case. See, e.g., Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. at 33, 10 L. Ed. 2d at 738, 83 S. Ct. at
1629-30; State v. Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38 (1984); see
also State v. Lehman, 40 Wash. App. 400, 698 P.2d 606 (1985);
see generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.8(a).

3.7(a)

Types of Entry Requiring Notice

The phrase "break open" in the Washington knock and
announce statute refers to all nonconsensual entries and not
simply to those involving forcible breaking. See State v. Coyle,
95 Wash. 2d 1, 5-6, 621 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1980) (knock and wait
statute was violated when officers grabbed occupant who had
opened door just as police were about to knock and officers
then entered through open door without alerting other occupants); State v. Miller, 7 Wash. App. 414, 419, 499 P.2d 241, 244
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(1972) (execution of search warrant unlawful when police
entered through partially opened door without knocking or
announcing purpose). A consensual entry, however, is not a
"breaking open." State v. Hartnell, 15 Wash. App. 410, 418, 550
P.2d 63, 69 (1976) (defendant's wife invited unidentified officer
into house; thus entry was consensual and announcement of
purpose not required).
Notice is required for entry by use of a pass key. Ker v.
California,374 U.S. 23, 37-41, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 740-42, 83 S. Ct.
1623, 1631-34 (1963), and for entry through a closed but
unlocked door, State v. Miller, 7 Wash. App. 414, 416, 499 P.2d
241, 243 (1972). Although courts in other jurisdictions are
divided on the question of whether passage through an open
door requires notice, see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 4.8(b), at 274 n.24, Washington courts require notice in such
situations. See Miller, 7 Wash. App. at 416, 499 P.2d at 243
(fourth amendment and WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.040 prohibit
an officer executing a search warrant from entering a house
without providing notice of office and purpose, even though
door through which the officer entered was open far enough to
permit passage); see also State v. Talley, 14 Wash. App. 484,
490-91, 543 P.2d 348, 352-53 (1975) (officer entering dwelling
must give "notice of his office and purpose" even though door
to apartment partially open).
The Washington Supreme Court has held that consent to
enter that has been obtained by deception is effective consent.
Thus, an officer who deceives a suspect into allowing him or
her to enter need not announce office and purpose. State v.
Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 553, 689 P.2d 38, 42 (1984). In Myers,
the police had been aware that the doors and windows to the
defendant's house were covered by iron bars, and they had
been told by an informant that the defendant kept a handgun
within reach whenever he opened the door. The police prepared a fictitious warrant for the defendant's arrest for a traffic offense, knowing that the defendant had no outstanding
traffic violations. Upon being permitted to enter his house to
execute the arrest warrant, the police executed the search warrant. The court held that even though the officers failed to
announce their office and purpose, the occupant of the house
had granted "valid permission" for them to enter. Id. at 552,
689 P.2d at 42; see State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 621 P.2d
1256, 1259 (1980). Because an occupant may not deny entry to
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police in possession of a valid search warrant, his or her right
to privacy is not infringed by the fact that permission to enter
was obtained by ruse. Myers, 102 Wash. 2d at 555, 689 P.2d at
43. See also id. at 560, 689 P.2d at 45-46 (Dimmick, J., concurring in result) (execution of search warrants requires case-bycase evolution of tactics used to reduce violence and prevent
destruction of property; prohibiting use of ruse may result in
police having to approach houses massively armed and with
weapons drawn, or to destroy building entrance).
Entry by ruse, subterfuge, or deception is not a violation of
the knock and announce statute because no "breaking" occurs
within the term of the statute; such an entry is approved
because the interests underlying the statute are well served by
an entry gained with permission of the occupant. State v. Williamson, 42 Wash. App. 208, 710 P.2d 205 (1985); see also State
v. Hashman, 46 Wash. App. 211, 729 P.2d 651 (1986) (Officer
used ruse to gain entry in order to obtain probable cause to
support a search warrant. Court held that police may use ruse
to gain entry when they have justifiable and reasonable basis
to suspect criminal activity in a residence.).
Washington Court of Appeals cases involving entry by
deception include State v. Ellis, 21 Wash. App. 123, 129, 584
P.2d 428, 432 (1978) (when officer unable to gain entry through
use of false name, subsequent forcible entry absent exigent circumstances unlawful without compliance with knock and wait
statute), and State v. Huckaby, 15 Wash. App. 280, 290, 549 P.2d
35, 37 (1976) (when undercover officers gain entry into suspect's home with suspect's consent and for apparent purpose of
drug transaction, knock and announce statute inapplicable).
Cf. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 17 L. Ed. 2d 312, 87 S.
Ct. 424 (1966) (entry lawful when undercover officer telephoned suspect and misrepresented his identity in order to
gain invitation in to suspect's home). But see State v. Collier,
270 So. 2d 451, 453-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (undercover
officer who leaves gathering at defendants' home that appears
to be "pot party" may not return and re-enter home in order to
execute search warrant without first providing "due notice of
his authority and purpose" within meaning of Florida knock
and announce statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 933.09 (West 1971)).
Subsequent to the court's decision in Collier, the Florida courts
have permitted re-entry without "knock and announce" if
there is an implied invitation to return. See State v. Stephani,
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398 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Schwartz, 398
So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). See generally Annotation, What Constitutes Compliance with Knock-and-Announce
Rule in Search of Private Premises-State Cases, 70 A.L.R.3d
217 (1976) (Supp. 1983).
The Washington knock and announce statute requires
notice prior to entry through inner as well as outer doors.
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.040 (1987); but see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
& SEIZURE, § 4.8(b) (federal rule does not require separate
notice for different rooms in one house).
3.7(b)

Compliance with Requirements

The police must identify themselves as police officers and
indicate to the person in apparent control of the premises that
they are present to execute the warrant. It is not sufficient to
make this announcement simultaneously with a forcible entry.
State v. Elis, 21 Wash. App. 123, 129, 584 P.2d 428, 432 (1978);
State v. Lowrie, 12 Wash. App. 155, 157, 528 P.2d 1010, 1012
(1974) ("Announcing your identity as you kick in the door is
not compliance with the general [knock and wait] rule.").
Police are not required, however, to give a detailed or completely accurate description of their purpose, as long as they
comply with the statute. Cf. State v. Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548,
689 P.2d 38 (1984) (use by police of fictitious arrest warrant to
gain entry into defendant's house in order to execute valid
search warrant did not violate knock and announce requirements because officers announced identity and stated that purpose was to execute warrant); State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203,
687 P.2d 861 (1984).
After giving notice, officers must allow the occupants an
opportunity to "refuse admittance" before entering, but the
officers need not wait until the occupants affirmatively deny
their entry. State v. Jones, 15 Wash. App. 165, 167, 547 P.2d
906, 908 (1976) (officers' entry after ten second wait with no
affirmative refusal held reasonable). What constitutes refusal
is "a factual determination to be made primarily by the trial
court." Id.; see State v. Woodall, 32 Wash. App. 407, 411, 647
P.2d 1051, 1054 (1982) ("In light of the information concerning
the number of people at the party, danger of violence, the concern for destruction of the evidence, and the deputy's testimony that someone inside the clubhouse saw [the officers] long
before they reached the door," a three or four second wait
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after the officers announced their identify and purpose made
entry reasonable.), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Wash. 2d 74, 75,
666 P.2d 364, 365 (1983); State v. Haggarty,20 Wash. App. 335,
337-38, 579 P.2d 1031, 1033 (1978) (when officers knocked on
door and announced office and purpose, and when door opened
after thirty second wait, officers were justified in believing
door opened in response to announcement and did not need to
repeat office and purpose); State v. Lowrie, 12 Wash. App. 155,
157, 528 P.2d 1010, 1012 (1974) ("failure to answer a knock at
the door within 15 seconds and then merely walking away
from door is insufficient" refusal when officers have not
announced their identity and purpose nor explicitly demanded
entry, even if occupant might have recognized one of the
officers); State v. Berlin, 46 Wash. App. 587, 594, 731 P.2d 548,
552 (1987) (When the wife of the defendant answered the
officers' knock but failed to open the door, the officers were
justified in opening the door after a 30 second wait, entering
and restating their identity and purpose. The fact that the
police had been told that the defendant had weapons and a history of violence was not enough to waive compliance with the
knock and announce rule, but did bear upon the reasonableness of the length of time that the police waited after announcing themselves.).
Circumstances must reasonably indicate that the occupant
has consented to the officer's entry. State v. Sturgeon, 46
Wash. App. 181, 730 P.2d 93 (1986) (court held that the knock
and announce statute was violated when the police knocked,
the defendant shouted "yeah," and the police entered the
apartment). In State v. Lehman, 40 Wash. App. 400, 698 P.2d
606 (1985), the court rejected the contention that the officers'
failure to wait long enough to permit the occupants a reasonable opportunity to grant or deny admission violated the knock
and announce rule. The plain clothes officers knocked and a
defendant opened the door approximately 12 inches. The
officers displayed their badges and advised the defendant that
they had a warrant to search the house. One officer looked
through the open door, and saw two men sitting in the living
room. Without waiting for the defendant to grant or deny permission to enter, the officers entered the house and conducted
the search. The Lehman court distinguished State v. Coyle by
noting that unlike Coyle, there was an announcement by the
police. It was not necessary that all occupants be aware of the
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announcement; hence, sufficient compliance with the knock
and announce statute was found. Lehman, 40 Wash. App. at
404, 698 P.2d at 609. State v. Jones, 15 Wash. App. 165, 547
P.2d 906 (1978), is questioned in 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 4.8(c), at 130.
The announcement of office and purpose may be made to
the person answering the door even when he or she is not in
possession of the premises. See State v. Sainz, 23 Wash. App.
532, 538-39, 596 P.2d 1090, 1095 (1979). Unnecessary roughness
in executing a warrant "does not rise to constitutional magnitude ... or negate prior compliance with [WASH. REV. CODE]
§ 10.31.040." Id.
The fact that an undercover agent who could legally seize
the evidence is present does not excuse other officers from
knocking and waiting. State v. Dugger, 12 Wash. App. 74, 77,
528 P.2d 274, 276 (1974).
An entry is in conformity with the knock and announce
statute when compliance is substantial. See State v. Reid, 38
Wash. App. 203, 687 P.2d 861 (1984).
3.7(c)

Exceptions

Under the "useless gesture" exception, compliance is
excused if the authority and purpose of the police are already
known to those within the premises. Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 753, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1643 (1963)
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Washington has required
that officers be "virtually certain" that occupants of a dwelling
are aware of the officers' presence. State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d
1, 11, 621 P.2d 1256, 1262 (1980). See generally 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.8(f).
The useless gesture exception has been applied by implication to justify a police officer's forcible entry when the officer
identified himself, but was unable to state his purpose before
the suspect tried to close the door. State v. Neff, 10 Wash. App.
713, 716, 519 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1974). But closing a door upon an
officer not in uniform, under ambiguous circumstances, will
not excuse the officer from complying with the knock and
announce rule. State v. Ellis, 21 Wash. App. 123, 127, 584 P.2d
428, 431 (1978); see also Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d at 13, 621 P.2d at
1262.
Police need not comply with the knock and announce
requirement but may instead enter immediately and with force
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when exigent circumstances are present. Ker v. California,374
U.S. 23, 37-40, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 740-42, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1631-33
(1963); State v. Young, 76 Wash. 2d 212, 215, 455 P.2d 595, 597
(1969).
A police officer's reasonable belief that the items identified in the search warrant will be destroyed or removed constitutes one type of exigent circumstance. The fact that the items
could be easily destroyed is insufficient; the police must possess specific information indicating that the items are in actual
imminent danger of destruction or removal. See State v.
Young, 76 Wash. 2d 212, 215, 455 P.2d 595, 597 (1969) (belief of
exigent circumstances cannot be based upon vague suspicion or
ambiguous acts); Coleman v. Reilly, 8 Wash. App. 684, 687, 508
P.2d 1035, 1038 (1973) ("[Tlhere must be more than mere suspicion on behalf of the police officers that evidence will be
destroyed before [the police] are justified in making an unannounced entry."); see also State v. Harris, 12 Wash. App. 481,
492-94, 530 P.2d 646, 653-54 (1975) (police justified in not complying strictly with knock and announce requirements when
they had reliable information that suspect kept heroin in condoms and would swallow them if confronted by police).
Washington thus has rejected the blanket rule, favored by
some courts, that permits an unannounced entry when the
warrant is for easily disposable items such as drugs. State v.
Jeter, 30 Wash. App. 360, 362, 634 P.2d 312, 314 (1981); see State
v. Edwards, 20 Wash. App. 648, 652, 581 P.2d 154, 157 (1978).
Specific factual situations are discussed in State v. Dugger, 12
Wash. App. 74, 81, 528 P.2d 274, 278 (1974). See generally 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.8(d).
A police officer's reasonable belief that announcing office
and purpose would jeopardize police or public safety is a second type of exigent circumstance. State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App.
203, 687 P.2d 861 (1984); State v. Carson, 21 Wash. App. 318,
322, 584 P.2d 990, 992 (1978). A mere good faith concern for
safety, however, is not sufficient; police must know from prior
information or from direct observation that the suspect both
keeps weapons and has a propensity to use them. State v.
Jeter, 30 Wash. App. 360, 363, 634 P.2d 312, 314 (1981) (no exigent circumstances when officer had prior knowledge only of
defendant's possession of gun and not of any propensity to use
it to resist arrest); see State v. Allun, 40 Wash. App. 27, 696
P.2d 45 (1985) (police knew from undercover agent that
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defendant had several firearms in his dwelling and had a
strong propensity to use them; hence, the police were justified
in executing a search warrant without complying with the
knock and announce rule); Dugger, 12 Wash. App. at 71, 528
P.2d at 278 (1974); People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 879, 512 P.2d
1208, 1214, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 310 (1973) (information that
defendant habitually answered door armed with firearm constituted exigent circumstcmces); 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 4.8(e).
For a discussion of exigent circumstances justifying the
absence of a warrant, see infra §§ 5.16-5.19.
Finally, law enforcement officers need not comply with
the notice requirements when covert entry of the premises is
the only way to effectively execute the warrant. Dalia v.
United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177, 186, 99 S.Ct.
1682, 1688 (1979) (covert entry onto premises to install listening device authorized by warrant constitutional, even when
entry not specifically authorized by warrant); cf. State v.
Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38 (1984) (police justified in
using ruse to gain entry when informant had stated that
defendant usually had handgun within reach when answering
door and all doors and windows covered by bars).
Police officers are not required to comply with the knock
and announce rule if they have obtained written consent from
an owner or lessee to enter and search the premises. State v.
Chichester, 48 Wash. App. 257, 738 P.2d 329 (1987). Since the
resulting search is warrantless, however, the police have the
burden of establishing the validity of the warrantless search
based upon consent. In Chichester, the officer "burst in with
gun drawn" raising the concern of violence. Id. at 260, 738 P.2d
at 331. The court felt that because the defendant did not himself consent to the search, and because the officer failed to
"knock and announce," the state must prove exigent circumstances to justify the manner in which the officers entered the
house. In Chichester, the defendant's wife had told the police
to expect a fight and the officer had heard a noise and movement inside after the knock. Danger to the arresting officer is
an exigent circumstance, thus justifying the entry. See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, §§ 4.8(d)-(g).
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3.8 Search and Detention of Persons on Premises
Being Searched
3.8(a)

Search of Persons on Premises Being Searched

Generally, a search warrant for premises "justifies a
search of personal effects of the owner found therein which
are plausible repositories for the objects specified in the warrant." State v. Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d 622, 624
(1984). But a search warrant for premises or for the person
and premises of one occupant does not authorize a search of
other occupants or visitors who happen to be on the premises
while the search is taking place,. nor does it automatically justify a search of personal effects belonging to such other occupants or visitors. See State v. Douglas S., 42 Wash. App. 138,
709 P.2d 817 (1985) (frisk of juvenile entering residence not
justified when there were no reasonable grounds to believe
that the juvenile was armed, and there was no showing that
the juvenile had dominion and control over the objects specified in warrant since the father had admitted that the marijuana plants found on the premises were his). See 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.9(b).
There are several circumstances, however, in which persons on the premises may be searched. First, a warrant may
describe a person to be searched. See supra § 3.4(c). Because
warrants are to be intepreted with common sense, a warrant
stating that there is probable cause to believe that there is evidence concealed on a person allows a search of that person
even though the command portion of the warrant mentions
only "places and premises." State v. Williams, 90 Wash. 2d
245, 246, 580 P.2d 635, 636 (1978). Second, a search may be conducted incident to an arrest. State v. Cottrell, 86 Wash. 2d 130,
542 P.2d 771 (1975); see infra § 5.1. In Cottrell, the warrant
authorized a search of defendant's residence or "person . . . 'if

found thereon.'" Id. at 131, 542 P.2d at 772. The court upheld
the search of defendant's person once the officer had probable
cause to place defendant under control as defendant exited a
car parked in front of the residence. Id.
When the warrant itself gives no express or implied
authorization to search persons on the premises and the police
do not have probable cause to arrest them, officers may search
such person in two situations. First, a person not named in the
warrant but present on the premises may be searched if the
police "have reasonable cause to believe [that the person] has

1988]

1988 Search and Seizure

the articles for which the search is institited upon his person."
State v. Halverson, 21 Wash. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408, 410
(1978) (citations omitted). "Reasonable cause" requires that
the person engage in some type of suspicious activity. Id.
Thus, in the execution of a search warrant for narcotics, police
were justified in searching an occupant's fists when at the time
of the officers' entry, the occupant was observed kneeling in
front of a weighing scale and then rising with his fists
clenched. Id. But police were not justified in searching an
occupant's purse when the occupant gave no evidence of suspicious behavior. State v. Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889, 893, 683
P.2d 622, 624 (1984). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 4.9(c), at 143-47.
Courts are divided over whether persons who enter a place
being searched may be legally searched without a warrant if
they had no opportunity to conceal the named items. See 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.9(c), at 295. In each of these
situations, the scope of the search of a bystander is limited to
that necessary for detecting the items sought; thus, police may
not search a person if the search warrant is for a television set.
Id. at 295 n.29.
Second, police may conduct a limited search for weapons
to protect themselves during the execution of the warrant.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338
(1979); State v. Halverson, 21 Wash. App. 35, 38, 584 P.2d 408,
410 (1978); State v. Galloway, 14 Wash. App. 200, 202, 540 P.2d
444, 446 (1975); see also State v. Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889, 683
P.2d 622 (1984). The police must, however, have a reasonable
suspicion that the person searched is armed. Ybarra, 444 U.S.
at 92-94, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 246-47, 100 S.Ct. at 343. Moreover, the
search must be limited to ascertaining whether the individual
is armed. State v. Allen, 93 Wash. 2d 170, 172, 606 P.2d 1235,
1236 (1980) (officer conducting patdown of individual who
knocked on door of residence being searched may not examine
contents of wallet found on individual "after satisfying himself
that the 'bulge' [wallet] was not a weapon"). Cf. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 10, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 899, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1874 (1968)
(police may conduct limited weapons search to protect themselves during lawful investigatory stop). Slightly different considerations may control search situations as compared with
Terry stops because the encounter in the search situation is
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more lengthy than that in a Terry stop. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH
& SEIZURE, § 4.9(d).
3.8(b)

Detention of Persons on Premises Being Searched

A "warrant to search for contraband founded on probable
cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain
the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d
340, 351, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
A brief detention is permissible even when the police do
not have probable cause to believe that the objects of the
search are on the person detained; in addition, the police may
ascertain whether any individual arriving on the scene might
interfere with the search and determine what business, if any,
the individual has at the premises. State v. Galloway, 14 Wash.
App. 200, 201, 540 P.2d 444, 446 (1975). Such a limited stop,
however, is not a license to detain and frisk all persons
approaching within 100 feet of the location of the search.
State v. Melin, 27 Wash. App. 589, 592, 618 P.2d 1324, 1325
(1980); see also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, §§ 4.9(d)-(e).
3.9

PermissibleScope and Intensity of Search

Assuming that a search warrant describes the area and
items with the requisite particularity, the remaining question
is the permissible scope and intensity of the search. "As a general rule search warrants must be strictly construed and their
execution must be within the specificity of the warrant." State
v. Cottrell, 12 Wash. App. 640, 643, 532 P.2d 644, 646, rev'd on
other grounds, 86 Wash. 2d 130, 542 P.2d 771 (1975).
The permissible intensity of a search is governed by the
nature of the items to be seized. Generally, a search warrant
for premises "justifies a search of personal effects of the owner
found therein which are plausible repositories for the objects
specified in the warrant." State v. Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889,
892, 683 P.2d 622, 624 (1984). See State v. Anderson, 41 Wash.
App. 85, 702 P.2d 481 (1985) (evidence was admissible where
the warrant was to search for clothing used in a robbery, thus
extending to the entire residence where clothing might be
found-including inside a garbage can sized commercial vacuum cleaner), revd on other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d 745, 733
P.2d 517 (1987). Once the purpose of the warrant has been carried out, the authority to search ends. See State v. Legas, 20
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Wash. App. 535, 541, 581 P.2d 172, 176 (1978) (warrant permitting search of bedroom for papers linking defendant to premises did not justify search of small box after such papers
discovered). Thus, a search is unlawful when a warrant names
one item and the officer begins searching for another, even
though the omission of the latter item was a mistake. State v.
Eisele, 9 Wash. App. 174, 176, 511 P.2d 1368, 1370 (1973); cf.
State v. Dearinger, 73 Wash. 2d 563, 567, 439 P.2d 971, 973
(1968) (when officers had reason to believe that during search
occupant threw sack into adjoining yard, sack and contents
found in adjoining yard within ambit of warrant), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1102 (1969).
For a discussion of the scope of a warrantless police search
following a private search by a private party, see infra § 7.5,
and following an administrative search see infra § 6.4(c).
3.9(a)

Area

A search may extend to the entire area covered by the
warrant's description. See generally State v. Cottrell, 12 Wash.
App. 640, 644, 532 P.2d 644, 647 (1975), rev'd on other grounds,
86 Wash. 2d 130, 542 P.2d 771 (1985). Police may enter areas
not explicitly named in the warrant when such entry is necessary to execute the warrant. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S.
238, 257, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177, 193, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 1693 (1979) (warrant explicitly authorizing planting hidden microphone implicitly authorized covert entry onto premises).
On the other hand, authority to search a vehicle does
not
include authority to break into a garage where the vehicle was
parked when the officers knew at the time they applied for the
warrant that the vehicle was in the garage, and they could
have included the garage in the warrant. People v. Sciacca, 45
N.Y.2d 122, 127, 379 N.E.2d 1153, 1155, 408 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25
(1978). It has been suggested that police may enter adjacent
areas if they reasonably fear for their safety. See 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.10(a), at 136.
3.9(b)

Personal Effects

Personal effects found on the premises and belonging to
the occupant may be searched if the effects can reasonably be
expected to contain the described items. State v. Worth, 37
Wash. App. 889, 892, 683 P.2d 622, 624 (1984). Those effects
that the police know belong to other occupants, however, may
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not ordinarily be searched. See id. at 893, 683 P.2d at 624-25.
Even when a warrant authorizes a search of the entire premises, it does not justify the search of another person residing on
the premises who was not mentioned in the affidavit, nor does
it justify a search of a purse belonging to that person if she was
holding it or in close proximity to it. Id
It is worth noting that the court of appeals in Worth
rejected a distinction between personal effects worn on or held
by the person and those effects nearby at the time of the
search. Id.; cf. State v. Biggs, 16 Wash. App. 221, 556 P.2d 247
(1976). "A narrow focus on whether a person is holding or
wearing a personal item would tend to undercut the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment and leave vulnerable readily recognizable effects, such as [a] purse, which an individual has under
his control and seeks to preserve as private." Worth, 37 Wash.
App. at 893, 683 P.2d at 625; cf. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 4.10(b), at 318-22 (suggesting that proper test in case involving visitors is whether police have reasonable belief that items
described would be concealed in visitor's belongings); State v.
Scott, 21 Wash. App. 113, 117, 584 P.2d 423, 425 (1978) (warrant
authorizing search of business records of "spa" to uncover evidence of prostitution did not permit search of employees'
purses for names of customers). One court has attempted to
avoid the problem by holding that one has no privacy interest
in items left at another's house. State v. Biggs, 16 Wash. App.
221, 556 P.2d 247 (1976) (visitor who had departed without his
jacket no longer had expectation of privacy in jacket and thus
jacket could be searched).
For a case involving abandoned personal effects, see
United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1986) (The
defendant abandoned briefcase containing cocaine in locked
trunk of automobile and made no effort to recover it or notify
authorities. Held, such abandonment carries no expectation of
privacy and it makes no difference that the defendant may
have had some hope of regaining possession in the future.).
See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.6(b).
The Supreme Court has recently held that there is no
expectation of privacy in garbage left beyond the curtilage of
L. Ed. 2d -,
the home. California v. Greenwood, - U.S. La EsperDe
v.
States
United
also
See
108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
for
placed
container
illa, 781 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1986) (trash
curbside collection); Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653 (Okla. Ct.
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App. 1985) (trash can at front curb). See LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 2.6(c). See also infra § 1.3(g).
3.9(c)

Vehicles

Some courts have held that a warrant authorizing a search
of "premises" permits a search of vehicles found thereon. 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH

& SEIZURE, § 4.10(c) (suggesting that doc-

trine at least should be limited to vehicles belonging to the
occupant); cf. infra § 5.1 (search incident to arrest); People v.
Sciacca, 45 N.Y.2d 122, 379 N.E.2d 1153, 408 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1978).
3.10

Seizure of Unnamed Items: Requirements in General

Items not listed in the search warrant may be seized when
the seizure falls within one of the general exceptions to the
warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d
686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) (search incident to arrest); State v.
Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 632 P.2d 44 (1981) (open view); State
v. Helmka, 86 Wash. 2d 91, 542 P.2d 115 (1975) (plain view).
See generally infra ch. 5.
The plain view doctrine requires that (1) the officers have
prior justification for the intrusion, (2) the incriminating evidence be discovered inadvertently, and (3) the officers must
know immediately that they have incriminating evidence
before them. State v. Anderson, 41 Wash. App. 85, 702 P.2d 481
(1985), rev'd on other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d 745, 733 P.2d 517
(1987); see also State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash. 2d 632, 716 P.2d
295 (1986) (evidence was in plain view, and significance of the
material to the investigation was readily apparent). The
officers need not be certain that the material is incriminating-it is sufficient if the officers have probable cause to
believe the material is incriminating. State v. Gonzales, 46
Wash. App. 388, 731 P.2d 1101 (1986) (incriminating nature of
pill bottles sufficient). When the elements of the plain view
doctrine are met, there is no additional requirement of exigent
circumstances to justify a warrantless seizure. State v. Bell, 43
Wash. App. 319, 716 P.2d 973 (1986), aff'd, 108 Wash. 2d 193,
737 P.2d 254 (1987).
3.11

Delivering Warrant and Inventory: Requirements for
Execution of Warrants

Statutes or court rules may impose requirements on the
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execution of warrants beyond those mandated by the federal
constitution. Washington court rules provide:
The peace officer taking property under the warrant shall
give to the person from whom or from whose premises the
property is taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the
property taken. If no such person is present, the officer may
post a copy of the search warrant and receipt. The return
shall be made promptly and shall be accompanied by a written inventory of any property taken. The inventory shall be
made in the presence of the person from whose possession or
premises the property is taken, or in the presence of at least
one person other than the officer. The judge shall upon
request deliver a copy of the inventory to the person from
whom or from whose premises the property was taken and
to the applicant for the warrant.
CRR 2.3(d). The requirement that an inventory be made in the
presence of another person is designed to prevent error in the
inventory. The requirement is satisfied by the presence of
another police officer. State v. Wraspir, 20 Wash. App. 626,
628, 581 P.2d 182, 184 (1978).
Washington follows the majority rule that defects relating
to the return of a search warrant are ministerial and do not
compel invalidation of the warrant, absent a showing of prejudice. State v. Smith, 15 Wash. App. 716, 719, 552 P.2d 1059, 1062
(1976); but see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.12(c) (contending that the complete absence of any return should render
the search unconstitutional).
3.12

Chiallengingthe Content of an Affidavit
3.12(a)

Informant's Identity

Although a defendant is generally entitled to examine an
affidavit in order to challenge whether the warrant was issued
on probable cause, the court may excise portions of the affidavit that identify a confidential or unnamed informant to protect the state's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
such informants. Franks v. Delaware,438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d
667, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 62, 87 S. Ct. 1056 (1967); State v. Mathiesen, 27 Wash.
App. 257, 260, 616 P.2d 1255, 1257, review denied, 94 Wash. 2d
1025 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 914 (1981). On the other
hand, "fundamental fairness" may require the disclosure of an
informant's identity when the informant's potential testimony
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at trial would be relevant to the determination of the defendant's innocence. See State v. Casal, 103 Wash. 2d 812, 816, 699
P.2d 1234, 1237 (1984) (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639, 77 S. Ct. 623 (1957)). Sce also WASH. REV.
CODE § 5.60.060(5) (1987) (public officer/governmental informant privilege).
When a defendant makes allegations that identify a secret
informant and cast reasonable doubt on the veracity of a material representation included in the affidavit used to obtain a
search warrant, and probable cause to search is not otherwise
established, the trial court should conduct an in camera hearing to determine whether the defendant's identification of the
informant is correct and whether the affiant truthfully
reported the facts stated by the informant. State v. Casal, 103
Wash. 2d 812, 699 P.2d 1234 (1985). See also State v. Wolken,
103 Wash. 2d 823, 700 P.2d 319 (1985) (defendant must make a
threshold substantial showing of falsehood). It is within the
sound discretion of the trial court to order an in camera hearing. Casal, 103 Wash. 2d at 820, 699 P.2d at 1239.
To determine whether an accused's interest in learning
the identity of an informant outweighs the public interest in
protecting the informant's anonymity and the flow of information, a court should consider all the particular circumstances of
each case, including the crime charged, the possible defenses,
and the materiality of the informant's testimony as to guilt or
innocence at an in camera hearing. The disclosure decision is
within the trial court's discretion. State v. Uhthoft 45 Wash.
App. 261, 724 P.2d 1103, review denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1017
(1986). If a trial court's questioning of a secret informant at an
in camera hearing does not refute the existence of probable
cause to search, but does give rise to a threshold substantial
showing that material information set forth in the affidavit
was false, the court should hold an evidentiary hearing at
which the informant's identity should be disclosed to determine the veracity of the information. Casal, 103 Wash. 2d at
822, 699 P.2d at 1240. See also Wolken, 103 Wash. 2d at 828-29,
700 P.2d at 322. Cf. State v. Fredrick, 45 Wash. App. 916, 729
P.2d 56 (1986) (in camera hearing not required when defendant's reasons for seeking an informant's testimony are
speculative).
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Misrepresentations and Omissions in the Affidavit

A defendant may challenge the validity of a warrant based
on a misrepresentation of fact in the supporting affidavit.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct.
2674 (1978). The defendant must first make a substantial showing that a false statement in the affidavit (1) was either made
intentionally or in reckless disregard for the truth, and (2) was
necessary, or material, to the finding of probable cause. Id. at
155-56, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 672, 98 S. Ct. at 2676. The showing must
be based on specific facts and offers of proof rather than conclusory assertions.
A criminal defendant may not undertake discovery to
enable him to challenge statements set forth in an affidavit in
support of a facially valid search warrant, before making a preliminary showing that the affiant, knowingly, intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth included in his affidavit a
false statement that was necessary to the probable cause determination. State v. Blackshear, 44 Wash. App. 587, 723 P.2d 15
(1986). Once the defendant has made this preliminary showing, he or she is entitled to a full hearing on the issue. State v.
Thetford, 109 Wash. 2d 392, 745 P.2d 496 (1987) (court must
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the veracity of the
statements even when the statements are made by a known
informant who is so involved with and controlled by the police
that he acquires the status of a de facto police officer).
There is no right to an evidentiary hearing if the unchallenged affidavit information is sufficient to establish probable
cause. State v. Lodge, 42 Wash. App. 380, 385, 711 P.2d 1078,
1082 (1985). At the hearing the defendant must prove the
truth of his or her allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. If the defendant is successful, the misrepresentations must be stricken from the affidavit; if in the absence of
the stricken statements probable cause does not exist, the warrant is void. Id.; State v. Coates, 107 Wash. 2d 882, 735 P.2d 64
(1987); State v. Ludvik, 40 Wash. App. 257, 698 P.2d 1064 (1985).
Cf. United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1976) (if
misrepresentation made with intent to deceive magistrate,
then warrant void regardless of materiality). Washington has
extended the Franks rule to cover material omissions of fact.
State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81, 85 (1985); cf.
United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Again, the defendant must prove both that the omission was
made either intentionally or with reckless disregard and that
the omitted information would have negated probable cause.
Cord, 103 Wash. 2d at 367, 693 P.2d at 87; cf. State v. Seagull, 95
Wash. 2d 898, 906-07, 632 P.2d 44, 46 (1981) (officer's innocent
but inaccurate identification of tomato plant as marijuana
plant did not invalidate warrant).
3.13
3.13(a)

Special Situations

First Amendment Limitations

A film may be seized pursuant to a warrant only if a
prompt judicial determination is available. Heller v. New York,
413 U.S. 483, 489, 37 L. Ed. 2d 745, 752, 93 S. Ct. 2789, 2793
(1973). If the film is a single copy, however, the court should
permit copying the film to allow showings to continue. Id. at
483, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 734, 93 S. Ct. at 2795.
When seizure of a large quantity of allegedly obscene
books is contemplated, the usual warrant requirements are
insufficient to ensure constitutionality. Such planned seizures
call for a prior judicial determination of obscenity in an adversary proceeding. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378
U.S. 205, 210, 12 L. Ed. 2d 809, 812, 84 S. Ct. 1723, 1725 (1964);
see also G.I. Distrib. Inc. v. Murphy, 490 F.2d 1167, 1169 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 939 (1974). Cf.Maryland v.
Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 472-77, 86 L. Ed. 2d 370, 378-82, 105 S. Ct.
2778, 2783-86 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (first amendment
implicated when officer purchased magazine in bookstore and
magazine was later introduced into evidence to convict seller
on obscenity charges). But cf.id. at 469, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 377, 105
S. Ct. at 2782 (police did not commit unreasonable seizure of
property when, without warrant, they bought magazine later
used as evidence to convict seller on obscenity charges; sale
cannot be considered seizure within fourth amendment). See
2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,

3.13(b)

§ 4.1(c).

Intrusions Into the Body

Even when a warrant has been obtained, a physical intrusion into a person's body will violate due process if the intrusion "shocks the conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172, 96 L. Ed. 183, 190, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209 (1952). Thus, for
example, "[a] compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's
body for evidence implicates expectations of privacy and secur-
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ity of such magnitude that the intrusion may be unreasonable
even if likely to produce evidence of a crime." Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662, 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985); Schmerber
v. California,384 U.S. 757, 770-72, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919-20, 86 S.
Ct. 1826, 1835-36 (1966). An intrusion that does not 'shock the
conscience' and is reasonable is one in which:
1. there is a clear indication, rather than a mere chance,
that the intrusion will produce the desired evidence;
2. the intrusive procedure is reasonably suited to
obtaining the evidence, as for example, a blood test used for
determining blood alcohol levels; and
3. the intrusive procedure is performed in a reasonable
manner, as, for example, a blood test performed by medical
personnel rather than officers at the station house. Id.
Thus, for example, taking a blood sample from a defendant charged with negligent homicide in several automobile
deaths is reasonable when the police have probable cause to
believe the defendant is intoxicated. State v. Judge, 100 Wash.
2d 706, 675 P.2d 219 (1984).
Extraction of blood samples for testing is a highly effective
means of determining the degree to which a person is under
the influence of alcohol. Such tests are a commonplace in
these days of periodic physical examinations and experience
with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is
minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves
virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.
Id. at 712, 675 P.2d at 223 (citation omitted). See also State v.
Komoto, 40 Wash. App. 200, 208, 697 P.2d 1025, 1031 (probable
cause established if person appears intoxicated and intoxication
is an element of the crime for which the suspect is arrested),
review denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1009, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021
(1985). Washington has upheld mandatory blood tests of putative fathers if full adversary hearings have first been instituted. State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 738-39, 612 P.2d 795,
798 (1980). See generally infra §§ 4.4(a) (use of force during
arrest) and 5.18(a) (warrantless intrusions into the body).
Rochin's "shocks the conscience" standard to exclude evidence
obtained by pumping a suspect's stomach has been called into
doubt by the Seventh Circuit. In Lester v. City of Cicago, 830
F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987), the court rejected the use of the due
process "shocks the conscience" standard of Rochin's in a case
involving excessive force in arrest. Instead, the court held that
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the fourth amendment's objective reasonableness standard
should apply.
More intrusive procedures may be permitted in special
environments such as at prisons and jails, see Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979) (full body
cavity searches of prison inmates following contact visits not
unreasonable, even when searches routine and not based on
probable cause), and at borders, see United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381, 105 S. Ct. 3304
(1985) (suspect fitting profile for alimentary canal drug smuggler may be subjected to rectal cavity search when warrant
based on profile plus suspect's unwillingness to eat, drink, or
defecate during 16 hour confinement). See generally infra
§§ 6.2 (prisons), 6.3 (borders).
Other factors considered include the necessity of the
search for a fair determination of the charges and whether
opportunities for an adversary hearing and interlocutory appellate review are provided. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,

§ 4.1(d); see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 763, 84 L. Ed. 2d at
670-71, 105 S.Ct. at 1618.
3.13(c)

Warrants Directed at Non-Suspects
The Constitution does not prohibit warrants directed at
nonsuspects. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560, 56
L. Ed. 2d 525, 538, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1978-79 (1978). But see
O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979) (invalidating warrant authorizing search of attorney's office when
attorney not suspected of criminal activity and no threat
existed that materials would be destroyed). Critics have
argued that a search warrant of a third party is per se unreasonable and that a subpeona duces tecum can adequately protect law enforcement interests. See Note, The Reasonableness
of WarrantedSearches of Nonsuspect Third Parties,44 ALB. L.
REV. 212, 232-35 (1979) (criticizing Stanford Daily for failing to
adopt a less drastic alternative or less intrusive practice test in
fourth amendment cases). See also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, §§ 4.1(e)-(g).
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SEIZURE OF THE PERSON: ARRESTS
AND STOP-AND-FRISKS

4.0 Arrest. Introduction
This chapter deals with principles that are unique to
seizures of the person. Related issues are discussed infra § 5.1
(search incident to -rrest); supra ch. 2 (probable cause); and
supra § 3.7 (knock and announce).
An illegal arrest is not a defense to prosecution. The legality of the arrest, however, affects the legality of searches and
confessions taking place subsequent to the arrest, the admissibility of evidence derived from the arrest, and the consequent
search. See generally infra ch. 7.
4.1 Arrests Without Warrants: Public versus Home Arrests
Arrests are not subject to the same strict warrant requirements as searches, and an officer may make a warrantless felony arrest in a public place even though he or she had time to
obtain a warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423, 46
L. Ed. 2d 598, 609, 96 S. Ct. 820, 828 (1976); State v. Luellen, 17
Wash. App. 91, 93, 562 P.2d 253, 255 (1977). See 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.1(b), at 225-33. When a warrantless
arrest has occurred, however, the defendant is entitled to a
prompt judicial determination of probable cause. Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975); see
infra § 4.4(c).
Although the police may make a warrantless arrest in a
public area, in the absence of exigent circumstances they may
not make a warrantless arrest after a nonconsensual entry into
a suspect's home. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 63
L. Ed. 2d 639, 652-53, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381 (1980). Fact patterns
constituting exigent circumstances are described in some detail
infra §§ 5.16-5.20. See generally Donnino & Gierese, Exigent
Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 ALB. L.
REV. 90 (1980). The Payton prohibition on a warrantless nonconsensual entry of a suspect's home is applied to three sets of
facts in State v. Counts, 99 Wash. 2d 54, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983).
See also State v. Hendricks, 25 Wash. App. 775, 779-80, 610 P.2d
940, 943 (1980).
Under the fourth amendment, police who make a warrantless arrest outside an arrestee's home may then accompany the
arrestee into his or her home even if the arrestee, with the
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officer's consent, enters the home for a purpose such as
obtaining identification. See Washington v. Chrisman,455 U.S.
1, 6-7, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778, 102 S. Ct. 812, 817 (1982) (risk of danger
to officer and possibility of confederates' escape justified police
officer accompanying arrested person into dwelling; police
need no affirmative indication of likelihood of danger or
escape); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 49 L. Ed. 2d
300, 305, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2409 (1976).
Washington, however, has rejected the bright line rule
that an officer may, in all circumstances, accompany an arrestee into the arrestee's home. State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d
814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984). Under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, when a person is arrested for a minor violation, the arresting officer may not follow the arrestee into his
or her home unless the officer can reasonably conclude that
the officer's safety is endangered, evidence might be destroyed,
or escape is a strong possibility. Id. at 821-22, 676 P.2d at 424
(officer's entry into 11th floor dormitory room of student
arrested for misdemeanor unlawful when circumstances indicated no likelihood of escape, destruction of evidence, or danger to officer). A police officer may accompany an arrestee
into his or her residence without a warrant if the officer knows
of specific, articulable facts that indicate a threat to the
officer's safety. State v. Wood, 45 Wash. App. 299, 308, 725 P.2d
435, 440 (officer executing an arrest warrant for a felony parole
violation had sufficient reason to accompany the arrestee into
residence for security purposes), review denied, 107 Wash. 2d
1017 (1986); State v. Nelson, 47 Wash. App. 157, 161, 734 P.2d
516, 518-19 (1987) (fact that the arrestee was a suspected drug
dealer, and that police officer's experience indicated that drug
dealers frequently carried weapons, and that officers serving
warrant were warned to be cautious, presented sufficient facts
to reasonably justify officers' accompaniment of arrestee into
his home because of concern for their safety, despite fact that
the arrest was made for a different and minor violation).
The arrest of a suspect who is standing in the doorway of
his or her home is treated the same as an arrest in the home.
See State v. Holevnan, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 429, 693 P.2d 89, 91
(1985). For fourth amendment purposes, the location of the
suspect and not the location of the officer is material to the
issue of whether an arrest occurs in the home. Id. at 429, 693
P.2d at 91. An arrest of a suspect who is located on a front
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porch, as opposed to in the doorway, however, is considered a
public arrest. State v. Bockman, 37 Wash. App. 474, 682 P.2d
925 (1984).
4.2 Arrests Without Warrants: Felony versus
MisdemeanorArrests
4.2(a)

Felony Arrest

This section discusses differences in the warrant requirements for felony and misdemeanor arrests. For a discussion of
custodial arrests for misdemeanor offenses, see infra § 4.4(d).
Under the common law standard and the fourth amendment,
an officer's authority to make a warrantless arrest in public
generally applies only to felonies. See United State v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411, 423, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 609, 96 S. Ct. 820, 828 (1976).
While some states have placed restrictions on warrantless felony arrests, Washington has codified the common law rule.
WASH. REV. CODE

§ 10.31.100 (1987).

4.2(b)

Misdemeanor Arrest

The common law rule for misdemeanor arrests requires
that a warrant be procured unless a breach of peace is committed in the officer's presence. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 5.1(b), at 396; contra Tacoma v. Harris,73 Wash. 2d 123, 126,
436 P.2d 770, 772 (1968). The common law misdemeanor rule
has not been held to be constitutionally required, and many
states have enacted statutes applying the felony rule to misdemeanors. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 46 L.
Ed. 2d 598, 606, 96 S. Ct. 820, 825 (1976). Some states that
require misdemeanor warrants have held that a statutory--as
opposed to constitutional-violation is not grounds for the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of the arrest. See, e.g.,
State v. Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556, 560, 196 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1973).
Washington law permits an officer to make a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest only when the offense (1) is committed in
the officers presence, (2) involves physical harm or the threat
of physical harm to persons or property, (3) is for possession of
marijuana, or (4) is for one of a number of specified traffic
offenses. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.100 (1987). Cf. State v.
Whatcom County, 92 Wash. 2d 35, 38, 593 P.2d 546, 547 (1979)
(officer may not make arrest at location other than accident
scene); State v. Teuber, 19 Wash. App. 651, 645-55, 577 P.2d 147,
149-50 (1978) (officer may make lawful misdemeanor arrest for
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offense committed four hours earlier when offense involves
physical harm to property).
The "in the presence" requirement of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.31.100 (1987) is satisfied whenever the officer directly perceives facts permitting a reasonable inference that a misdemeanor is being committed. Snohomish v. Swoboda, 1 Wash.
App. 292, 295, 461 P.2d 546, 548-49 (1969). Questions arise as to
whether the officer must view all the elements of a crime and
as to what types of information may be used to fill in "gaps."
Id. ("in the presence" requirement was satisfied when from 150
feet away police officers, as part of "sting" operation, observed
person handing an object to another; even though police could
not positively identify the object, the nature of the operation
permitted a reasonable inference the object was contraband);
State v. Silverman, 48 Wash. 2d 198, 202-03, 292 P.2d 868, 870
(1956) (when officer enters establishment as member of public
and views "peep shows," arrest of person operating establishment is valid; elements of possession of obscene pictures with
intent to show them committed in officer's presence). The
misdemeanor offense of possessing or consuming alcohol by a
person under 21 years of age (WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.270) is
not committed in the police officer's presence if the officer
does not witness the person's ingestion of the alcohol, but only
senses symptoms indicating that the person has alcohol or
other drugs in his system. State v. Hornaday, 105 Wash. 2d
120, 128-29, 713 P.2d 71, 76-77 (1986) (the terms "consumed"
and "possession" in WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.270 should be
strictly interpreted in light of the exception in WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.31.100(1) allowing the warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor involving the "use" or "possession" of cannabis). See
also United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1128 (1st Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979); State v. Greene, 75 Wash. 2d
519, 521, 451 P.2d 926, 928 (1969). See generally 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.1(c).
4.3 Arrest with Warrants
The principles governing the procurement and execution
of search warrants also apply to arrest warrants. See supra ch.
3; CRR 2.2; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.31.030-040 (1987). Thus, an
invalid warrant will not support an arrest. Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306, 313, 91 S. Ct. 1031,
1037 (1971); see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.1(g).
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A seizure is lawful if police have reasonably articulable
grounds to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee
named in the warrant. If doubt arises as to the identity, the
officer is expected to immediately take reasonable steps to confirm or deny whether the warrant was applicable to the person
held. The initial arrest, however, must be based on more than
the individuals similarity to the general physical description
set forth in the warrant. State v. Smith, 102 Wash. 2d 449, 688
P.2d 146 (1985) (applying test articulated in Sanders v. United
States, 339 A.2d 373, 379 (D.C. App. 1975), court found seizure

of "chako sticks" to be unlawful). See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 5.1(a).
4.4 Arrests: Miscellaneous Requirements
4.4(a)

Use of Force

Under traditional common law, an officer was permitted to
use reasonable force to make an arrest, and the officer could
use deadly force if such force reasonably appeared necessary to
prevent a suspect's escape from a felony arrest. The common
law rule has been restricted, however, and an arresting officer
may use deadly force only when he or she "has probable cause
to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or
serious physical injury to the officer or others." Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, 4, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1696
(1985) (police not permitted to shoot unarmed, fleeing burglary
suspect).
In Washington, the amount of force an officer may use is
governed by statute to the extent that the statute is consistent
with Tennessee v. Garner. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.31.050 (1987) ("If after notice of the intention to arrest the
defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist (sic), the officer may
use all necessary means to effect the arrest."); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9A.16.040 (1987). In a Washington case decided before
Tennessee v. Garner, the court upheld the use of a chokehold
to prevent destruction of evidence even though the officers did
not fear harm to themselves or to the public. State v. Taplin,
36 Wash. App. 664, 676 P.2d 504 (1984) (chokehold used to prevent defendant from swallowing balloons suspected of containing heroin did not violate due process of fourth amendment
rights; defendant was capable of breathing when chokehold
was applied). Cf. infra §§ 5.2(a) and 5.18(a). In a recent
amendment to WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040 (1987), the legis-
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lature specifically limited the use of deadly force under WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.16.040 (1)(c) to instances in which the officer
has "probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer
... or others." WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(2) (1987). The
use of deadly force by a public officer is justified "when necessar[y] ... to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the
legal process . .. or in the discharge of a legal duty." WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(b) (1987). In addition, deadly force is
justified when either a public officer or a
person acting under his command and in the officers aid...
[t]o arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably
believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony; or ... [t]o prevent
the escape ... [or to] retak[e] a person who escapes from a
[federal or state correctional] facility; or... [t]o prevent the
escape of a person from county or city jail ... if the person
has been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a felony;
or to lawfully suppress a riot if the actor is armed with a
deadly weapon.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(1)(c) (1987). In construing a
prior statute, the Washington Supreme Court held that deadly
force may be used even when a felony has not in fact occurred
as long as the officer reasonably believes that a felony has been
committed. Reese v. Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 374, 379-80, 503 P.2d
64, 69-70 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973). In Reese, the
court stated that "[g]reat caution must be exercised by an
officer in the use of deadly force and it must be resorted to by
an officer only when all other reasonable efforts to apprehend
a person fleeing from a lawful arrestfor a felony have failed."
Id. at 382-83, 503 P.2d at 71 (emphasis original). In light of Tennessee v. Garner,and recent amendments to WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.31.050 (1987), the officer will now be required to show
probable, rather than merely reasonable, cause.
4.4(b)

Significance of Booking and Crime Charged:
Pretextual Arrests

Courts differ as to the significance of a suspect being
booked for one offense yet formally charged with another.
Conflicting considerations underlie the decisions. On the one
hand, if the booking and formal charges need not be similar,
police can use an arrest as a pretext for detaining a suspect for
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questioning about an unrelated crime for which the police lack
probable cause. On the other hand, at the time police first
establish probable cause for one crime, they may not possess
sufficient information to establish probable cause for another.
See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.1(e).
In Washington, the formal charge may differ from the
booking charge. State v. Teuber, 19 Wash. App. 651, 656, 577
P.2d 147, 150 (1978). The booking charge has no significance
after a formal charge has been lodged, and booking "for investigation" is permissible provided probable cause for an arrest
on any charge is present. See State v. Thompson, 58 Wash. 2d
598, 606-07, 364 P.2d 527, 532 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 945
(1962).
When a suspect is arrested for a misdemeanor not committed in the officer's presence, the arrest is not illegal if the
arresting officer has knowledge of a felony for which the suspect could have been arrested. State v. Vangen, 72 Wash. 2d
548, 553, 433 P.2d 691, 694 (1967).
4.4(c)

Judicial Review

A person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a postarrest probable cause determination. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 114, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 65, 95 S. Ct. 854, 863 (1975)
("Once the suspect is in custody, . . . the reasons that justify
dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate."). A neutral and detached magistrate must make the
probable cause determination, but the hearing may be ex parte.
Id. at 119-23, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 68-71, 95 S. Ct. 865-68.
The issue of whether a violation of the Gerstein rule
requires suppression of evidence seized after the arrest has not
been resolved. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.1(f), at
244-52; see also Williams v. State, 264 Ind. 664, 668, 348 N.E.2d
623, 627 (1976) (defendant's voluntary confession suppressed
when, following probable cause arrest, defendant was held for
eight days without judicial determination of probable cause
and confession was made during that detention).
4.4(d)

Custodial Arrests for Minor Offenses

The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed
whether probable cause always justifies an arrest. Lower court
decisions, however, have held that for certain offenses an
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arrest is unconstitutional in the absence of a special need for
custody. See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.1(h).
When civil as opposed to criminal proceedings are
involved, custodial arrests may be improper. The Washington
Supreme Court has held unconstitutional a statute authorizing
the custodial arrest of any person against whom a paternity
complaint is filed. State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 537 P.2d
268 (1975). Thus, in the absence of a contrary showing, the
usual summons and complaint procedure for civil cases is
deemed adequate for securing the defendant's presence at trial.
Id. at 522, 537 P.2d at 278. Criminal cases are treated differently because the public interest in restraining the defendant
is greater. Id. at 520, 537 P.2d at 277; see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 5.1(h), at 434-35.
Although traffic infractions may fall within the criminal
code, under Washington law "as a matter of public policy ...
custodial arrest for minor traffic violations is unjustified,
unwarranted, and impermissible if the defendant signs [a]
promise to appear ... [in court] ... .. " State v. Hehman, 90
Wash. 2d 45, 47, 578 P.2d 627, 528 (1978); see WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.64.015 (1987); cf. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.2(e). A
custodial arrest is not inappropriate, however, merely because
the offense is traffic-related. State v. Carner, 28 Wash. App.
439, 443, 624 P.2d 204, 207 (1981) (arrest proper when minor
tried to evade police on his motorcycle); cf. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.64.015 (1987) (police may detain suspect who refuses to
sign a promise to appear in court).
A police officer may make a custodial arrest for a traffic
violation when the violation is a crime, rather than merely a
traffic infraction, or when the circumstances surrounding the
arrest dictate transferring the violator to another location for
completion of the arrest process. State v. LaTourette, 49 Wash.
App. 119, 125, 741 P.2d 1033, 1036, review denied, 109 Wash. 2d
1025 (1988) (officers' decision to move arrestee to another location to complete defendants' arrest for reckless driving was
proper when hostile crowd gathered in crowded parking lot).
See also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756-64, 80 L. Ed. 2d
732, 747-52, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2101-104 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (state acted within its proper police power in dealing with
perceived seriousness of drunk-driving when it enacted a statute that permitted a warrantless arrest for the misdemeanor);
State v. McIntosh, 42 Wash. App. 579, 586, 712 P.2d 319, 321
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(fact that arrestee for misdemeanor traffic violation had no
identification, did not claim to own the vehicle he was driving,
and related a suspicious account of his activities, justified a reasonable assumption that arrestee would not respond to a citation if issued), review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1015 (1986).
4.5 Stop-and-Frisk" Introduction
Police investigatory stops that fall short of arrests may be
based on less proof than probable cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Although these
brief detentions fall within the scope of the fourth amendment,
the public interest in crime detection and the relative nonintrusiveness of a stop permit a lower standard of proof. Id. at
20-27, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905-09, 88 S. Ct. at 1879-83. Thus, the
investigatory stop is tested against the fourth amendment's
general proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures,
rather than by the amendment's probable cause requirement.
Id. at 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.
The standard of proof that must be satisfied for a lawful
investigatory stop is a "reasonable suspicion, based on objective
facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity."
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362, 99 S. Ct.
2637, 2641 (1979). The mere subjective good faith of the investigating officer is insufficient. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 20 L. Ed.
2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880 (citation omitted). See generally
supra § 2.9(b).
Once an officer possesses a reasonable suspicion, he or she
may forcibly stop the suspect, but the stop must be a more limited intrusion than an arrest. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 209, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 833, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2255 (1979). An
investigatory stop will be held "reasonable" when "the limited
violation of individual privacy" is outweighed by the public's
"interests in crime prevention and detection.... ." Id. Although
a balancing test determines the permissible scope of a stop,
once an intrusion is substantial enough to constitute an arrest,
probable cause is necessary regardless of how substantial the
public's interest is. See id. at 212-216, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 835-38, 99
S. Ct. at 2256-58 (custodial detention, even when charges not
filed and suspect is not told that he is under arrest, requires
probable cause). But cf United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381, 105 S. Ct. 3304 (1985)
(special governmental interest in detaining smugglers at bor-
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der justifies holding suspect 16 hours based on reasonable suspicion of transporting contraband); see infra § 6.3.
Reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop may
ripen into probable cause to arrest if the totality of the circumstances would lead a reasonably cautious and prudent police
officer with the arresting officer's experience to believe that
the suspect had committed a crime. State v. McIntosh, 42 Wash.
App. 579, 583-84, 712 P.2d 323, 325 (suspects' inability to give
rational account of appearance and presence in a high burglary
area late at night, absence of identification, and presence of
what appeared to be burglar's tools gave rise to probable cause
to arrest), review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1015 (1986). A temporary seizure of a suspect that falls short of an arrest does not
require that the officer give the suspect Miranda warnings
until the police officer's suspicion of criminal activity ripens
into probable cause for arrest. State v. Mercer, 45 Wash. App.
769, 777, 727 P.2d 676, 682 (1986); see also State v. Marshall, 47
Wash. App. 322, 324-25, 737 P.2d 265, 267 (1987); State v. Cameron, 47 Wash. App. 878, 885-86, 737 P.2d 688, 692 (1987).
Terry stops are permitted both to prevent ongoing or
future criminal activity and to investigate completed crimes.
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 105 S.
Ct. 675 (1985). For a discussion of the use of the reasonable
suspicion standard in special environments, see infra §§ 6.1
(schools) and 6.3 (border). See also Preiser, Confrontations
Initiated by Police on Less Than Probable Cause, 45 ALB. L.
REV. 57, 58 (1980); see generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§§ 9.1(a)-(e).
4.6 Satisfying the Reasonable Suspicion Standard
4.6(a)

Factual Basis and Individualized Suspicion

The reasonable suspicion standard requires that the
officer's belief be based on objective facts. Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1979);
State v. Gluck, 83 Wash. 2d 424, 426, 518 P.2d 703, 705 (1974).
The facts must be both "specific and articulable." An "inarticulate hunch" is insufficient. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889, 906, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968); State v. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838, 842, 613 P.2d 525, 527 (1980). See Florida
v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165, 105 S. Ct. 308 (1984);
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 422, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629,
101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1980). An officer's ability, as a result of his
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or her experience, to perceive meaning in what, to the ordinary citizen, would appear innocent conduct may make a suspicion reasonable. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S.
873, 884-85, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 619, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582 (1975).
Individualized suspicion is generally required for a Terry
stop. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362, 99
S. Ct. 2637, 2640-41, (1979); State v. Kennedy, 38 Wash. App. 41,
684 P.2d 1326 (1984), aff'd, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
However, several exceptions exist. Thus, in some circumstances a stop may be based on less than individualized suspicion when "carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers."
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362, 99 S. Ct.
may constitute such a
2637, 2640-41 (1979). Border checkpoints
circumstance. See infra § 6.3. When individualized suspicion is
lacking, however, officer discretion must be limited; thus, for
example, police officers stopping vehicles for driver's license
and vehicle registration checks may not select the vehicles at
random. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660,
673-74, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979); see also State v. Marchand,
104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985); Seattle v. Messiani, 110
Wash. 2d 454, - P.2d - (1988). For a discussion of stops
requiring no individualized suspicion, see infra §§ 6.3 (stops at
or near borders) and 6.4(c) (vehicle spot checks). See generally
3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 9.3(c).
4.6(b)

Particular Applications: Informants

When stops have been based on information provided by
informants, the information does not have to meet the same
criteria required for probable cause. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617, 92 S. Ct. 1921,
1924 (1972). See generally supra § 2.5. The information must,
however, carry "indicia of reliability." Adams, 407 U.S. at 147,
32 L. Ed. 2d at 617, 92 S. Ct. at 1924 (informant was known personally to officer and had provided information in past). See
also State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 7, 726 P.2d 445, 449
(1986) (prior reliability of informant, plus officer's observation
corroborating parts of informant's tip, i.e., that suspect drove
car of certain color and regularly bought drugs at certain residence, were sufficient indicia of reliability to justify investigative stop). Potential danger to the public is a factor that bears
on the reasonableness of a police officer's temporary investiga-
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tory detention of the suspect. State v. Franklin,41 Wash. App.
409, 413, 704 P.2d 666, 669 (1985) (an anonymous informant's
observation of a person displaying a gun in a public restroom,
together with the police officer's verification of the informant's
report of the person's attire and location justified an investigatory stop of the person). For a summary of cases interpreting
Adams, see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 9.3(e).
Police may make a Terry stop on the basis of information
provided by other divisions or agencies. United States v. Hens.ey, 469 U.S. 221, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985). Thus,
an investigatory stop may be based on information regarding a
completed crime that was provided by other police agencies so
long as the length and the intrusiveness of the detention do
not exceed that which would have been effected by the police
agency providing the information. State v. Dorsey, 40 Wash.
App. 459, 470, 698 P.2d 1109, 1115-16, review denied, 104 Wash.
2d 1010 (1985). If, however, the officer who was the source of
the information did not possess facts supporting a reasonable
suspicion, the stop would be unlawful. Hensley, 469 U.S. at
231, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 614, 105 S. Ct. at 682-83.
In Washington, police must have some reason to believe
that an informant is reliable and possess "[s]ome underlying
factual justification for the informant's conclusion" that a
crime is being committed. State v. Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d 43, 48,
621 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1980). No reliability may be inferred from
an anonymous informant or from a named but unknown telephone informant, nor may the basis for the informant's knowledge be inferred from conclusory allegations. Id. But
conclusory allegations may be sufficient when independent
police observations corroborate the presence of criminal activity or the reliability of the manner in which the information
was obtained. Id.; State v. Lesnick, 84 Wash. 2d 940, 944, 530
P.2d 243, 246, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 891 (1975). See also State v.
Kennedy, 38 Wash. App. 41, 684 P.2d 1326 (1984), aff'd, 107
Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986); State v. Sykes, 27 Wash. App.
111, 115-16, 615 P.2d 1345, 1347-48 (1980); State v. McCord, 19
Wash. App. 250, 254, 576 P.2d 892, 895 (1978).
An informant's tip may be sufficiently reliable to support
a stop even when it would not support an arrest. See State v.
Moreno, 21 Wash. App. 430, 436, 585 P.2d 481, 483 (1978)
(officer had cause to stop but not arrest when defendant
arrived on flight specified by anonymous informant); State v.
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Chatmon, 9 Wash. App. 741, 748, 515 P.2d 530, 535 (1973)
(officer's failure to establish reliability of anonymous informant by obtaining description of informant and by learning both
informant's purpose for being at scene of crime and reason for
informant's desire to remain anonymous does not invalidate
investigative stop, but because circumstances do not indicate
probable cause the subsequent search is invalidated).
The Washington Supreme Court has suggested that less
reliability is required for a stop when the tip involves a serious
crime, than that required in other circumstances. State v. Lesnick, 84 Wash. 2d 940, 944-45, 530 P.2d 243, 246 (1975), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 891 (1975); see also Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d at 50,
621 P.2d at 1276. See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 9.3(e),
at 486, for a discussion of State v. Lesnick and the argument
that lesser indicia of reliability should be necessary for serious
crimes.
4.6(c)

Particular Applications: Nature of Offense

Terry stops have been upheld for offenses ranging from
aggravated robbery, United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 83
L. Ed. 2d 604, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985), to possession of narcotics,
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 92 S. Ct.
1921 (1972). For arguments that Terry stops should be limited
to investigations of serious offenses, see Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. at 151-53, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 620-21, 92 S. Ct. at 1926-27
(Brennan, J., dissenting); 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 9.2(c); cf. State v. Moreno, 21 Wash. App. 430, 434, 585 P.2d
481, 483 (1978) (possession of narcotics characterized as "serious" offense).
4.6(d)

Examples of Satisfying or Failing to Satisfy the
Reasonable Suspicion Standard

The mere fact that a suspect is in a high crime area will
not justify a stop. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 61 L. Ed. 2d
357, 362-63, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1979); State v. Larson, 93 Wash.
2d 638, 641, 611 P.2d 771, 774 (1980). Cf. State v. Belanger, 36
Wash. App. 818, 819-21, 677 P.2d 781, 782-83 (1984) (officer
acquired a well-founded suspicion of criminal conduct when he
observed individual walking in high crime area in early morning, the individual gave unsatisfactory responses to the officer's
questions after voluntarily engaging in conversation with the
officer, and the officer observed guns, including one with a
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pawnshop tag). A person leaving a crime scene when police
arrive is not the proper subject of a stop in the absence of
other circumstances. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 360,
99 S. Ct. at 2639; State v. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838, 841-42,
613 P.2d 525, 527 (1980). Similarly, officers may not stop an
individual because the individual is in proximity to others who
are suspected of criminal activity. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d at
841, 613 P.2d at 517; Larson, 93 Wash. 2d at 642, 611 P.2d at 774;
see infra § 4.7(b). But cf Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,
705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 351, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2595-96 (1981) (valid
search warrant for residence allows detention of occupants
during search). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§§ 9.3 (c), (d), and (f) (discussing and evaluating state and federal case law on the common Terry stop situations).
Washington decisions upholding Terry stops include: State
v. Sweet, 44 Wash. App. 226, 233, 721 P.2d 560, 564 (suspect's
flight after seeing police is a circumstance, along with other
relevant circumstances, which may give rise to a reasonable
suspicion justifying an investigatory stop), review denied, 107
Wash. 2d 1001 (1986); State v. Mercer, 45 Wash. App. 769, 727
P.2d 676 (1986); State v. Young, 28 Wash. App. 412, 421-23, 624
P.2d 725, 731-32 (1981) (police officer's knowledge of numerous
specific, articulable facts reasonably warranted suspicion that
suspect involved in burglary); State v. Walker, 24 Wash. App.
823, 827-28, 604 P.2d 514, 517 (1979) (information given to police
officer when examined in conjunction with defendant's physical appearance, proximity to crime scene, possession of black
purse, .and possession of loose currency in hand, gave rise to
reasonable inference justifying investigatory stop); State v.
Dunn, 22 Wash. App. 362, 365, 591 P.2d 782, 784 (1979) (defendant's lack of identification and statement that he did not live
anywhere, coupled with proximity to burglary site, permitted
"swell-founded suspicion" warranting stop and frisk); State v.
Serrano, 14 Wash. App. 462, 466, 544 P.2d 101, 104 (1975)
(because of the late hour, fact that car did not "fit" neighborhood justified temporary detention to inquire into suspicious
activity); State v. Clark, 13 Wash. App. 21, 23, 533 P.2d 387, 389
(1975) (silent alarm signaling forcible entry, in conjunction
with defendant's appearance, conduct, and presence in vicinity,
justified stop); State v. Sinclair,11 Wash. App. 523, 530-31, 523
P.2d 1209, 1214 (1974) (police officers' suspicion that defendant
had outstanding traffic warrant, in conjunction with defendant
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using modus operandi common for type of crime in question,
justified stop); State v. Smith, 9 Wash. App. 279, 281, 511 P.2d
1032, 1034 (1973) (description of two black men-one short, one
tall-possibly driving green or blue, older model automobile
justified detaining green 1966 automobile containing two black
persons within appropriate driving distance from scene of
crime).
4.7 Dimensions of a PermissibleStop
4.7(a)

Time, Place, and Method

An investigatory stop may be based on less than probable
cause because the intrusion on individual freedom is relatively
minor. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905, 88 S.
Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968). When an investigatory stop becomes as
intrusive as an arrest, the stop is considered an arrest and
requires probable cause. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
214-16, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 836-38, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2257-59 (1979).
A valid stop must be limited as to length, movement of the
suspect, and investigative techniques employed. See Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 299, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319,
1325 (1983); State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065
(1984). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 9.2(f).
Generally, the level of suspicion required for an investigative
stop of a pedestrian is the same as that required for an investigative stop of a vehicle. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 6,
726 P.2d 445, 448 (1986).
The Supreme Court has declined to set an absolute limit
on the permissible duration of a Terry stop in terms of minutes
or hours. The duration of a stop is evaluatedt in terms of
whether "the police diligently pursued a means of investigation
that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly,
during which time it was necessary to detain the [suspect]."
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 677, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 616,
105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 75 L.
Ed. 2d at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 1325 (stop may "last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate [its] purpose . . ."). Detainment of a
suspect to preserve the "status quo" while police investigate
suspicious circumstances justifying an investigatory stop, may
not exceed the scope of a Terry stop. State v. Mercer, 45 Wash.
App. 769, 776-77, 727 P.2d 676, 681-82 (1986) (when officer's suspicion was not dispelled by initial answers, officer had suspect
wait 20 minutes in front of officer's car headlights until a more
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experienced officer arrived); State v. Moon, 45 Wash. App. 692,
695, 726 P.2d 1263, 1265 (1986) (following consensual entry into
suspect's motel room, officer detained suspect in room approximately 20 minutes while robbery victim was brought to room
for identification). The means of investigation need not be the
least intrusive available, provided the police do not act unreasonably "in failing to recognize or to pursue" a less intrusive
alternative. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 677, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 616, 105 S.
Ct. at 1576.
The investigative methods employed in a Terry stop must
be less intrusive than those employed in arrests in all respects,
not merely duration. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979). Thus, for example,
police may not transport a nonconsenting suspect in a patrol
car to the police station and subject the suspect to custodial
interrogation based only on a reasonable suspicion. Id. at 212,
60 L. Ed. 2d at 836, 99 S. Ct. at 2256; see Hayes v. Florida,470
U.S. 811, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705, 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985) (police may not
transport suspect to police station for fingerprinting absent
probable cause, although based on reasonable suspicion, police
may take fingerprints while stopping and questioning suspect),
cert denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 119 (1986); Floridav. Royer,
460 U.S. at 496, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 235, 103 S. Ct. at 1323 (seizing
suspect's luggage at airport and directing suspect to small room
for interrogation constituted arrest); State v. Gonzales, 46
Wash. App. 388, 396, 731 P.2d 1101, 1107 (1986) (handcuffing
and transporting suspect to a police station before probable
cause to arrest arises, i.e., before police have knowledge that a
crime has been committed, may constitute an illegal arrest
under the fourth amendment and article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution). But when, as a result of a radio call
summoning the investigating officers to an apparently unrelated crime scene, a reasonable suspicion was sufficient to justify the officers transportation of the suspect with them. State
v. Sweet, 36 Wash. App. 337, 675 P.2d 1236 (1984), review
denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1001 (1986). Cf. State v. Byers, 85 Wash.
2d 783, 787, 539 P.2d 833, 836 (1975) (transportation to crime
scene).
The transportation of a suspect for a short distance to
obtain idenficiation, is within the permissible scope of a Terry
stop when the police have knowledge of a reported crime. The
search may not be proper when there is a mere observation of
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suspicious conduct. State v. Wheeler, 108 Wash. 2d 230, 737 P.2d
1005 (1987). See also State v. Hoffpauir, 44 Wash. App. 195,
198, 722 P.2d 113, 115 (suspect voluntarily consented to transportation to crime scene for identification purposes), review
denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1003 (1986); State v. Sweet, 44 Wash. App.
226, 232-33, 721 P.2d 560, 564 (suspect's demonstrated propensity to flee justified his being placed in patrol car and transported to an apparently unrelated crime scene), review denied,
107 Wash. 2d 1001 (1986).
A Washington court has held that an officer did not use
the least intrusive means reasonably available to confirm or
dispel his suspicion that a house was being burglarized when
he ordered three juveniles out of the house at gunpoint. State
v. Johnston, 38 Wash. App. 783, 690 P.2d 591 (1984).
Other Washington cases involving Terry stops include:
State v. Thornton, 41 Wash. App. 506, 512, 705 P.2d 271, 275
(officer who had reasonable suspicion that suspects were fleeing an armed robbery could properly stop suspects and order
them out of car at gunpoint without having probable cause for
arrest), review denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1022 (1985); State v.
Walker, 24 Wash. App. 823, 828, 604 P.2d 514, 517 (1979)
(detention in police car for eight minutes so victim could arrive
and identify suspect was proper); State v. Davis, 12 Wash. App.
32, 35, 527 P.2d 1131, 1133 (1974) (officer who reasonably suspected that an automobile was stolen could request identification from each occupant); State v. Sinclair, 11 Wash. App. 523,
530-31, 523 P.2d 1209, 1214-15 (1974) (officers with well-founded
suspicion that defendant had an outstanding traffic warrant
were justified in detaining defendant pending radio check);
State v. Smith, 9 Wash. App. 279, 281, 511 P.2d 1032, 1034 (1973)
(investigatory stop justified by officer's knowledge that defendants and defendants' car matched description from robbery
witness and by proximity of stop, in time and location, to robbery). See also State v. Moreno, 21 Wash. App. 430, 434, 585
P.2d 481, 483 (1978) (officer may not proceed with specific
questions designed to elicit incriminating information during
investigatory stop without making formal arrest and giving
Miranda warnings).
4.7(b)

Detention of Persons in Proximity to Suspect

The Washington Supreme Court has held that under the
fourth amendment the mere fact of an individual's proximity
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to one independently suspected of criminal activity is insufficient to justify a stop. State v. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838, 642,
613 P.2d 525, 528 (1980) (stop based on parking violation by
driver does not reasonably provide grounds to require identification of passengers in absence of independent cause to question passengers). See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, §§ 9.2(b)
and 9.3(c) at 77; cf. State v. Serrano, 14 Wash. App. 462, 466-68,
544 P.2d 101, 104-105 (1975).
4.8

ConstitutionalLimitations on Compelled Responses to
Investigatory Questions

The fourth amendment guarantees prohibit an officer
from forcibly stopping an individual in the absence of at least a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Brown v. Texas, 443
U.S. 47, 52, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362-63, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1979).
Even when a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion,
however, and forcibly detains and questions the suspect, the
officer may not compel the suspect to answer. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676, 681, 89 S. Ct. 1394,
1397 (1969), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 855 (1972); State v. White, 97
Wash. 2d 92, 105-06, 640 P.2d 1061, 1069 (1982). Furthermore, a
suspect's refusal to -answer the investigating officer's questions
cannot provide the basis for an arrest. Id at 105-06, 640 P.2d at
1069.
A number of states, including Washington, have enacted
stop-and-identify statutes or other legislation designed in part
to facilitate police investigation of ongoing or imminent crimes.
See, e.g., State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982);
see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 103
S. Ct. 1855 (1983). Some of these statutes have been struck
down as unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., id. The statutes
can be challenged on a number of grounds: for implicating the
first amendment free speech right, the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination, and the fourteenth amendment due
process right, in addition to the fourth amendment right.
White, 97 Wash. 2d at 97 nn. 1 & 2, 640 P.2d at 1064. See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 9.2(f). Thus, a Terry stop
that survives a fourth amendment challenge may collapse
under a challenge brought under another amendment.
4.9

Groundsfor Initiatinga Frisk

An officer conducting a Terry stop may conduct a limited
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search for weapons in order to protect himself or herself or
persons nearby from physical harm. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968). Even such
a limited intrusion, however, is a "search" within the fourth
amendment. Id. at 29, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 910, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.
A prerequisite to a pat-down for weapons is that the
officer legitimately be in the presence of the party to be
frisked and have grounds for a forcible stop. Id. at 32-33, 20 L.
Ed. 2d at 912-13, 88 S. Ct. at 1885-86 (Harlan, J., concurring). A
frisk may then be undertaken if the officer reasonably believes
that the suspect "may be armed and presently dangerous" to
the officer or others, and if nothing in the course of an initial
investigation dispels that fear. Id. at 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911, 88
S. Ct. at 1884. A frisk may not be used as a pretext for a
search for incriminating evidence when the officer has no reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect is armed. Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 935, 88 S. Ct. 1889,
1903 (1968).
Lower federal courts have read Terry to mean that for certain crimes in which the offender is likely to be armed, the
right to conduct a protective search is "automatic"; for other
crimes, such as possession of marijuana, additional circumstances must be present. See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 9.4(a).
Washington requires that the officer have an individualized suspicion that the suspect is presently dangerous. State v.
Hobart, 94 Wash. 2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429, 433 (1980); State v.
Smith, 102 Wash. 2d 449, 452-53, 688 P.2d 146, 148 (1984) (fact
that detention occurs in high crime district is not in itself sufficient to justify search); see State v. Harper,33 Wash. App. 507,
511, 655 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1982) (officer must have "sufficient
basis" to believe that an individual is armed in order to conduct a self-protective search). Thus, police may not take intrusive protective measures when they cannot articulate a reason
for believing that a suspect is dangerous other than that the
suspect was seen leaving in his car from the scene of a possible
burglary. State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065
(1984). An overt threatening gesture is not a condition precedent to seizure. State v. Perez, 41 Wash. App. 481, 483, 704 P.2d
625, 628 (1985) (officer's observation of gun on the floor of suspect's car, at 1:30 a.m. driver's bloodshot eyes and smell of alcohol constituted reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect
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was armed and might gain access to weapon). Frisks have been
permitted in State v. Guzman-Cuellar,47 Wash. App. 326, 332,
734 P.2d 966, 970 (officer's recognition that suspect matched
description of murder suspect justified initiating a frisk),
review denied, 108 Wash. 2d 1027 (1987); see State v. Sweet, 44
Wash. App. 226, 232-33, 721 P.2d 560, 565 (suspect's flight from
a high crime area when he saw officers, and the fact that he
dropped a ski mask when apprehended, justified reasonable
suspicion he was armed and dangerous), cert. denied, 107
Wash. 2d 1001 (1986); State v. Galloway, 14 Wash. App. 200,
202, 540 P.2d 444, 446 (1975) (defendant entered apartment during execution of search warrant and suspiciously kept hand in
overcoat pocket during police questioning). See also State v.
Howard, 7 Wash. App. 668, 674, 502 P.2d 1043, 1046-47 (1972)
(defendant parked car near residence being searched, and
officer had prior knowledge that defendant carried concealed
knife); State v. Brooks, 3 Wash. App. 769, 775, 479 P.2d 544, 548
(1970) (defendant matched description of suspect who had fired
shots at other officers moments before stop). But see State v.
Harvey, 41 Wash. App. 870, 875, 707 P.2d 146, 149 (1985) (officer
was justified in making a protective search of a burglary suspect on the ground that it is well known that burglars often
carry weapons).
Under certain circumstances a search may be conducted
pursuant to a Terry stop, even in the absence of grounds for
believing that the suspect is armed and dangerous. A police
officer may seize property from a suspect if the suspect's
actions give rise to a reasonable suspicion that evidence of
crime is in danger of being destroyed or lost. State v. Dorsey,
40 Wash. App. 459, 472, 698 P.2d 1109, 1117 (officer detaining
suspect for questioning about credit card theft observed suspect
shaking his coat so as to apparently dislodge an envelope which
could have contained credit cards from coat pocket), review
denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1010 (1985).
4.9(a)

Scope of a Permissible Frisk

A frisk must be justified not only in its inception but also
in its scope. The scope of a valid frisk is strictly limited to
what is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be
used to harm the officer or others nearby. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968). Cf.
infra § 5.1 (search incident to arrest). Pat-down searches are
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permitted if the police officer has reasonable grounds to
believe a suspect is armed and presently dangerous. State v.
Broadnax, 98 Wash. 2d 289, 293-94, 654 P.2d 96, 101 (1982); State
v. Hobart, 94 Wash. 2d 437, 617 P.2d 429 (1980); State v. Samsel,
39 Wash. App. 564, 573, 694 P.2d 670, 676 (1985) (frisk reasonable when officers stopped taxicab that suspects were observed
entering in close special and temporal proximity to robbery,
suspects matched the victim's description of the robbers, and,
after stopping the taxicab,. officers observed marijuana and a
gun holster on the floor of the passenger compartment). A
frisk need not conform to the conventional pat-down. See
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 322 L. Ed. 2d 612, 617-18,
92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923-24 (1972) (when officer received information that narcotics suspect was seated in nearby car and carried
gun in his waistband, and when the suspect refused to comply
with officer's request to step out of the car, officer was justified
in reaching through window and removing revolver from suspect's waistband). See also 3 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 9.4(b), at 517; infra § 4.9(c)-(d).
A Washington court has upheld an officer's grab at a suspect's hand when the suspect had furtively withdrawn his
hand from his pocket and thrust it behind his back. State v.
Serrano, 14 Wash. App. 462, 469, 544 P.2d 101, 106 (1975).
Although the court reasoned that the officer's reflexive action
was not actually a search, the Terry principle that officers may
act to protect themselves also justifies the interference. Id.
While the scope of the search should be sufficient to
assure the officer's safety, the scope of the search should also
be strictly limited to the purpose for which it is permitted.
State v. Franklin, 41 Wash. App. 409, 414, 704 P.2d 666, 670
(1985) (search of suspect's totebag is allowed when unidentified
person informed officer that suspect had a gun, officer immediately accosted the suspect, and suspect told officer that a
weapon was in the totebag). When in the course of a frisk an
officer feels what may be a weapon, the officer may take only
such action as is necessary to examine the object. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85
(1968) (officer merely reached into coat and removed gun).
Once the police ascertain that no weapon is involved, their
authority to conduct even a limited search ends. State v.
Keyser, 29 Wash. App. 120, 124, 627 P.2d 978, 980 (1981) (when
officer removes bag from under car seat and determines from
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touching it that bag contains no weapons, officer not justified
in further examining contents of bag); see also State v. Hobart,
94 Wash. 2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429, 433 (1980); State v. Allen, 93
Wash. 2d 170, 173, 606 P.2d 1235, 1236 (1980). See generally 3
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 9.4(c).
4.9(b)

Frisks of Persons in Proximity to Suspect

Police may not frisk persons present on the premises of a
place lawfully being searched, absent a reasonable suspicion
that such persons are armed. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979); supra § 3.8(a). Similarly, police may not take protective measures such as searching the purse of a vehicle's passenger when the driver is
stopped on the basis of a traffic violation, absent a reasonable
suspicion that the passenger is involved in criminal conduct.
See State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 642, 611 P.2d 771, 774
(1980). When an officer makes a lawful investigative stop, and
has objective reasons for believing that there may be a weapon
in the vehicle, the officer may make a limited search of the
passenger compartment for weapons within the area of control
of both the suspect and any other passenger in the vehicle.
State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 726 P.2d 445, 451 (1986).
Thus, a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic offense
committed by the driver may be frisked if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that he is armed and dangerous. State v.
McIntosh, 42 Wash. App. 579, 582-83, 712 P.2d 323, 325 (investigating officer noticed driver was armed with knife and saw a
weapon-like object under front seat of car), review denied, 105
Wash. 2d 1015 (1986). State v. Coahran, 27 Wash. App. 664, 620
P.2d 116 (1980) (when the driver is lawfully stopped for reasons pertaining to handgun possession and threats of violence,
however, a protective frisk of a passenger is permitted). One
commentator suggests that the appropriate inquiry is whether
the officer is under a reasonable apprehension of danger, a
determination that would depend on the nature of the crime,
the time and place of the arrest, the number of officers and
suspects, and whether the companion has made any threatening movements. 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 9.4(a).
4.9(c)

Other Protective Measures Besides Frisks

An officer may take self-protective measures other than a
frisk. A police officer may order a driver who has been validly
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stopped to get out of his or her car, regardless of whether the
driver is suspected of being armed or dangerous or whether
the offense under investigation is a serious one. Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 335, 98 S. Ct. 330,
333 (1977) (intrusion de minimus, and risks confronting officer
substantial); see also State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d
445 (1986). Lower cnurts have not agreed on whether Mimms
extends to passengers. See 2 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 5.2, at 467-69.
4.9(d)

Search of Area Measures Besides Frisks

Officers may extend a Terry search for weapons to the
passenger compartment of a detained person's vehicle when
the police have a reasonable belief that the suspect is both dangerous and within easy access of a weapon in the vehicle.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct.
3469 (1983); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 12, 726 P.2d 445,
451 (1986) (when stopping suspect's vehicle for investigation of
possible drug buy, officer observed suspect leaning forward as
though to place something under seat); State v. McIntosh, 42
Wash. App. 579, 582, 712 P.2d 323, 325 (driver of vehicle armed
with knife, and weapon-like object visibly protruded from
under passenger seat), review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1015 (1986).
See also State v. Perez, 41 Wash. App. 481, 485, 704 P.2d 625. 629
(1985). A police officer may search a container carried by a
suspect who is detained for questioning if the officer reasonably believes that the suspect possesses a weapon, and that the
suspect has told the officer that a weapon is in the container.
State v. Franklin, 41 Wash. App. 409, 415, 704 P.2d 666, 670
(1985) (backpack). The related issue of whether an officer may
search items carried by a suspect is analyzed in great detail in 3
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 9.4(e).
CHAPTER 5:

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: THE

EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
5.0

Introduction

"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
...subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 19
L. Ed. 2d 576, 585, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967) (footnotes omitted);
see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564,
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91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971); State v. Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d 562, 565, 647
P.2d 489, 492 (1982); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 188, 622
P.2d 1199, 1210 (1980); State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 149,
622 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1980).
The following sections examine the various "jealously and
carefully drawn" exceptions to the warrant requirement. See
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 24142, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2590-91 (1979). Note that even when a search
or seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement, it may be invalid if other rights are infringed.
See, e.g., United States v. Sherwin, 572 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir.
1977) (plain view seizure of photographs or sexual activity
invalid; officers' determination that obscene photographs violated first amendment), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 909 (1978).
5.1

Search Incident to Arrest

Police may conduct a warrantless search and seizure incident to an arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety
might be well endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer
to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the
area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a
weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by
a like rule.... There is ample justification, therefore, for a
search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his
immediate control"--construing that phrase to mean the
area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.
There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest
occurs-or, for that matter, for searching through all the
desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself. Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized
exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a
search warrant.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685,
693-94, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2039-40 (1969).
The "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant
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requirement applies only when (1) the arrest was valid, and
(2) the search incident to the arrest was "restricted in time and
place in relation to the arrestee and the arrest" as opposed to
"wide-ranging, exploratory, rummaging, [and] ransacking...."
State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 135, 559 P.2d 970, 974, cert
denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
As the following section will demonstrate, the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is subject
to a different analysis under the Washington Constitution than
under the fourth amendment.
5.1(a)

Lawful Arrest

The criteria for a lawful arrest are discussed in Chapter 4.
If the arrest is invalid, then the search incident to the arrest is
invalid. State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 50, 578 P.2d 527, 529
(1978). When an arrest is not merely a pretext for conducting
a search for evidence of another offense, property seized incident to a lawful arrest may be used to prosecute the arrested
person for a crime other than the one for which the person
was initially arrested. State v. White, 44 Wash. App. 276, 278,
722 P.2d 118, 119 (following arrest for driving while intoxicated, officer found a cosmetic case in defendant's pocket containing cocaine, a razor blade, and a straw), review denied, 107
Wash. 2d 1006 (1986). Even when an arrest is valid, however, a
search is not properly "incident" to the arrest if the arrest was
merely a pretext for conducting the search for evidence of
another offense. State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 239, 242-43, 427
P.2d 705, 707 (1967). Cf. State v. Carner, 28 Wash. App. 439,
445, 624 P.2d 204, 208 (1981) (second body search made after
decision to release defendant and in retaliation for his remarks
held invalid, even when arrest and initial search were valid).
If the arrest is valid, then a search incident to arrest is permissible. State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 164, 720 P.2d 436,
440-41 (1986). The search incident to arrest exception requires
a custodial arrest. See Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d at 50, 578 P.2d at
529. Washington prohibits custodial arrests for minor traffic
violations when the arrestee signs a promise to appear in court;
thus, a search incident to a custodial arrest for a minor traffic
violation would be unlawful. Id. at 47, 578 P.2d at 528; see also
Watts v. United States, 328 A.2d 770 (D.C. App. 1972); cf.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 94 S.
Ct. 467 (1973); supra § 4.2(b). In order to invoke the doctrine
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of search incident to arrest, the officer must have the requisite
authority. Under Washington law, an officer does not have this
authority when he or she has only witnessed a minor traffic
infraction. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.020 (1987). If the officer
has witnessed a misdemeanor, however, then he or she will
have authority to make a lawful arrest, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.31.100 (1987), and the search is lawful. A police officer's
exercise of discretion in making a custodial arrest for a misdemeanor traffic violation (see supra § 4.4(d)) may make a search
of the arrestee's person incident to the lawful arrest reasonable. No additional justification is required. State v. McIntosh,
42 Wash. App. 573, 712 P.2d 319 (following arrest for operating
a motor vehicle without a driver's license, a search of defendant's person yielded jewelry providing evidence of a burglary),
review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1015 (1986). See also State v. Jordan, 50 Wash. App. 170, 175, 747 P.2d 1095, 1098-99 (1987)
(search for drugs did not exceed permissible scope of search
incident to minor traffic violation.) Both McIntosh and Jordan
were decided on the basis of federal constitutional analysis. It
is unclear whether article I, section 7 of the Washington State
Constitution might provide greater protection.
One judge has suggested that when police safety is a concern, police could protect themselves by closing and locking car
doors and windows while processing the arrest or citation
rather than by searching the car. See United States v. Frick,
490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974);
crf Pennsylvaniav. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 98 S.
Ct. 330 (1977) (police may direct driver out of car while issuing
citation for motor vehicle violation). For a suggestion that in
the noncustodial arrest situation a search should be limited to
the scope of a Terry frisk unless there is an evidentiary basis
for a full search, see 2 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.2(h).
5.1(b)

"Immediate Control"

In determining whether, under the fourth amendment, the
area searched or the object seized was within the "immediate
control" of the defendant, courts have recognized that "there
can be no hard and fast rule.... ." People v. Williams, 57 Ill. 2d
239, 246, 311 N.E.2d 681, 685, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
Factors that have been considered include: (1) whether the
arrestee was physically restrained; (2) the position of the
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officer in relation to the defendant and the place searched;
(3) the difficulty of gaining access into the container or enclosure searched; and (4) the number of officers present as compared with the number of arrestees or other persons. See 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 6.3(c), at 630; 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 7.1(b), at 6.
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides a more protective standard than that provided by the
fourth amendment. For example, under article I, section 7,
"[d]uring the arrest process, including the time immediately
subsequent to the suspect's being arrested, handcuffed, and
placed in a patrol car, officers should be allowed to search the
passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons or destructible evidence. However, if the officers encounter a locked
container or locked glove compartment, they may not unlock
and search either container without obtaining a warrant."
State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986)
(overruling State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240
(1983) (limiting permissible search to area with arrestee's
immediate control)). In contrast, under the fourth amendment, both the passenger compartment of an automobile and
any containers found therein are within the scope of a search
incident to arrest even when the suspect has been removed
from the vehicle and taken into police custody. New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981)
(police may search jacket found on back seat of automobile
after driver and passengers have left vehicle). See infra
§ 5.2(b).
Under the fourth amendment, some courts have permitted
police in certain limited situations to extend a search incident
to an arrest into an area that is beyond the arrestee's immediate control. If the police permit an arrestee to move into other
rooms to gather clothing, for example, the police may accompany the arrestee and search the rooms and any areas, such as
closets or bureau drawers, where the arrestee has been. See 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 6.4(a). Courts have also permitted police to search premises to determine whether accomplices who could aid the arrestee are present, id. § 6.4(b), and
to conduct a protective sweep of premises when the officers
fear that third parties may offer resistance, id. § 6.4(c).
The Washington Constitution places greater restraints on
the police than the fourth amendment when the arrestee is in
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his or her home; entry into other rooms requires a reasonable
fear for police safety or a belief that the arrestee is likely to
escape or destroy evidence. See State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash.
2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); supra § 4.1; cf. Washington v. CGhrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778, 102 S. Ct. 812 (1982). See 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,

§§ 6.3(c) and 6.4(a)-(c), at 636-

651 and 7.1(b), at 5-12.
5.2

Immediate Control or PermissibleScope:
ParticularApplications
5.2(a)

The Defendant

Under the fourth amendment, an officer may search an
arrestee who has been taken into custody even when the
officer does not believe that the arrestee is armed or in possession of evidence of the crime for which the suspect was
arrested. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 38 L. Ed.
2d 427, 440-41, 94 S. Ct. 467, 477 (1973). It is the lawful arrest
that establishes the authority to search the arrestee; the arresting officer need not have a subjective fear that an arrestee is
armed or that evidence will be destroyed. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 263-64, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456, 460, 94 S. Ct. 488, 491
(1973). Thus, the rule applies even when the custodial arrest is
for a minor traffic violation unless such an arrest would be illegal. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 440-41, 94 S. Ct.
at 477; see State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978);
see supra § 5.1(a)'
Under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution,
an arrestee has a diminished expectation of privacy that permits an officer to search the arrestee's personal possessions
that are closely associated with his or her clothing, e.g., a wallet or cigarette pack. State v. White, 44 Wash. App. 276, 278,
722 P.2d 118, 120 (police lawfully examined contents of cosmetic case found in arrestee's coat pocket), review denied, 107
Wash. 2d 1006 (1986). Possessions that are not closely related
to the person's clothing, however, such as "purses, briefcases or
luggage" have a greater expectation of privacy and additional
reasons justifying the search must be present. Id. at 279, 722
P.2d at 120. Evidence seized pursuant to such a search does not
need to relate to the crime for which the defendant was
arrested, nor must the grounds for the initial search encompass
the evidence seized. State v. LaTourette, 49 Wash. App. 119,
129, 741 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1987) (court permitted cocaine found
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in a pocket admitted into evidence, even though the officer's
rationale for initiating the search incident to arrest was a concern for weapons), review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1025 (1988).
An intrusion into a suspect's body, such as drawing blood
samples, is not justifiable under the search-incident-to-arrest
exception to the warrant requirement. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966). Such
intrusions may be justified, however, by the exigent circumstances exception. Id. at 770-71, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 919-20, 86 S. Ct.
at 1835-36. See generally infra § 5.18(a) and supra § 3.13(b); 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.3(c).
The Schmerber rules do not apply, however, to less intrusive physical intrusions such as a chokehold intended to prevent a suspect from swallowing apparent contraband. See State
v. Taplin, 36 Wash. App. 664, 676 P.2d 504 (1984); State v. Williams, 16 Wash. App. 868, 560 P.2d 1160 (1977). Officers
attempting to prevent a suspect from swallowing evidence may
not, however, prevent the suspect from breathing or obstruct
the suspect's blood supply to the head, although they may
pinch his or her nose shut. Williams, 16 Wash. App. at 872,
560 P.2d at 1163. More aggressive conduct, such as jumping on
the suspect, is likely to violate due process rights. Id at 870,
560 P.2d at 1162; see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 96 L.
Ed. 183, 72 S. Ct. 205 (1952); 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 (1952). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.2(i). For a brief discussion of post-detention body searches, see infra § 6.2.
5.2(b)

Vehicles and Containers

Under both article I, section 7 and the fourth amendment,
police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle as a
search incident to the arrest of the driver. New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1980); State v.
Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986). Under
the fourth amendment, the compartment is considered within
the arrestee's immediate control even after the arrestee has
been placed in police custody. Belton, 453 U.S. at 459, 69 L. Ed.
2d at 774, 101 S. Ct. at 2864. Under article I, section 7, however, such a search may only be proper "immediately subsequent" to the suspect's arrest and placement in the police car.
Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 152, 720 P.2d at 441. When a suspect
has stepped out of a vehicle, subject to a lawful investigative
stop, the officer may make a limited search of the passenger
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compartment for weapons within the area of control of the suspect and any other passenger in the vehicle, if the police
officer has objective reasons for believing that there may be a
weapon in the vehicle. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 12-13,
726 P.2d 445, 451-52 (1986).
When police have probable cause to believe an automobile
contains contraband or evidence, whether or not they have
probable cause to arrest the vehicle's occupants, they may have
authority to search the vehicle without a warrant pursuant to
other exceptions to the warrant requirement. See generally
infra §§ 5.21-5.23. An occupant does not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in property visible thorough a vehicle
window, and such objects may fall within the "plain view" or
"open view" exception. State v. Gonzales, 46 Wash. App. 388,
397, 731 P.2d 1101, 1107 (1986); State v. Perez, 41 Wash. App.
481, 484, 704 P.2d 625, 628 (1985); State v. White, 40 Wash. App.
490, 494-95, 699 P.2d 239, 243 (1985).
Traditionally, sealed containers taken from an arrestee
and in the exclusive control of the police could not be searched
without a warrant as incident to the arrest. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243-44, 99 S. Ct. 2586,
2592 (1979). The "single purpose container" rule of Arkansas
v. Sanders has been upheld under article I, section 7. Under
this doctrine, the police do not need to obtain a warrant to
open a container that an officer is virtually certain contains
contraband because of its distinctive shape, odor, or other characteristic. Under the fourth amendment, the traditional rule
has been modified, and law enforcement officers may now
search pursuant to a lawful arrest "any containers found
within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will the containers in it be within his reach." Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 69 L.
Ed. 2d at 775, 101 S. Ct. at 2864 (permitting search of jacket
found on back seat of automobile when driver and passengers
not in vehicle); see United States v. Venizelos, 495 F. Supp.
1277, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (search of arrestee's purse lawful
when purse within immediate control of arrestee); see also
United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349, 354 (7th Cir. 1979)
(search of hand-carried suitcases lawful because arrestee could
have quickly opened suitcases and gained access to weapons or
evidence). But see Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 469 U.S. 979, 83 L.
Ed. 2d 315, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (4-4 decision) (affirming state
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court decision holding unconstitutional warrantless search of
suitcase in car trunk when police had probable cause to arrest
driver but not to believe suitcase contained drugs); State v.
Cole, 31 Wash. App. 501, 510, 643 P.2d 675, 680 (1982) (zone of
control under Belton does not include luggage contained in
hatchback area of car); 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.5(a),
at 529-30.
In order to provide the necessary added protection guaranteed by article I, section 7, however, the court will require "virtual certainty that the container, in the circumstances viewed,
holds contraband, as if transparent." State v. Courcy, 48 Wash.
App. 326, 332, 739 P.2d 98, 102 (during lawful Terry stop officer
viewed precisely folded paper "bindle," commonly used to
package cocaine, in suspect's identification folder; officer was
justified in seizing the "bindle" and opening it), review denied,
109 Wash. 2d 1017 (1987). See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 7.2(d). See also id. §§ 5.5 (a)-(d).
5.3

Pre-ArrestSearch

If a warrantless search is closely related in time and place
to a lawful arrest, the search may be considered incidental to
the arrest, and therefore valid, even if it occurs before the
arrest. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633,
645-46, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2564 (1980); State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d
127, 138, 559 P.2d 970, 975, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977);
State v. Donohoe, 39 Wash. App. 778, 782-84, 695 P.2d 150, 153,
review denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1032 (1985); State v. Ward, 24
Wash. App. 761, 765, 603 P.2d 857, 860 (1979), review denied, 93
Wash. App. 1019, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 964 (1980). See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, §§ 5.4(a); 6.3(a).
Under limited circumstances, pre-arrest searches are permitted even when the arrest does not closely follow the search.
Police may conduct a search incident to the arrest of a suspect
when they have probable cause, when they believe the suspect
is in the process of destroying highly evanescent evidence, and
when they can preserve the evidence by a limited search.
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900, 906, 93 S.
Ct. 2000, 2004 (1973). See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 5.4(b); State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 137-38, 559 P.2d 970,
975 (1977) (upholding officer's seizure of evidence prior to
arrest because of exigent circumstance of its possible destruction). Pre-arrest searches are Terry searches and should be
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subject to the same standard applied and discussed supra
§§ 4.5-4.9.
5.4 Post-DetentionSearches: Search Incident to Arrest and
Inventory Search
5.4(a)

Post-Detention Search Incident to Arrest

The search incident to arrest exception can apply both to a
search at the place of detention as well as to a search at the
place of arrest. See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 5.3(a).
Any post-arrest search is unlawful, however, if probable
cause to arrest dissipates by the time the suspect is taken into
custody. A more difficult question arises when a suspect is
detained only because the police have failed to comply with
laws allowing release. See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 5.3(d).
Even when an arrestee is searched upon booking, officers
may later conduct a warrantless "second look" into the arrestee's belongings. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 805,
39 L. Ed. 2d 771, 777, 94 S. Ct. 1234, 1238 (1974) (search of
defendant's personal belongings long after defendant had been
searched and placed in jail cell was permissible search incident
to arrest; police did no more than they were entitled to do incident to an arrest). See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.3(b),
at 487-88 (Edwards requires that (1) the object come into plain
view at the time of arrival at the place of detention, (2) later
investigation establishes that the object has evidentiary value,
and (3) the object remains in custody as part of arrestee's
inventoried property). See United States v. Venizelos, 495 F.
Supp. 1277, 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (arrestee's purse may be
searched either at place of arrest or anytime during detention).
Under Washington law, probable cause is still required for
a "second look." When the actions of the person detained give
rise to a reasonable suspicion by an officer that the person is
attempting to destroy or rid himself of evidence, seizure of that
evidence is permissible. State v. Dorsey, 40 Wash. App. 459,
472, 698 P.2d 1109, 116-17 (officers observed detainee's attempt
to rid himself of an envelope that protruded from detainee's
coat pocket), review denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1010 (1985); see also
State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 194, 622 P.2d 1199, 1214
(1980) (Utter, J., concurring) (probable cause required for
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detailed, post-booking search through arrestee's personal
belongings stored in police property box).
A search conducted after police have decided to release a
suspect is improper when there is no probability that the suspect possesses relevant evidence or weapons. State v. Carner,
28 Wash. App. 439, 445, 624 P.2d 204, 207-08 (1981). See also 2
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURe, § 5.3(a)-(d).
5.4(b)

Post-Detention Inventory Search

Police officers may search containers or packages as part
of an inventory of the arrestee's possessions prior to storage of
the items for safekeeping. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640,
643, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65, 69-70, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2608 (1983); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1005,
96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097 (1976). The police need not have probable
cause to believe that the containers conceal evidence of crime,
nor must they fear concealed weapons. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10 n.5, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 547, 97 S. Ct. 2476,
2482-83 (1977). The police have some obligation, however, to
safeguard the container and its contents when they seize it. Id.
at 19, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 553, 97 S. Ct. at 2487. Whether the
defendant is arrested in a private or a public place can thus be
significant. Id. (when a person is arrested in a public place, it is
reasonable for police to take custody of the arrestee's property
rather than to leave the property in the public place while a
warrant is obtained). Lower courts have reached differing
results as to whether police may conduct an item-by-item
inventory of contents. See generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 5.5(b).

5.5

Searches Conducted in Good Faith and Without Purposes
of FindingEvidence

If officers undertake a search in good faith for a reason
other than investigating crime-for example, to aid someone
who has been injured-any evidence they discover may be
admissible. 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, §§ 5.4(c)-(d), at 370-

71. Thus, even when police lack probable cause to believe a
crime has been committed, they may conduct a warrantless
search of premises when the premises contain persons in imminent danger of death or harm, objects likely to burn, explode
or otherwise cause harm, or information that will disclose the
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location of a threatened victim or the existence of such a
threat. 2 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 6.5(d).
For an officer's actions to come within the medical emergency exception to the warrant requirement, the officer must
honestly and reasonably believe that aid or assistance is necessary. State v. McAlpin, 36 Wash. App. 707, 677 P.2d 185 (1984);
see State v. Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d 562, 568, 647 P.2d 489, 493
(1982) (search of defendant's totebag for identification
improper when defendant regained consciousness prior to
search); see also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 83 L. Ed.
2d 246, 105 S. Ct. 409 (1984); State v. Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306,
308, 506 P.2d 892, 895-96 (1973) (entry proper when police
informed by telephone operator of problem at residence, when
no one answered officer's knock at door, and when police
observed through a window a person swaying back and forth,
in apparent need of assistance).
When the medical emergency is a homicide, the officer
may not only enter to aid the victim, but may also make a
quick check of the area to see if the perpetrator or other victims are present. See Thompson, 469 U.S. at 22, 83 L. Ed. 2d at
251, 105 S. Ct. at 412. Such a search must be brief; a general
exploratory search lasting several hours is not permissible. Id.
Cf. supra § 5.1(b).
In the course of rendering aid, police may conduct a warrantless search of a victim's personal effects. See, e.g., Chavis
v. Wainwright, 488 F.2d 1077, 1078 (5th Cir. 1973) (police justified in making inventory search of defendant's clothing and
effects when clothing and effects were removed in hospital
during defendant's treatment for possibly fatal stab wounds,
and when police were required to keep clothing and effects as
evidence of possible homicide); United States v. Dunavan, 485
F.2d 201, 203 (6th Cir. 1973) (when taking person to hospital,
police may search his or her briefcase for purpose of establishing identity). But see Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d at 568, 647 P.2d at
493 (necessity must exist at time of search).
Similarly, police may make a warrantless entry to protect
property, and may seize evidence within their plain view. State
v. Bakke, 44 Wash. App. 830, 723 P.2d 534 (1986) (police may
make a warrantless entry into a private residence in response
to a reported burglary, and may seize contraband within their
plain view), review denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1033 (1987); State v.
Campbell, 15 Wash. App. 98, 100, 547 P.2d 295, 297 (1976)
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(police entry to investigate alleged burglary permissible).
Firefighters may enter a house to extinguish a fire and immediately thereafter conduct a limited warrantless investigation
to determine the fire's cause. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,
510, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486, 498, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1950 (1978). But once a
fire has been extinguished, a warrant is required for arson
investigators to search the premises to discover a possible criminal cause of the fire. Id. at 511, 56 L. Ed. 2d at 500, 98 S. Ct. at
1951; Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477,
486, 104 S. Ct. 641, 649 (1984).
Police officers may enter a private residence without a
warrant when officials of another government agency have validly entered the residence and discovered contraband. The
police may not, however, exceed the scope of the prior intrusion. State v. Bell, 108 Wash. 2d 193, 201, 737 P.2d 254, 259
(1987) (marijuana growing operation discovered in plain view
by firemen after fire was extinguished). Seizure of immediately recognizable contraband by firefighters is valid if it is
inadvertently discovered while they are engaged in their fire
fighting activities. Id. at 197, 737 P.2d at 257. Exigent circumstances are not required to justify such a seizure. Police
officers then step into the firefighters' shoes, and may subsequently enter a residence without a warrant and seize the contraband as long as they do not exceed the scope of the prior
intrusion. Id. at 201, 737 P.2d at 259.
5.6

The Plain View Doctrine: DistinctionBetween "Plain
View" and "Open View"

This section discusses the warrantless seizure of objects
based on the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.
Courts have used the term "plain view" to describe three types
of searches: (1) when an officer observes an item that is
exposed to public view in a public place or in a location that is
not constitutionally protected; (2) when an officer intrudes into
a constitutionally protected area-either lawfully or unlawfully-and there observes a clearly exposed object; and
(3) when an officer, standing in a non-protected area, observes
an object that is located inside a constitutionally protected
area. See generally State v. O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 574,
380 A.2d 728, 729-30 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1032 (1978); 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.2(a).
These three situations are distinguished by the nature of
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the defendant's expectation of privacy in the object. In the
first situation-the discovery of an object in a public place or in
a location that is not constitutionally protected-there is no
true search, for the defendant has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in an object that is exposed to public view. O'Herron,
153 N.J. Super. at 574, 380 A.2d at 730. Generally, "[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home
or office, is not a subject of fourth amendment protection."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 582, 88
S. Ct. 507, 511 (1967); see generally supra §§ 1.1-1.3. Thus, the
first situation is more accurately referred to as "open view"
and not "plain view." State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 632
P.2d 44 (1981).
For the same reason, the mere observation of an object
located in a protected area from a vantage point in a non-protected area does not constitute a search. Privacy rights are
implicated, however, when police enter the constitutionally
protected area to seize the object. "[S]eizing something in open
view does not... dispose, ipso facto, of the problem of crossing
constitutionally protected thresholds .... Light waves cross
thresholds with a constitutional impunity not permitted arms
and legs. Wherever the eye may go, the body of the policeman
may not necessarily follow." Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine:
Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography
Battle, 26 MERCER L. REv. 1047, 1096 (1975).
Although the open view doctrine may justify observing an
object located in a constitutionally protected area, it will not
justify seizing the object; the search is in the entry, not the
inspection. If no additional search is conducted in order to
seize the object, however, then seizure is permissible. Thus,
when in accord with the "single purpose container" doctrine an
officer is virtually certain that a container holds contraband, as
if it were transparent, the suspect does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy that would prevent opening the
container or field testing its contents. "Because of the appearance of the container itself, the contents [are] in effect in open
view." State v. Courcy, 48 Wash. App. 326, 330, 739 P.2d 98, 101
(paper "bindle" containing cocaine observed by officer in suspect's identification folder during lawful investigative stop),
review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1017 (1987).
The plain view doctrine has been used to justify the
seizure of objects without a warrant. The following sections
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will discuss the criteria for falling within the exception to the
warrant requirement in the second and third situations: the
discovery and seizure of an object after entry into a constitutionally protected area, and the entry into a protected area and
the seizure of an object that was viewed from an unprotected
area.
5.7

Criteriafor Falling Within the "PlainView" Exception

5.7(a)

Discovery of Object in Plain View Following Entry
Into Constitutionally Protected Area

The most common plain view situation occurs when the
officer lawfully enters a constitutionally protected area and
unexpectedly discovers incriminating evidence. See, e.g., State
v. Johnson, 17 Wash. App. 153, 154-55, 561 P.2d 701, 703 (1977).
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the
police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
doctrine serves to supplement the prior justificationwhether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate
reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused--and permits the warrantless seizure...
[But] the extension of the original jurisdiction is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564,
583, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038 (1971).
For a warrantless seizure to fall within the plain view
exception, three requirements must be met: (1) the police
must have a priorjustification for the intrusion into the constitutionally protected area; (2) the discovery of the incriminating evidence must be inadvertent; and (3) the police must
immediately realize that the object they observe is evidencethat is, the incriminating character of the evidence must be
immediately apparent. State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d 263,
267, 616 P.2d 649, 651 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 958 (1981);
see State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986); State
v. Lesnick, 84 Wash. 2d 940, 942, 530 P.2d 243, 245, cert. denied,
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423 U.S. 891 (1975); State v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527
P.2d 1303, 1307 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
(1)

Prior Justification for Intrusion

The plain view doctrine applies only when the police are
justified in occupying the position from which they observe the
illegal object or activity. Thus, when the initial stop of a vehicle is unlawful, and as a consequence the police have no right
to be in a position to observe the vehicle's interior, the observation of contraband within the vehicle constitutes an unlawful
search. State v. Lesnick, 84 Wash. 2d 940, 942-43, 530 P.2d 243,
245 (1975); see also Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9, 70
L. Ed. 2d 778, 786-87, 102 S. Ct. 812, 818 (1982), on remand, 100
Wash. 2d 14, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash.
2d 263, 269, 616 P.2d 649, 652 (1980); State v. McCrea, 22 Wash.
App. 526, 529, 590 P.2d 367, 369 (1979). Because the plain view
exception to the warrant requirement rests on the lawfulness
of the officer's presence, plain view cases will have different
outcomes under the federal and state constitutions when the
two constitutions differ as to that lawfulness. For example,
when an officer has accompanied an arrestee to the arrestee's
dormitory room and follows the arrestee into the room, the
inspection of objects within the room may be lawful under the
fourth amendment and unlawful under article I, section 7.
Chris~man, 455 U.S. at 9, 70 L. Ed. 2d at 786-87, 102 S. Ct. at 818
(fourth amendment permits officer to accompany arrestee
wherever arrestee goes), on remand, 100 Wash. 2d at 822, 676
P.2d at 424 (article I, section 7 prohibits officer from entering
misdemeanor arrestee's home unless officer can demonstrate
threat to officer's safety, possibility of destruction of evidence
of misdemeanor charged, or strong likelihood of escape).
(2)

Inadvertent Discovery

The plain view exception does not apply when an officer
expects to find the incriminating object; the officer must discover the object inadvertently. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 471, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 586, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2040-41
(1971). The Supreme Court has recently held that the plain
view doctrine is violated when the officer moves an object
belonging to the defendant in order to obtain a better view.
Arizona v. Hicks, - U.S. - , 94 L. Ed. 2d 347, 107 S. Ct. 1149
(1987) (officer '"exposed to view concealed portions of stereo in
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order to obtain serial number"). Thus, there is a distinction
between "looking at a suspicious object in plain view and moving it even a few inches." Id. at -, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 354, 107 S.
Ct. at 1152.
One Washington court, however, has held the discovery of
an object inadvertent when the officer looked in a location
where he expected to find evidence; the officer, however, had
not taken "unreasonable steps" to be in a position to observe
the object. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d 445
(1986) (officer lawfully stopping vehicle observed driver reaching under seat of car; officer justified in removing partially visible plastic bag from under seat as plain view seizure).
Similarly, a police officer's change of position, so as to see more
clearly into a suspect's vehicle, does not violate the inadvertent
discovery component of the plain view doctrine. State v. Perez,
41 Wash. App. 481, 484-85, 704 P.2d 625, 628 (1985) (officer
moved from passenger side to driver's side of vehicle, where
driver had exited vehicle and saw what appeared to be a rifle
on the floorboard). Thus, the change in position of the officer
and that of the object should be distinguished; while the former may be permissible, the latter is not.
Courts have generally held that when police have sufficient grounds to name an item in a warrant, they may not seize
it on the basis of plain view. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH &

§ 4.11(d). The limitation may apply only to items that
are "not contraband nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves."
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 586, 91 S.Ct. at 2041.
One Washington court, however, has upheld the seizure of
objects not mentioned in a search warrant because they could
have been seized under the plain view exception during a prior
lawful intrusion. State v. McAlpin, 36 Wash. App. 707, 714-15,
677 P.2d 185, 190 (1984) (police observed contraband in plain
view during lawful intrusion based on medical emergency in
defendant's home; officer's subsequent failure to list contraband in affidavit in support of search warrant did not invalidate seizure of contraband during execution of warrant
because evidence previously had been in plain view).
When the discovery of an object in the course of a search
for another object is in fact inadvertent, its seizure may fall
within the exception. State v. Lair, 95 Wash. 2d 706, 717, 630
P.2d 427, 433-34 (1981) (discovery of drug other than marijuana
during "wide open" search for marijuana was, for plain view
SEIZURE,
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purposes, inadvertent); State v. Johnson, 17 Wash. App. 153,
561 P.2d 701 (1977) (stolen property from prior burglary may
be seized under plain view doctrine during execution of search
warrant based on subsequent burglary, provided police did not
have probable cause to believe that the property from prior
burglary was present on the premises at time they applied for
warrant); but see Lair, 95 Wash. 2d at 721, 630 P.2d at 436 (Dolliver, J., dissenting) ("wide open search for all controlled substances" renders impossible any inadvertent discovery of
drugs). Cf. State v. Callahan, 31 Wash. App. 710, 712-13, 644
P.2d 735, 736 (1982).
Some courts have bolstered the inadvertent discovery rule
by requiring that a search warrant be executed in good faith.
See, e.g., United States v. Tranquillo, 330 F. Supp. 871, 876
(M.D. Fla. 1971) (bringing along vice squad officers to look for
narcotics while other officers executed search warrant for stolen clothing deemed "bad faith"); see generally 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.11(e).
(3)

Immediate Knowledge: Incriminating Character
Immediately Apparent

The plain view exception applies only when the police
immediately recognize the incriminating nature of the object.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S. 443, 466, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564,
583, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2038 (1971). For example, the discovery of a
contraband television set inside the defendant's apartment did
not come within the plain view doctrine, despite the validity of
the entry into the apartment, because the officers did not realize that the television was contraband until they had copied
down the serial number and checked with police headquarters.
State v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); see also Arizona v.
Hicks, - U.S. -, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987); but
see 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.11(c).
The officer's knowledge need not be certain; it is sufficient
that the officer has probable cause to believe that the substance constitutes incriminating evidence. Thus, in State v.
Gonzales, 46 Wash. App. 388, 400-01, 731 P.2d 1101, 1108-09
(1986), a clear vial of capsules and pills, in context of other
items of drug paraphernalia, was properly seized although consent was only given to search for jewelry and other items.
However, a closed brown paper bag containing marijuana, was
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improperly seized since its weight immediately indicated that it
could not contain items within the scope of consent, and the
marijuana was clearly not within plain view. Id. at 400, 731
P.2d at 1109. See also State v. Anderson, 41 Wash. App. 85, 96,
702 P.2d 481, 490 (1985) (although warrant was limited to a
search for clothing, the police properly seized weapons and
weapon components discovered within the allowable area of
the search, which were probable instrumentalities of the crime
under investigation), rev'd on other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d 745
(1987); State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash. 2d 632, 649, 716 P.2d 295,
303 (1986) (grocery store receipts, not mentioned in search
warrant, which did mention sales slips for weapons, immediately recognized as capable of substantiating or undermining
the suspect's alibi).
The United States Supreme Court has not indicated what
is meant by "immediately apparent" and to what extent
officers may examine an object to determine whether it is
incriminating. But cf.Arizona v. Hicks, - U.S. -, 94 L. Ed. 2d
347, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987); see also 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 4.11(b) & (c) (suggesting that in order for officers to
inspect items, they must be aware of facts that justify a reasonable suspicion that the items are incriminating, for officers to
seize the items, they must have probable cause).
A useful synthesis of Washington cases and doctrine pertaining to the issue of when an object's incriminating nature is
immediately apparent is found in State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App.
535, 581 P.2d 172 (1978) (officers may inspect for serial numbers on radio equipment when they have well-founded suspicion that equipment is stolen based upon knowledge of other
stolen property on premises, past criminal activities of person
having access to premises, and peculiarly large quantity of
equipment); see also State v. McCrea, 22 Wash. App. 526, 590
P.2d 367 (1979) (when federal officers executing warrant for
machine gun came upon items they thought might be controlled substances and called local officers to identify items,
seizure was unlawful because incriminating nature was not
immediately apparent to federal officers, and local officers had
no prior justification for intrusion); State v. Keefe, 13 Wash.
App. 829, 537 P.2d 795 (1975) (typewriter sample could not be
seized under "plain view" doctrine while police executed
search warrant for stolen gun).
For the objects seized to be incriminating, they must be
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fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime. Evidence of
crime includes objects having a "sufficient nexus" with the
crime under investigation. State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203,
213, 687 P.2d 861, 868 (1984); State v. Turner, 18 Wash. App.
727, 729, 571 P.2d 955, 957 (1977). Evidence may also be seized
if it will aid in the apprehension of a suspect. Turner, 18 Wash.
App. at 729, 571 P.2d at 957.
The officer's knowledge is relevant to a determination of
the legality of an object. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,
.483, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627, 644, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2749 (1976). Thus, an
officer's experience and knowledge that plastic baggies are
common receptacles for marijuana will enable the officer to
immediately recognize the incriminating nature of a baggie
even when its contents are not observed. State v. Kennedy, 107
Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
5.7(b) Seizure of Object from Protected Area After
Observing Object from Non-Protected Area
In those cases in which the police officer is in a public or
non-protected area at the time he or she observes contraband
within a constitutionally protected area, the officer's mere visual observation-without physical intrusion-does not constitute a "search." See State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 23, 691
P.2d 929, 942 (1984) (when an officer peered into defendant's
car on public street and saw blood on door handle and jewelry
similar to that observed at homicide scene, his observation fell
within the open view doctrine of Seagull), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1094 (1985); see also 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.2(a), at
322-23; State v. O'Herron,153 N.J. Super. 570, 575, 380 A.2d 728,
730 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1032 (1978).
When an officer enters a constitutionally protected area to
seize an object observed from outside the area, the plain view
doctrine will not justify the absence of a warrant.
[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless
seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar
principle ... that no amount of probable cause can justify a
warrantless search or seizure absent "exigent circumstances." Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an
incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal
suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this
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court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that

the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S. 443, 468, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564,
584, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2039 (1971) (emphasis original). See also
Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 5-6, 76 L. Ed. 951, 953, 52 S.
Ct. 466, 467 (1932) (although police were standing where they
had a right to be wnen they looked through a small opening in
a garage and saw contraband, their warrantless entry to seize
the contraband was unconstitutional).
Thus, a police officer who lawfully observes contraband
within a constitutionally protected area may enter the, area
without a warrant only if the officer can justify the entry by
one of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement. 1
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.2(a), at 323-25; see State v.
Drumhiller,36 Wash. App. 592, 675 P.2d 631 (1984); see generally O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super. at 576-81, 380 A.2d at 730-34.
For example, the warrantless entry into the defendant's vegetable garden to seize lawfully observed marijuana plants was
unconstitutional because the officer could not show exigent circumstances or any other warrant requirement exception.
O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super. at 582, 380 A.2d at 733-34.
5.8 Plain View: Aiding the Senses With
Enhancement Devices
The Washington Court of Appeals and lower courts in
other jurisdictions have applied the plain view doctrine when
police officers used flashlights to aid their observations, provided that the observations could have taken place in daylight
without flashlights. State v. Young, 28 Wash. App. 412, 417, 624
P.2d 725, 729 (tools suspected of being used in robbery were
properly seized when officer observed tools after shining flashlight on front seat of car with door left open), review denied,
95 Wash. 2d 1024 (1981). See 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 2.2(b); see also United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 992 (6th
Cir. 1972); Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.
1970); People v. Whalen, 390 Mich. 672, 678-79, 213 N.W.2d 116,
130 (1973) (proper to use flashlight to observe interior of car
and occupants).
The decisions permitting the use of enhancement devices
are based on the theory that the object has been "knowingly
exposed to public view" even though "artificial illumination,
specifically directed, might be required to render the property
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visible." State v. Stone, 294 A.2d 683, 688-89 (Me. 1972). Consistent with traditional plain view requirements, the flashlightenhanced observation must be from a location where the
officer has a right to be. See, e.g., Tyler v. United States, 302
A.2d 748, 751 (D.C. 1973) (search invalid when officer improperly opened car door before using flashlight to observe gun in
interior of vehicle; officer did not have "a right to be in the
position to have that view").
The rule governing magnification is similar to the one governing the use of flashlights. Police officers may use binoculars and telescopes to observe that which is in the open and
subject to some scrutiny by the naked eye from the same location, or to observe that which they lawfully could have
observed from a closer location. 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 2.2(c); see e.g., United States v. Minton, 488 F.2d 37,

38 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); United
States v. Loudmannz, 472 F.2d 1376, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 957 (1973). The binocular/telescope rule does
not permit enhanced observations that enable the officer to
observe objects or activities that could not be observed by the
naked eye; in these circumstances, the defendant may have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the objects or activities.
See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D. Haw.
1976) (plain view exception does not apply to FBI agents' use
of 800 millimeter telescope to observe activities in defendant's
apartment from building one-fourth of one mile away, when no
observation possible from closer locations); State v. Kender, 60
Haw. 301, 305-06, 588 P.2d 447, 450-51 (1979) (plain view exception inapplicable when officer climbed up fence on neighboring
property and used a telescope to observe marijuana plants in
defendant's backyard that otherwise would have been concealed by a fence and heavy foliage). But see Commonwealth v.
Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, 181-82, 263 A.2d 904, 906 (1970)
(applying plain view exception to binocular observation, from
atop a four-foot ladder, of activity that could not have been
seen with the naked eye). Cf. supra § 1.3(c) (reasonable expectation of privacy in "open fields").
As to defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy requiring a warrant before use of enhancement devices, see supra
§ 1.3(c); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234-35,
90 L. Ed. 2d 226, 231-32, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1826-27 (1986).
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5.9 Extensions of the Plain View Doctrine
5.9(a)

Plain Hearing

Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized a "plain
hearing" analogue to the plain view doctrine. For example,
officers did not need a warrant in order to obtain a motel room
next to the suspects' room and to listen at the connecting door.
United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973). See also United States v. Pagan,
395 F. Supp. 1052, 1060-61 (D.P.R. 1975) (eavesdropping on
hotel room conversation permitted), ffl'd, 537 F.2d 554 (3d
Cir. 1976); State v. Day, 50 Ohio App. 2d 315, 322, 362 N.E.2d
1253, 1257-58 (1976). Use of hearing enhancement devices may
"raise very different and far more serious questions" from visual enhancement devices when determining the defendants
reasonable expectation of privacy requiring a warrant. Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234-35, 90 L. Ed. 2d
226, 231-32, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827 (1986). This distinction may
also be applicable to the plain hearing doctrine, where the use
of binoculars is appropriate with regard to the plain view doctrine but similar enhancement may not be permitted for hearing devices.
In Washington, eavesdropping by means of an electronic
device or the interception of private telephone, telegraph,
radio, or other electronic communications is governed by the
Washington Violating Right of Privacy Act, WASH. REV. CODE

ch. 9.73 (1987). Even tape recordings made by federal agents
pursuant to the federal wiretap statute are inadmissible in
state courts when the recordings are made in violation of the
Washington statute. State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 541,
617 P.2d 1012, 1018 (1980). Police testimony about such
recorded conversations is also inadmissible. Id. at 543, 617 P.2d
at 1019. Cf. infra § 7.3(c) (use of illegally obtained evidence at
probable cause hearings).
5.9(b)

Plain Smell

There is disagreement on whether the plain view doctrine
applies to odors and permits the warrantless seizure of an
object based on its smell. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 707
F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 469 U.S. 478,
83 L. Ed. 2d 890, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985); United States v. Haley,
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669 F.2d 201, 203-204 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117
(1982). See generally 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 2.2(a).
Washington has permitted the warrantless seizure of an
object based on its odor when the odor establishes probable
cause. See State v. Huckaby, 15 Wash. App. 280, 291, 549 P.2d
35, 42, review denied, 87 Wash. 2d 1006 (1976); see also State v.
Hammond, 24 Wash. App. 596, 600, 603 P.2d 377, 379 (1979)
(marijuana odor emanating from vehicle); State v. Compton, 13
Wash. App. 863, 864-65, 538 P.2d 861, 861-62 (i975).
5.10 Consent Searches: Introduction
A warrantless search is constitutional when valid consent
is granted. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10, 70 L. Ed.
2d 778, 787, 102 S. Ct. 812, 818 (1982). A valid consent search
requires that: (1) the consent be "voluntary"; (2) the consent
be granted by a party having the authority to consent, State v.
Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d 207, 210-12, 533 P.2d 123, 125 (1975);
and (3) the search be limited to the scope of the consent
granted, State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 239, 243-45, 427 P.2d 705,
708 (1967). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.1.
5.11

Voluntariness of Consent: Burden of Proof

The state has the burden of proving that consent to a
search was given voluntarily. Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d at 210,
533 P.2d at 125. The level of proof required is "clear and positive evidence." State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wash. App. 876, 878, 582
P.2d 904, 906 (1978). See also State v. Johnson, 16 Wash. App.
899, 903, 559 P.2d 1380, 1383, review denied, 89 Wash. 2d 1002
(1977).
For a discussion of the distinctions between voluntariness
of consent and waiver of constitutional rights, see 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.1(a).
5.12 Factors Considered in Determining Voluntariness
The validity or voluntariness of a consent to search is analyzed in a similar manner as the voluntariness of a confession.
But cf. State v. Wethered, 110 Wash. 2d 466, -

P.2d

-

(1988)

(consent to search distinguished from testimonial admissions
since the prior is consistent with innocence). Thus, the issue of
whether "consent to search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the
product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question
of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circum-
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stances." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229, 36 L.
Ed. 2d 854, 862-63, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047-48 (1973); see Shoemaker,
85 Wash. 2d at 211-12, 533 P.2d at 125. Unlike the confession
situation, however, an individual's knowledge of the right to
refuse consent is only one factor bearing on voluntariness; such
knowledge is not essential to an effective consent.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 862-63, 93 S.Ct. at
2047-48. But when examining the totality of the circumstances,
"account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as
well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
who consents." Id. at 229, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 864, 93 S. Ct. at 2049.
Factors generally considered as bearing on the voluntariness of
consent include: (1) whether Miranda warnings were given
prior to obtaining the consent; (2) the degree of education and
intelligence of the consenting party; and (3) whether the consenting party had been advised of the right not to consent.
Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d at 212, 533 P.2d at 125; see State v.
Johnson, 17 Wash. App. 153, 561 P.2d 701 (1977). These and
other factors are discussed in the following sections.
5.12(a)

Police Claim of Authority to Search

An express or implied claim by the police that they will
proceed immediately to conduct the search even without the
individual's consent is likely to indicate that the subsequent
consent was involuntary. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543, 550, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797, 803, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792 (1968).
See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.2(a).
A threat to seek a search warrant if the person refuses to
allow a search, however, does not invalidate a consent. See
State v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); State v. Bellows, 72
Wash. 2d 264, 268, 432 P.2d 654, 656 (1967) (defendant not
coerced into signing statement giving consent to search hotel
room when officer had stated he could obtain search warrant
and that to do so would prejudice defendant); see generally 3
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.2(c).
5.12(b)

Coercive Surroundings

If the police make a show of force at the time the consent
is sought, or if the surroundings are coercive in another
respect, the consent will generally not be considered voluntary.
See McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wash. 2d 530, 537, 398 P.2d 732, 737
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(1965); State v. Werth, 18 Wash. App. 530, 535, 571 P.2d 941, 943
(1977) (when defendant placed under physical restraint and
not informed of right to refuse consent to search, and when
police had searched her home illegally without consent two
days previously, defendant did not voluntarily consent to
search of her home even if she verbalized consent), review
denied, 90 Wash. 2d 1010 (1977); see also State v. Dresker, 39
Wash. App. 136, 692 P.2d 846 (1984); cf. INS v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 105 S. Ct. 1758 (1984) (INS agents
moving systematically through factory asking workers about
their citizenship while other INS agents were stationed at the
factory exits did not render workers' responses nonconsensual); see supra § 1.4(a); see generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 8.2(b).
On the other hand, the fact that a defendant is in custody
when he or she consents to a search does not by itself establish
coercion or involuntariness of consent. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598, 609, 96 S. Ct. 820, 828
(1976); McNear v. Rhay, 65 Wash. 2d 530, 538, 398 P.2d 732, 73738 (1962). Consent was held to be voluntary and uncoerced
when defendant, arrested on the porch of his home in mid-winter wearing only pants and a t-shirt, consented to officers
accompanying him into his home. State v. Nelson, 47 Wash.
App. 159, 163-64, 734 P.2d 516, 519-20 (1987). Arresting officers
had given the defendant the alternative of proceeding to the
police station as he was, but indicated that if he returned
inside, they would have to accompany him. Defen~dant's fear
that his behavior might appear "crazy" if he accepted arrest
without his jacket and keys, was not considered equal to coercion. Id. at 163, 734 P.2d at 519-20. Custodial restraint, is, however, a significant factor in assessing voluntariness. See State v.
Werth, 18 Wash. App. 530, 535, 571 P.2d 941, 943-44 (1977);
State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wash. App. 876, 881, 582 P.2d 904, 907
(1978).
5.12(c)

Awareness of the Constitutional Right
to Withhold Consent

Although an individual's knowledge of the right to refuse
a search is taken into account in determining whether consent
to a search was voluntary, the state may prove that consent
was voluntary without establishing such knowledge.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854,
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863, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2048 (1973). See Florida v. Rodriguez, 469
U.S. 1, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165, 105 S. Ct. 308 (1984); see also State v.
Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123, 125 (1975); State
v. Werth, 18 Wash. App. 530, 535-36, 571 P.2d 941, 944 (1977); cf.
State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wash. App. 876, 880-81, 582 P.2d 904, 907
(1978) (consent voluntary despite defendant's assertion he was
not told and did net know of right to refuse consent). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.2(i).
Washington and the majority of jurisdictions hold that the
failure to give Miranda warnings to a defendant in custody
does not automatically invalidate a consent to search. State v.
Lyons, 76 Wash. 2d 343, 458 P.2d 30 (1969); State v. Rodriguez,
20 Wash. App. 876, 880, 582 P.2d 904, 907 (1978).
5.12(d)

Prior Illegal Police Action

A prior illegal act by the police may suggest that the
defendant's consent was involuntary. See, e.g., State v. Werth,
18 Wash. App. 530, 535, 571 P.2d 941, 943-44 (1977) ("In view of
the additional circumstance that 2 days before, Werth's home
had been searched illegally without her consent, it is apparent
that overall, the situation was rife was coercion."); see generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.2(d). Thus, a prior illegal search or arrest may taint the subsequent consent and
thereby render the consent invalid. 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 8.2(a). See generally infra ch. 7.
The state has the burden of proving that a consent to
search was not obtained by the exploitation of a prior illegal
search. A court determines whether the subsequent consent
was tainted by the earlier illegality by considering, among
other factors, the period of time between the illegal search and
the subsequent consent, the presence of intervening circumstances, the purpose and flagrancy of the prior official misconduct, and whether the person who consented to the search
received Miranda warnings. No single factor is dispositive.
State v. Jensen, 44 Wash. App. 485, 489-90, 723 P.2d 443, 445-46
(1986) (although only two hours intervened between the illegal
search and the consent, the consent was valid since in the
intervening period the defendant was advised of his right to
refuse consent, verbally consented twice, was allowed to call
his sister, and there was no evidence that police did anything
to frighten or intimidate defendant), review denied, 107 Wash.
2d 1012 (1986); see also State v. Gonzales, 46 Wash. App. 388,
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397-98, 731 P.2d 1101, 1107 (1986) (prior illegal arrest did not
render a subsequent consent to search involuntary when prior
police misconduct was not flagrant, no attempt was made to
exploit the prior illegal arrest, defendant was advised of right
to withhold consent, and consent was spontaneously
volunteered).
5.12(e)

Maturity, Sophistication, Mental or Emotional State

The sophistication and emotional state of the defendant
are always considered in assessing the voluntariness of the consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 36 L. Ed. 2d
854, 875, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2058 (1973) ("The traditional definition
of voluntariness we accept today has always taken into account
evidence of minimal schooling, [and] low intelligence. .. .");
State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123, 125
(1975) (determination of voluntariness should include consideration of "the degree of education and intelligence of the consenting person"); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980). See generally 3
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.2(e).
5.12(f)

Prior Cooperation or Refusal to Cooperate

A prior voluntary confession or other type of cooperation
with the police will weigh in favor of a finding that the consent
to search was voluntary. A prior refusal to consent to a search
will suggest that a subsequent consent was not voluntary. See
generally 3 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.2(g).

A suspect's behavior may indicate consent even when verbal consent is withheld. See State v. Sabbot, 16 Wash. App. 929,
938, 561 P.2d 212, 218-19 (1977) (although undercover investigator followed defendant into defendant's home after defendant
had told him to wait outside, investigator's presence in house
was with defendant's tacit acquiescence).
5.12(g)

Police Deception as to Identity or Purpose

The use of deception by a police officer does not necessarily affect the voluntariness of a consent to search. Police may
use a ruse to gain entry to a residence to conduct a criminal
investigation if they have a justifiable and reasonable basis to
suspect criminal activity within the residence. State v.
Hashman, 46 Wash. App. 211, 216, 729 P.2d 651, 655 (1986) (a
police officer disguised as a building contractor gained entry
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into a residence after another officer, who had lawfully been
within the residence, reported evidence of a marijuana growing
operation), review denied, 108 Wash. 2d 1021 (1987). See also
State v. Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38 (1984) (police use
of ficitious arrest warrant to gain entry into defendant's house
in order to execute valid search warrant did not invalidate
defendant's consent to entry or defendant's subsequent cooperation in search); State v. Williamson, 42 Wash. App. 208, 21213, 710 P.2d 205, 207-08 (1985) (fact that officers concealed their
identity and intent to effect an arrest did not abrogate validity
of consent), review denied, 105 Wash. 2d 1012 (1986); State v.
Huckaby, 15 Wash. App. 280, 285-88, 549 P.2d 35, 38-41 (1976),
review denied, 87 Wash. 2d 1006 (1976); 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, §§ 8.2(m)-(n).
5.13 Scope of Consent
A consensual search must be limited to the area covered
by the defendant's consent; consequently, any search exceeding
the scope of consent is invalid. See, e.g., State v. Murray, 84
Wash. 2d 527, 534, 527 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1974) (when defendant
consented to search by officers who said they were looking
only for office and video equipment, search could not include
inspection of television serial numbers not in plain view); State
v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 530, 538, 398 P.2d 732, 738 (1965) (when
police request for consent to search was "predicated solely
upon a belief that stolen property, in the nature of 'shoplifted'
articles, would be found," and when defendant "signed the consent with that understanding[,]" the scope of the consent to
search was so limited); State v. Cuzick, 21 Wash. App. 501, 505,
585 P.2d 485, 488 (1978) (defendant's consent to officer looking
in his car did not authorize officer rummaging through suitcase
discovered in back seat and containing defendant's personal
belongings). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 8.1(c). Although an object may be outside the limits of a
valid consent, items that are immediately apparent as contraband may be seized by a police officer. The officer's knowledge
need not be certain; it is sufficient if the officer has probable
cause to believe that the substance constitutes incriminating
evidence. State v. Gonzales, 46 Wash. App. 388, 731 P.2d 1101
(1986) (although consent was given to search for jewelry and
other items stolen in recent burglaries, a clear vial of capsules
and pills, surrounded by other items of drug paraphernalia,
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was properly seized; however, a closed brown paper bag containing marijuana, was improperly seized since its weight
immediately indicated it could not contain items within the
scope of the consent).
Whether a consent to search applies to a later search
depends on* the time elapsed between the searches and
whether the second search has the same objectives and is conducted by the same officers as the first search. State v. Koepke,
47 Wash. App. 897, 738 P.2d 295 (1987) (Sheriff obtained valid
third-party consent to search a room, looked quickly within
and decided to obtain a warrant. Although the warrant was
defective, it was unnecessary since the second search, conducted by the same officer within 24 hours and with the same
objectives as the first search, was validated by the original
consent.).
A general and unqualified consent to search an area for a
particular type of material permits a search of personal property within the area in which the material could be concealed.
In State v. Jensen, 44 Wash. App. 485, 723 P.2d 443, review
denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1012 (1986), the defendant consented to a
"complete" search of his vehicle for materials of any evidentiary value. Officers conducting the search found cocaine in the
pocket of a jacket found in the backseat of the defendant's car.
The court held that the officers did not exceed the scope of
consent since the defendant had consented to the search for
evidence of the size and nature that could reasonably be in the
jacket pocket, and he never expressly or implicitly withheld
consent to search his personal belongings in the car. See also
State v. Anderson, 41 Wash. App. 85, 702 P.2d 481 (1985) (warrant granting authority for search of clothing justified search
of garbage can sized commercial vacuum cleaner in which
clothing could be hidden), revd on other grounds, 107 Wash. 2d
745, 733 P.2d 517 (1987). A consensual search is not invalidated
if it results in the discovery of evidence that the consenting
party did not expect to be discovered. Thus, in State v. Johnson, 40 Wash. App. 371, 699 P.2d 221 (1985), the court admitted
evidence of the suspect's involvement in murder after the suspect signed a voluntary consent form permitting officers to
search his vehicle. Although the suspect claimed that he limited the search to marijuana, the record did not support his
claim.
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Consent by a Third Party

Under appropriate circumstances, warrantless searches
may be based upon the consent of third parties, and evidence
discovered during such searches may be used against a nonconsenting defendant. State v. Vidor, 74 Wash. 2d 607, 452 P.2d 961
(1969). See, e.g., State v. Porter,5 Wash. App. 460, 463, 488 P.2d
773, 775 (1971).
The validity of a third-party consent is affected both by
the relationship between the defendant and the third party
and by other, more general considerations. The general considerations include: (1) antagonism between the defendant and
the third party, see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.3(b);
(2) specific instructions that the defendant may have given to
the third party, see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.3(c); and
(3) objection by the defendant, when he or she was present at
the time the third party authorized the search, see 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.3(d). Note that in some cases the
defendant's contemporaneous objections do not invalidate the
third party's consent. E.g., People v. Cosine, 48 N.Y.2d 286, 397
N.E.2d 1319, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1979).
For a discussion of the significance of a police officer's reasonable mistake that the third party had authority over the
place searched, see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.3(g).
The following sections discuss the relationships between a
defendant and a third party that may give rise to third-party
consent.
5.14(a)

Defendant's Spouse

The defendant's spouse, having equal use of the object or
equal right to occupation of the premises, may consent to a
search of the object or premises. See, e.g., State v. Gillespie, 18
Wash. App. 313, 316, 569 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1977), review denied,
89 Wash. 2d 1019 (1978); State v. Hartnell, 15 Wash. App. 410,
417, 550 P.2d 63, 68 (wife's invitation to police officer to enter
defendant's house in response to officer's request was consensual entry requiring no notice of authority or purpose as ordinarily required under knock and announce statute or
applicable constitutional provisions), review denied, 87 Wash.
2d 1010 (1976); see generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 8.4(a). But see State v. Chichester, 48 Wash. App. 257, 738
P.2d 329 (1987) (exigent circumstances needed to justify noncompliance with knock and announce rule). See supra § 3.7.
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Defendant's Parents

A parent may consent to a search, whether or not the
child is a minor, if the child is living with the parent. See, e.g.,
State v. Thompson, 17 Wash. App. 639, 644, 564 P.2d 820, 823
(1977) (when defendant's mother consented to search of home
in which she and defendant were living knowing that defendant was to be placed under arrest, and when there was no evidence of coercion, consen . was valid), review denied, 89 Wash.
2d 1018 (1978). See also State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 718
P.2d 407 (1986).
5.14(c)

Defendant's Child

The defendant's child, in appropriate circumstances, may
consent to a search of the parent's home. See, e.g., State v.
Jones, 22 Wash. App. 447, 451-52, 591 P.2d 796, 799 (1979) (thirteen-year-old child's invitation to enter apartment in which
child resided was legally sufficient consent, absent any evidence that opening of door and invitation were unusual, unexpected, or unauthorized acts, or that child was too young or
immature to consent). For a general discussion of the scope
and limitations of a child's consent to a search of the parent's
house, see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.4(c).
5.14(d)

Co-tenant or Joint Occupant

A co-tenant or other joint occupant of the defendant's
dwelling who "possess[s] common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be
inspected" may give valid consent to a search of these premises
or effects. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 39 L. Ed.
2d 242, 250, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993 (1974); see also United States v.
Green, 523 F.2d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1975). Washington has
adopted the "common authority" standard of Matlock for
determining the validity of third-party consent under article I,
section 7 of the state constitution. State v. Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d
537, 543, 688 P.2d 859, 863 (1984). The common authority rule
requires first, that the consenting party possess the authority
to permit the search in his or her own right, and second, that it
is reasonable to infer that the defendant assumed the risk that
the co-occupant might permit a search. Id. at 543-44, 688 P.2d
at 863. When a person with common authority over premises
gives consent to search, but is absent when the search is to
take place, the "knock and announce rule" applies. State v.
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Chichester, 48 Wash. App. 257, 738 P.2d 329 (1987) (Upon arrival of officers who announced their presence and immediately
burst into home to search premises, defendant's wife who had
consented to the search, abandoned the premises leaving the
defendant in sole possession. Exigent circumstances, however,
abrogated knock and announce rule requirements.).
The common authority rule applies to apartments and to
more limited rental arrangements such as those found in
motels, boarding homes, and room rentals. Mathe, 102 Wash.
2d at 544, 688 P.2d at 863. See also State v. Bellows, 72 Wash. 2d
264, 268, 432 P.2d 654, 657 (1967) (co-occupants of premises,
may each grant consent to search); State v. Porter, 5 Wash.
App. 460, 463, 488 P.2d 773, 775 (1971) (tenant who believes
that her roommate was trafficking in drugs may let police into
the apartment during drug transaction); State v. Koepke, 47
Wash. App. 897, 738 P.2d 295 (1987) (tenant of an apartment
consented to search of room in which defendant was residing
as a guest for a period of two to three weeks, the door was
unlocked, defendant paid no rent, the tenant stored property
in defendant's living area, and there was no indication of when
defendant would return); see also State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash.
2d 398, 717 P.2d 722 (1986) (common authority rule applicable
to validate consent to search a "hobo" camp, located outside
the city of Wenatchee), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 328
(1986); see generally 3 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.5(c).
5.14(e)

Landlord, Lessor, or Manager

The lessor or manager of an apartment building may consent to a search of an area that is not within the exclusive possession of the lessee. See, e.g., State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112,
123, 542 P.2d 782, 789 (1975) (search of rented half of garage
upheld when police, with permission of rental manager,
searched unrented half, pried off partition separating two
halves, and observed rented portion); State v. Talley, 14 Wash.
App. 484, 487, 543 P.2d 348, 351 (1975) (grounds outside apartment building were common areas not under exclusive control
of defendant and thus police could lawfully search grounds
with consent of building manager).
A landlord, however, may generally not authorize a search
of premises that are within the lessee's exclusive possession.
Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d at 544, 688 P.2d at 863. See Annotation,
Admissibility of Evidence Discovered in Warrantless Search
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of Rental Property Authorized by Lessor of Such PropertyState Cases, 2 A.L.R.4th 1173, 1208 (1980).
For an example of a tenant abandoning his interest in a
property and indicating no actual expectation of privacy, see
State v. Christian, 95 Wash. 2d 655, 659, 628 P.2d 806, 808
(1981); see generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.5(a).
For discussion of consent by a lessee, see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, § 8.5(b).
5.14(f)

Bailee

A bailee may consent to a search of the bailor's belongings
when the bailee has a sufficient relationship to or degree of
control over the chattel. See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 8.6(a); see also State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 139-40, 559
P.2d 970, 976 (1977) (when hospital had joint control over
patient-defendant's clothing, hospital ward clerk could consent
to police seizure of the clothing), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876
(1977). For a discussion of consent by a bailor, see 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.6(b).
5.14(g)

Employee and Employer

Under some circumstances, an employee may give consent
to a search of the employer's premises, and an employer may
consent to a search of the place of employment even when the
belongings of an employee would be affected. Thus, under the
common authority rule analysis, see supra § 5.14(d), an
employer may validly consent to a search of that portion of the
employer's premises used by an employee for personal purposes. State v. Kendrick, 47 Wash. App. 620, 736 P.2d 1079
(defendant leased a "crash pad" on premises owned by his
employer-employer controlled guard dogs on the premises,
stored personal and business items there, had keys to the area,
and the area was used by other employees), review denied
(1987). For a discussion of the rules governing consent within
the employer-employee relationship, see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, §§ 8.6(c)-8.6(d). For a discussion of consent by an
educational institution (or officer thereof) to a search affecting
a student's belongings, see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§ 8.6(e).
5.14(h)

Hotel Employee

A hotel employee may not grant valid consent to a search
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of a guest's room. Stoner v. California,376 U.S. 483, 490, 11 L.
Ed. 2d 856, 861, 84 S. Ct. 889, 893 (1964).
5.14(i)

Host and Guest

For a discussion of consent by a host, see 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.5(d), and for a discussion of consent by
a guest, see 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 8.5(e). See also

common authority rule, supra § 5.14(d).
5.15 Statutory Implied Consent
A statute may establish that particular conduct constitutes
implied consent to a search. Thus, for example, a person driving a motor vehicle in Washington gives implied consent to a
blood test if he or she is arrested for vehicular homicide. State
v. Judge, 100 Wash. 2d 706, 675 P.2d 219 (1984); WASH. REV.
CODE § 46.20.308(1) (1987); cf. State v. Rogers, 37 Wash. App.
728, 683 P.2d 608, review denied, 102 Wash. 2d 1013 (1984).
5.16

Exigent Circumstances: Introduction

The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement applies when police have established probable
cause but do not obtain a warrant because of the need for an
immediate search or seizure. The reasoning underlying the
exception is that the delay involved in obtaining a warrant
could result in the loss of evidence, the escape of the suspect,
or harm to the public or the police. See generally 2 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 4.1. See also State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.
2d 144, 147, 720 P.2d 436, 438 (1986). Exigent circumstances,
however, are not created whenever a serious offense has been
committed. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 83 L. Ed. 2d
246, 105 S. Ct. 409 (1984); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 57 L.
Ed. 2d 290, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978); State v. Counts, 99 Wash. 2d
54, 58, 659 P.2d 1087, 1089 (1983).
The exigent circumstances exception has been narrowly
construed when the search requires intrusion into the human
body, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 16 L. Ed. 2d
908, 919, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835 (1966), or entry into private premises, Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409, 413, 90
S. Ct. 1969, 1972 (1970). At the same time, under the fourth
amendment, the exception broadly encompasses searches of
vehicles; thus, police may make a warrantless search of a vehicle even though the vehicle and its owner are in police custody.
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Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 428-29,
90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981 (1970); see infra § 5.22.
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution is not
as broad, however, and the scope of the permissible search incident to arrest is limited to the passenger compartment and any
unlocked compartments or containers. The search is only permissible during the arrest process and immediately subsequent
to the suspect's arrest and placement in the patrol car. State v.
Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986).
The requirement that exigent circumstances precede a
warrantless entry by police to make an arrest, does not apply
when the crime is committed in the officer's presence after
being admitted into the residence. Thus, in State v. Dalton, 43
Wash. App. 279, 716 P.2d 940, review denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1010
(1986), an officer who had obtained entry into a student's college dormitory room, under the pretense of making a drug buy,
but with the intent of effecting an arrest, could make a warrantless arrest under WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.100, which provides for an arrest without a warrant where the police officer
has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been, or is being
committed.

5.17 Exigent CircumstancesJustifying WarrantlessEntry
Into the Home
5.17(a)

Hot Pursuit

An arrest on the street does not create an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search of the arrestee's house.
Vale v. Louisiana,399 U.S. 30, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409, 90 S. Ct. 1969
(1970). But police may make a warrantless entry into a home
when they attempt to arrest the suspect in a public place, the
suspect retreats into the home, and the police reasonably fear
that delay will result in the suspect's escape, injury to the
officers or the public, or the destruction of evidence. See
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(escape); United States v. Weaklem, 517 F.2d 70, 72 (9th Cir.
1975) (injury); United States v. Bustamonte-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4,
8-9 (9th Cir. 1973) (destruction of evidence); see also United
States v. Santana,427 U.S. 38, 44, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300, 306, 96 S. Ct.
2406, 2409 (1976) (White, J., concurring); Warden, Maryland
Penitentiaryv. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 787,
87 S. Ct. 1642, 1645-46 (1967); State v. Gallo, 20 Wash. App. 717,
722, 582 P.2d 558, 562 (1978). While the police are on the prem-
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ises, the scope of the intrusion is limited to its purpose; if the
purpose is to prevent escape or harm, for example, the search
is limited to finding the suspect or weapons that could be used
against the police. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 299, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 78788, 87 S. Ct. at 1646.
For purposes of determining whether an arrest takes place
in a home, the location of the arrestee and not the officer is the
critical factor. State v. Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 429, 693
P.2d 89, 91 (1985). Thus, absent exigent circumstances, an
officer may not arrest a suspect without a warrant when the
suspect is standing in the doorway to his or her home, even
when the officer is outside the home. Id.
In determining whether the warrantless entry into a home
was justified by the hot pursuit exigent circumstance, courts
examine not only the purpose of the entry but also whether:
(1) the offense was serious or one of violence. Dorman v.
United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732, 745, 104 S. Ct. 2091,
2099 (1984) (warrantless arrest in defendant's bedroom for
noncriminal traffic offense not justified as necessary to preserve evidence of individual's blood-alcohol level, even assuming that underlying facts would have supported finding of that
exigent circumstance because state had chosen to classify
offense as noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no
imprisonment possible). But see Welsh, 466 U.S. at 763-64, 80
L. Ed. 2d at 752, 104 S. Ct. at 2105 (White, J., dissenting)
(because suspect could cast substantial doubt on validity of
blood or breath test by consuming additional alcohol after
arriving home, and in light of promptness with which officers
reached suspect's home, need to prevent imminent and ongoing
destruction of evidence of serious violation of Wisconsin's traffic laws provided exigent circumstance justifying warrantless
in-home arrest) (emphasis supplied);
(2) the suspect was armed. Dorman, 435 F.2d at 393;
(3) there was a clear and strong showing of probable
cause to believe the suspect committed the crime. Id.;
(4) there were reasonablegrounds to believe that the suspect was on the premises. Id.;
(5) the police identified themselves and provided an
opportunityfor surrenderprior to their entry. Id.;
(6) the arrest decision was made in the course of an ongoing investigation or in the field, and the exigency of entry into
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the house was not foreseen at the time of the decision. See
United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1976)
(entry into the defendant's home without warrant not justified
because entry was foreseeable consequence of planned investigation and prior police activities), cert. denied, Stephenson v.
United States, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752. 763, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 694, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040
(1969); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S. 443, 464, 29 L. Ed.
2d 564, 581, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2037 (1970);
(7) pursuit was substantially continuous and afforded
police no reasonable opportunity to obtain a warrant. People
v. Escudero, 23 Cal. 3d 800, 847, 592 P.2d 312, 318, 153 Cal. Rptr.
825, 831 (1979); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 752-53, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 732, 745, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 2099 (1984) (warrantless arrest
in home not justified by hot pursuit when police did not engage
in immediate or continuous pursuit of defendant from scene of
crime); State v. Counts, 99 Wash. 2d 54, 59, 659 P.2d 1087, 1089
(1983) (no hot pursuit when police stood outside defendant's
home for one hour after defendant retreated therein).
The more intrusive the search, the greater the level of
proof required for each element of the hot pursuit exception.
Dorman, 435 F.2d at 393 n.19.
Washington cases involving hot pursuit include State v.
Hendricks, 25 Wash. App. 775, 780, 610 P.2d 940, 943 (1980)
(escape); State v. Gallo, 20 Wash. App. 717, 582 P.2d 588 (1978)
(injury); State v. Stringer, 4 Wash. App. 485, 481 P.2d 910
(1971).
5.17(b)

Imminent Arrest

Even when a suspect has not been arrested, police may
make a warrantless entry into a home when they reasonably
believe that the suspect has been alerted to his or her imminent arrest and is likely to destroy evidence or escape. See
United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978). The exception also applies when
the police reasonably believe that the suspect is armed or the
crime for which he or she is to be arrested is one of violence.
Warden, Maryland Penitentiaryv. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 29899, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 787, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1647 (1967); lickinger,
573 F.2d at 1355-56.
In addition, police may make a warrantless entry when
they believe an accomplice has been alerted to the arrest of

566

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 11:411

another accomplice and the crime was one of violence. State v.
Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 209-10, 687 P.2d 861, 866, review
denied, 102 Wash. 2d 1025 (1984). Police may not, however,
make a warrantless entry when the likelihood of escape is
slight, the offense is minor, and the police do not believe the
suspect is armed. State v. Dresker, 39 Wash. App. 136, 692 P.2d
846 (1984).
Probable cause to believe a home contains contraband does
not constitute an exigent. circumstance justifying the absence
of a warrant; police must have reason to believe the contraband will be destroyed before a warrant could be obtained. See
United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973); cf State v.
Jeter, 30 Wash. App. 360, 362, 634 P.2d 312, 314 (1981) (presence
of easily disposable contraband does not of itself constitute exigent circumstance justifying noncompliance with "knock and
announce" statute), review denied, 96 Wash. 2d 1027 (1982). If
the police actually observe the destruction of evidence, a warrantless entry is justified. State v. Drumhiller,36 Wash. App.
592, 597, 675 P.2d 631, 633 (police observed occupants in process
of inhaling what police reasonably believed to be cocaine),
review denied, 101 Wash. 2d 1012 (1984).
5.18

Exigent CircumstancesJustifying WarrantlessSearch
and Seizure of the Person

Warrantless searches and seizures of persons may be justified by the exigent circumstances exception when police reasonably fear injury to themselves or others, flight, or the
destruction of evidence. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S.
85, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 919-20, 86 S. Ct. 1826,
1835-36 (1966); State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 138-39, 559 P.2d
970, 975-76, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977). The issue generally does not arise with respect to an arrestee because the warrantless search of an arrestee may be justified as incident to
the arrest. See supra § 5.1. Exigent circumstances are used to
justify two other kinds of warrantless searches of persons:
searches that penetrate the body, such as blood tests and other
invasive medical procedures, and searches of persons located
on premises being searched.
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Warrantless Searches Involving Intrusion
Into the Body

For a medical procedure to be performed without a warrant and justified by exigent circumstances, the test selected to
obtain the evidence and the medical procedures employed
must be reasonable. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 16
L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966); see supra § 3.13(b). In addition, there must be a clear indication that the desired evidence
will be found; that is, the state must show more than probable
cause because of the severity of the search. Schmerber, 384
U.S. at 771-72, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 86 S. Ct. at 1836. Compare
State v. Young, 15 Wash. App. 581, 585, 550 P.2d 689, 691 (1976)
(police may use reasonable force to constrict throat to prevent
swallowing), review denied, 87 Wash. 2d 1012 (1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 931 (1977) with Rochin v. California,342 U.S.
165, 172, 96 L. Ed. 183, 190, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209-10 (1952) (capsules
may not be forcefully extracted from suspect's mouth). Where
a serious crime involving intoxication is at issue, the natural
dissipation of alcohol in the blood of a suspect is an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless and non-consensual entry
into a residence to arrest the person and seize a blood sample.
State v. Komoto, 40 Wash. App. 200, 697 P.2d 1025 (1985)
(officer used passkey to enter apartment and arrest suspect following felony hit and run), review denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1009,
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985). But see State v. Wetherell, 82
Wash. 2d 865, 870-71, 514 P.2d 1069, 1073 (1973) (warrantless
blood test not permitted absent consent).
The fact that evidence is likely to be destroyed will not
automatically justify an intrusive medical procedure even
when a warrant is obtained; the evidence must be essential to a
conviction. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662,
105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985).
5.18(b)

Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Persons
Located on Premises Being Searched

When a search warrant for premises is being executed,
police may conduct a warrantless search of a person located on
the premises when they have "reasonable cause" to believe
that the person is concealing evidence sought and immediate
seizure is necessary to prevent its destruction. State v. Halverson, 21 Wash. App. 35, 589 P.2d 408 (1978) (warrant authorizing
search of home and its owner did not permit officers to search
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person found in home at time of search when magistrate had
made no prior determination of probable cause to search that
person and person did not act suspiciously). For a more complete discussion of when occupants may be searched during the
execution of a search warrant for premises, see supra § 3.8(a).
5.19 Exigent Circumstances Justifying Entry into the Home
or Search of the Person: Absence of Less
Intrusive Alternatives
A number of courts have held warrantless entries of
homes illegal when police could have kept the residence under
surveillance until a warrant was obtained. State v. Werth, 18
Wash. App. 530, 537, 571 P.2d 941, 944-45 (1977), review denied,
90 Wash. 2d 1010 (1978); see United States v. Pacheco-Ruiz, 549
F.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1978) (dictum). Cf. State v.
McKenzie, 12 Wash. App. 88, 528 P.2d 269 (1974) (when police
officers watched defendant's house while other officers applied
for search warrant, and when defendant drove car out of
garage, was approached by police, and then sounded his horn,
the officers were permitted to immediately enter house in
order to detain occupants, provided the officers refrained from
searching the house until the search warrant was issued); State
v. Peele, 10 Wash. App. 58, 516 P.2d 788 (1973) (search warrant
necessary when the suspect was not fleeing but might be
expected to hide out on premises until morning); People v.
Vogel, 58 Ill. App. 3d 910, 374 N.E.2d 1152 (1978) (when threat
of destruction of evidence in locker minimal or nonexistent
and could be thwarted by stationing officer at locker while
warrant obtained, warrantless search not justified); State v.
Allen, 12 Or. App. 633, 508 P.2d 472 (1973) (when no one who
could dispose of contraband remains on premises, police should
secure premises by stationing guard while search warrant is
obtained). See generally 3 LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§§ 6.5(a)-(e) (cordoning-off should be required when it constitutes lesser intrusion than a warrantless search and does not
jeopardize life).
Similarly, the police may be required to keep occupants
under surveillance or give them the option of leaving the
premises- instead of searching them-until a warrant is procured. See, e.g., United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1051 (1977); United States v.
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Roselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974) (police failure to apply for
warrant unlawful when police could have stationed officer
with informant to prevent informant from calling and warning
defendant of imminent search); State v. Lewis, 19 Wash. App.
35, 573 P.2d 1347 (1978). Police may use methods not involving
any searching activity to secure premises in which they are
legally present while awaiting the issuance of a search warrant. State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash. 2d 632, 716 P.2d 295 (1986)
(prior warrantless entry and arrest of defendant in his residence was justified by exigent circumstances; nothing observed
by police officers contributed to the issuance of the search warrant, nor was anything in "plain view" used as evidence).
A suspect attempting to swallow evidence may create an
exigent circumstance justifying efforts to prevent the swallowing even when the evidence could be expected to pass through
the digestive system and be recovered. State v. Taplin, 36
Wash. App. 664, 676 P.2d 504 (1984).
5.20

Exigent CircumstancesJustifying WarrantlessSearch
and Seizure of Containers

Generally, a container may be seized without a warrant
when there is probable cause to believe it is evidence of a
crime; the container's mobility is the exigent circumstance permitting the warrantless seizure. See, e.g., United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977). A
warrantless search of its contents, however, is permissible only
if delay would diminish the evidentiary value of the contents
or prevent the apprehension of suspects. Id.; State v. Smith, 88
Wash. 2d 127, 559 P.2d 313 (1977); State v. Randall, 116 Ariz.
371, 569 P.2d 313 (1977); State v. Dunlap, 395 A.2d 821 (Me.
1978); State v. Wolfe, 5 Wash. App. 153, 486 P.2d 1143 (1971).
Once the container is within the exclusive control of the police,
there is no danger of removal justifying a warrantless search of
the contents. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 25
L. Ed. 2d 282, 90 S. Ct. 1029 (1970); State v. Shoemaker, 28
Wash. App. 787, 626 P.2d 538 (1981).
Under the fourth amendment, at least, the rule requiring a
warrant for the search of a container's contents does not apply
when the container is located inside an automobile and probable cause exists for a search of the vehicle as a whole or for
more than just the container. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S.
478, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985); United States v.
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Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); see
generally 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 5.5; see infra § 5.22.
Note that a warrantless inspection or testing of a
container's contents is not always considered a "search." When
the only fact that can be gleaned from an inspection or test is
whether the contents are contraband, the fourth amendment is
not implicated. Urited States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123, 80
L. Ed. 2d 85, 100, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662 (1984) (chemical test that
merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is
cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy); Accord State v. Bishop, 43 Wash. App. 17, 714 P.2d 1199
(1986) (subjecting suspicious substance to chemical analysis to
determine identity does not invade privacy interests). Thus, a
canine sniff does not constitute a search. United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 121, 103 S. Ct. 2637,
2644-49 (1983) (trained narcotics dog sniffing exterior of luggage does not constitute a search); State v. Boyce, 44 Wash.
App. 724, 723 P.2d 28 (1987) (canine sniff of air outside suspect's bank safe deposit box); see generally supra § 1.6.
See State v. Courcey, 48 Wash. App. 326, 739 P.2d 98,
review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1017 (1987), for application of the
single purpose container rule in Washington. See supra
§§ 5.2(b), 5.6.
5.21

WarrantlessSearches and Seizures of Motor Vehicles

Automobiles and other motor vehicles are treated as a special category in search and seizure law for two reasons: first,
the reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle is less than
that in a home or person; and second, the mobility of a vehicle
may make obtaining a warrant prior to a search or seizure
impracticable. See Californiav. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393, 85 L.
Ed. 2d 406, 414, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070 (1985) (privacy expectation
in vehicles is less than in homes because of pervasive government regulation of driving and roads); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 49, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 427, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1980 (1970).
For purposes of the fourth amendment, at least, a motor home
is treated like a vehicle when it is mobile and "so situated that
an objective observer would conclude that it was being used
not as a residence, but as a vehicle." Carney, 471 U.S. at 393, 85
L. Ed. 2d at 414, 105 S. Ct. at 2070. The reasonable expectation
of privacy in motor vehicles is discussed supra § 1.3(e).
This section focuses on the warrantless search or seizure
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of a vehicle and its contents when police have probable cause
to believe the vehicle contains evidence of crime. Vehicles may
also be the subject of a warrantless search when the circumstances of the search are consistent with other exceptions to
the warrant requirement, such as the search incident to arrest
or Terry stop and frisk exceptions. See supra §§ 5.2(b) and 4.74.9, respectively.
The search of a motor vehicle and its contents is treated
differently under the fourth amendment than under article I,
section 7 of the Washington Constitution. See State v. Stroud,
106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986). This section will first set
forth federal law governing the search and seizure of
automobiles and their contents and will then discuss state law.
This section will conclude with the general principles governing impoundment and inventory searches.
5.22 Searches and Seizures of Vehicles under the
Fourth Amendment
-5.22(a)

Probable Cause to Search a Vehicle:
The Carroll Rule

Under the fourth amendment, police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile when there is probable cause
to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 428, 90
S. Ct. 1975, 1981 (1970); State v. Glasper,84 Wash. 2d 17, 21, 523
P.2d 937, 941-42 (1974); State v. Parker, 79 Wash. 2d 326, 328-29,
485 P.2d 60, 61-62 (1971). A warrantless search is permissible
because an automobile's mobility creates an exigency: the contraband or evidence could be transported out of the jurisdiction
while officers are applying for a warrant. Carroll, 267 U.S. at
153, 69 L. Ed. at 551, 45 S. Ct. at 285.
The special treatment of automobiles has been extended to
permit the warrantless search of a vehicle's trunk when police
reasonably believe that the trunk contains weapons and the
vehicle is vulnerable to vandalism. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 448, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 718, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2531 (1973).
Similarly, police may make a warrantless search of a trunk
when they reasonably believe a suspect may be hiding in it.
State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash. App. 185, 191, 605 P.2d 1279, 1283
(1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980).
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Application of the Carroll Rule When Actual
Exigency Removed

The Carroll rule permits a warrantless search even after a
vehicle has been taken into police custody and is in no danger
of removal or of disturbance of its contents. Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51-52, 26 L. Ed. 2d at 428-29, 90 S. Ct. at
1981; Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 80 L. Ed. 2d 381, 104 S.
Ct. 1852 (1984) (per curiam) (actual exigent circumstances not
necessary to justify warrantless probable cause search). The
rationale is that the initial justification for the warrantless
search does not disappear after impoundment. United States v.
Johns, 469 U.S. at 484, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 897, 105 S. Ct. at 885. The
vehicle, however, has to have been initially mobile or readily
mobile for the Carroll rule to apply. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-62, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 579-81, 91 S. Ct.
2022, 2034-36 (1971) (warrant was required when defendant
had already been arrested, his car was located in his driveway,
no other individual was available to move the car, and police
already had established probable cause to search the car); see
Californiav. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406, 41213, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2068-69 (1985).
The constitutional limits on the number of warrantless
searches and the length of time that may elapse before police
are required to obtain a warrant has not been clarified. See
United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. at 484-88, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 89799, 105 S. Ct. at 886-87. The Court has upheld the warrantless
search of containers in a vehicle under the Carroll rule when
the containers were stored in a government warehouse for
three days prior to the search. Id. at 488, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 899,
105 S. Ct. at 887. See generally Note, The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement: Speeding Away from the
Fourth Amendment, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 637 (1979-80).
5.22(c) Permissible Scope of Search or Seizure under
Carroll:The Vehicle Itself and Containers within
the Vehicle
When police have probable cause to believe that a vehicle
contains contraband, they may conduct a warrantless search
"of the same scope as could be authorized by a magistrate."
United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. at 483, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 896, 105
S. Ct. at 885 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821, 72
L. Ed. 2d 572, 591, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2170 (1982)).
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Thus, when the exact location of the contraband within
the vehicle is not known, police may conduct a warrantless
search not only of the vehicle itself but also of any of its contents, including containers. Ross, 456 U.S. at 825, 72 L. Ed. 2d
at 594, 102 S. Ct. at 2173. When, however, police have probable
cause to believe that the contraband is hidden within a particular container, and the container is placed inside a vehicle, probable cause does not automatically extend to the entire vehicle.
See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 97
S. Ct. 2476 (1977); see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
765, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 246, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (1979). Moreover,
when a warrant would traditionally be required for a search of
a container as, for example, when the container consists of personal luggage, the placement of the container inside the vehicle does not trigger the Carroll rule; although no warrant may
be required for the seizure of the container, a warrant is
required for a search of its contents. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12,
53 L. Ed. 2d at 549, 97 S. Ct. at 2484 (the expectation of privacy
in containers is not undermined by simply placing the containers in a vehicle).
5.23 Searches and Seizures of Vehicles
Under Article I, Section 7
The Washington Constitution does not permit a blanket
exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles; warrantless vehicle searches incident to arrest are limited so that
immediately following the arrest of the occupant of a vehicle,
the police may conduct a warrantless search of the passenger
compartment of a vehicle, including any unlocked containers
or glove compartments within the passenger compartment.
Before searching any locked glove compartment or other
locked container, however, the police must obtain a search
warrant. State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986).
In Stroud, the court attempted to provide a clearer rule to
guide officers' conduct than that previously enunciated in State
v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1246 (1983), thus relieving
the police of the burden of determining from the totality of the
circumstances whether actual exigencies exist or not.
Although the Stroud rule allows greater scope to an officer's
warrantless search than did the Ringer rule, it is still intended
to be more protective of an arrestee's rights than that permissible under the fourth amendment.
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Warrantless Vehicle Searches Based on Generalized
Suspicion: Spot Checks of Motorists

In the absence of a valid spot check program, police
officers may stop a motor vehicle to check for valid registration
or possible automobile violations only when they have a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979); State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985) (decided under
the fourth amendment). For police to institute general spot
check procedures, the procedures must constitute "a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion." Id. at
437-38, 706 P.2d at 226-27. In addition, the spot check procedures must be such that "the exercise of discretion by law
enforcement officials [is] sufficiently constrained." Id. at 438,
706 P.2d at 227; see also Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454,
459, -

P.2d -

(1988); (Seattle's sobriety checkpoint program

"gave police officers unbridled discretion to conduct intrusive
searches."); see generally infra § 6.4(c). The validity of a road
block program under the fourth amendment depends on the
balancing of the effectiveness of the road block program
against the degree of intrusion on the cumulative interests
invaded, rather than merely with one individual's interest in
freedom from intrusion. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 458-59, P.2d at - (checkpoint program involved no statutory constraints and involved extensive invasion of privacy such as
smelling of suspect's breath, visual check of automobile for
open containers, and physical tests designed to elicit evidence
of dexterity).
In Mesiani, the Washington Supreme Court held a sobriety checkpoint program unconstitutional under both article I,
section 7, and the fourth amendment. Relying on article I, section 7's explicit recognition of the privacy rights of the state's
citizens, and requirement that all searches be conducted under
"authority of law," the court dismissed the City's argument
that the stops fell within an exception to the warrant requirements. Id. at 457-58, -

P.2d at -.

In one of the cases relied

upon by the City, State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash. App. 185, 190,
605 P.2d 1279, 1283 (1980), the court permitted a warrantless
search when there was information that a serious felony had
recently been committed. The Mesiani court distinguished Silvernail, stating that "[notice that a felony had recently been
committed] is far different from an inference from statistics
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that there are inebriated drivers in the area." Mesiani, 110
Wash. 2d at 458 n.1, - P.2d at - (1988). But see Ingersoll v.
Palmer,43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987)
(A majority of the California Supreme Court used the "administrative search" doctrine to decide that sobriety checkpoints
pass constitutional muster so long as they are properly
designed and operated. Such checkpoints are intended primarily to deter intoxicated motorists from taking to the road, not
to discover evidence of crimes, and, therefore, may be characterized as administrative searches that require no individualized suspicion of illegal conduct.).
5.25

Warrantless Searches of Suspected Stolen Vehicles

Police may search a vehicle without a warrant in any place
where registration papers might be kept if the driver has fled
the vehicle and police reasonably believe that the vehicle
might be stolen. State v. Orcutt, 22 Wash. App. 730, 734-35, 591
P.2d 872, 875 (1979). Cf. State v. Taras, 19 Ariz. App. 7, 11, 504
P.2d 548, 552 (1972) (warrantless search for registration papers
may be made when occupant is arrested and refuses to identify
owner of the vehicle).
5.26 Forfeiture or Levy
Courts differ as to whether a vehicle that was used to
transport contraband may be seized without a warrant. 3
LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 7.3(b); see GeneralMotors Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352, 50 L. Ed. 2d 530,
543, 97 S.Ct. 619, 628 (1977) (IRS may impound car parked on
public street for levy or forfeiture purposes without obtaining
warrant when no legitimate privacy interest is invaded; when
car is on private property, a warrant may be required). In
Lowry v. Nelson, 43 Wash. App. 747, 719 P.2d 594 (1986), review
denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1013 (1986), appeal dismissed, 107 S. Ct.
864 (1986), it was held that under the fourth amendment, the
police are not required to obtain a search warrant before
exercising the authority granted by WASH. REV. CODE
§ 69.50.505(a)(4) (Uniform Controlled Substances Act) to seize
a vehicle used to transport a controlled substance. No analysis
of these issues was made under article I, section 7 because petitioner failed to raise any state constitutional arguments.
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5.27 Impoundment
A vehicle may be impounded without a warrant in several
circumstances:
(1) as evidence of a crime, if the officer has probable
cause to believe that it was stolen or used in the commission
of a felony; (2) as part of the police 'community caretaking
function,' if the removal of the vehicle is necessary... and
(3) as part of the police function of enforcing traffic regulations, if the driver has committed one of the traffic offenses
for which the legislature has specifically authorized
impoundment.
State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 742-43, 689 P.2d 1065, 107071 (1984) (quoting State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 189, 622
P.2d 1199, 1213 (1980)); State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 149,
622 P.2d 1218, 1223 (1980); see State v. Sweet, 36 Wash. App.
377, 675 P.2d 1236 (1984).
Recent cases concerning impoundment of a vehicle
include:
(1) as evidence of a crime, State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash.
2d 632, 716 P.2d 295 (1986) (police properly impounded a vehicle that they had probable cause to believe was used in commission of a felony, since defendant lured the victim to the
murder site by telephoning and requesting victim to bring gasoline to his empty vehicle);
(2) as part of the community caretakingfunction, State
v. Sweet, 44 Wash. App. 226, 721 P.2d 560 (impoundment of
vehicle was proper under the community caretaking function
when the arrestee was unconscious, items of value were visible
inside the vehicle, and the vehicle was in a high crime area),
review denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1001 (1986); and
(3) enforcement of traffic regulations, State v. Reynoso,
41 Wash. App. 113, 702 P.2d 1222 (1985) (impoundment of a
vehicle under WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.435 (1987) for the commission of certain offenses by its operator is not mandatory).
The "community caretaking function" permits impoundment when the vehicle has been abandoned, impedes traffic,
poses a threat to public safety and convenience, or is itself
threatened by vandalism or theft of its contents. South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1005, 96 S.
Ct. 3092, 3097 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowksi, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 37
L. Ed. 2d 706, 715, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973). In such cases, the
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police may have no reason to believe that the vehicle is connected with criminal activity.
When, however, police conduct warrantless impoundments
and subsequent inventory searches, see ir7fra § 5.28, the
searches may not be a pretext for a search that the police
otherwise could not have made. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.
2d 170, 188-89, 622 P.2d 1199, 1212 (1980); State v. Gluck, 83
Wash. 2d 424, 428-29, 518 P.2d 703, 706-07 (1974). One of the
justifications for warrantless inventory searches is that the
searches are undertaken without an intent to find evidence.
See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, §§ 7.4(a)-(g).
Officers are permitted to impound a vehicle only when
constitutionally reasonable and necessary to effect the purpose
of the statute, namely, the prevention of a continuing violation
of specified motor vehicle statute. Impoundment is unreasonable and improper when the owner of the vehicle, or a passenger in the vehicle, is available to transport it, mid the driver,
although under arrest, requests the officer to follow one of
these less intrusive alternatives. State v. Reynoso, 41 Wash.
App. at .118, 702 P.2d at 1224-25. When impoundment would be
permitted as part of the police community caretaking function,
police must first make an inquiry as to the availability of the
owner or the owner's spouse or friends to move the vehicle.
State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d at 743, 689 P.2d at 1071. See
State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 153, 622 P.2d 1218, 1224-25
(1980); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199,
1211 (1980); State v. Bales, 15 Wash. App. 834, 836-37, 552 P.2d
688, 690 (1976); State v. Singleton, 9 Wash. App. 327, 333, 511
P.2d 1396, 1400 (1973); see also State v. Alexander, 33 Wash.
App. 271, 274-75, 653 P.2d 1367, 1369 (1982) (basis for "community caretaking function" is need to protect owner's property
while it remains in police custody, to protect police against
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and to protect
police from potential danger). Police must also consider the
alternative of parking and locking the car. Williams, 102
Wash. 2d at 743, 689 P.2d at 1071.
A vehicle may be impounded as part of the police function
of enforcing traffic regulations when the driver has committed
one of the traffic offenses for which the legislature has specifically authorized impoundment. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.
2d 170, 189, 622 P.2d 1199, 1211 (1980); State v. Singleton, 9
Wash. App. 327, 332-33, 511 P.2d 1396, 1400 (1973).
A vehicle
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lawfully parked at one's home or even on a public street, however, may not be impounded simply because its owner has been
arrested. United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 970 (2d Cir.
1972). Similarly, impoundment is improper when the arrestee's release is imminent and the vehicle does not pose a safety
hazard. State v. Bales, 15 Wash. App. 834, 836, 552 P.2d 688, 690
(1976); State v. Bertram, 18 Ariz. App. 579, 582, 504 P.2d 520,
522 (1972).
Officers may also make a warrantless detention of a vehicle by deflating its tires during the time when officers are in
pursuit of a suspect. State v. Burgess, 43 Wash. App. 253, 716
P.2d 948, review denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1004 (1986). In Burgess,
the court held that since the detention was unaccompanied by
an exploratory search, the detention was reasonably restricted
in time and place and was necessary to prevent the suspect's
flight from the scene. Id.
5.28 Inventory Searches of Impounded Vehicles
Courts generally uphold inventory searches of vehicles
when the initial impoundment was lawful and the search was
pursuant to a promulgated set of procedures or guidelines. See,
e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371-72, 49 L. Ed.
2d 1000, 1006-07, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3098-99 (1976); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 733-34, 87 S. Ct. 788,
790-91 (1967) (permitting warrantless search of car seized pursuant to state statute authorizing retention of car used to
transport narcotics; search reasonable even though statute
authorized only seizure because the search was closely related
to the reason defendant was arrested, reason for impounding
car, and reason car was retained); cf Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221, 20 L. Ed. 2d 538, 543, 88 S.Ct.
1472, 1475 (1968) (car search illegal when police had not
intended to impound car but had parked it near courthouse for
convenience of owner).
In Washington, the owner's consent must be obtained
before police may conduct an inventory search of a vehicle
impounded pursuant to the community caretaking function.
State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984) (dictum). Compare State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633, 635 (La. 1976)
(search unlawful when police removed sleeping defendant
from car and subsequently searched car for incriminating evidence) and State v. Mangold, 82 N.J. 575, 577, 414 A.2d 1312,
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1317-18 (1980) (although impoundment lawful, inventory
search of vehicle's contents unlawful when vehicle occupants
were not first given the opportunity to safeguard their property) with People v. Clark, 65 Ill. 2d 169, 174, 357 N.E.2d 798,
800 (1976) (inventory search was lawful when arrest was for
unlawfully transporting alcohol, car was stalled and blocking
traffic, and inventory searches were customary when vehicles
had to be towed). An inventory search of a vehicle impounded
pursuant to the community caretaking function made without
the owner's consent has been held valid when an owner was
unconscious and thus unable to either give or withhold his consent. There was also no evidence suggesting that the search
was conducted in bad faith or that it was a mere pretext for an
investigatory search. State v. Sweet, 44 Wash. App. 226, 721
P.2d 560, review denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1001 (1986).
The scope of an inventory search is limited. For example,
police may not open and examine a locked trunk "absent a
manifest necessity for conducting such a search." State v.
Houser, 95 Wash. 2d at 156, 622 P.2d at 1226 (1980). Moreover,
police may not open luggage located in an impounded vehicle
absent consent or exigent circumstances. Id. at 158, 622 P.2d at
1227-28; see also United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200,
1203 (8th Cir. 1979) (barring search of knapsack within car).
5.29

Warrantless Vehicle Searches: Medical Emergencies

Police may enter a vehicle to aid a person in distress or to
seek information about a person in distress. United States v.
Haley, 581 F.2d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1005 (1978). Cf. supra § 5.5.
5.30

WarrantlessSearches in Special Environments

Warrantless searches have been permitted in special environments when the danger to the public is severe and the
degree of intrusion small. Thus, warrantless magnetometer
(metal detector) searches are permitted at airports to prevent
hijackings and bombings. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d
1272 (5th Cir. 1973). Similarly, brief stops and visual searches
of packages, purses, and briefcases are permitted at courthouses to prevent bombings. Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d
1230 (6th Cir. 1972).
At the same time, the Washington Supreme Court has
rejected as unconstitutional the warrantless pat-down of
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patrons at rock concerts. Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wash.
2d 668, 673-74, 658 P.2d 653, 656 (1983). The searches at concerts are distinguishable from the airport and courthouse
searches because the dangers posed by the violence at rock
concerts are substantially less than those posed by bombings
and hijackings, and because pat-down searches constitute a
higher degree of intrusion than magnetometer and typical
courthouse searches. Id.
For a discussion of warrantless searches in other special
environments, see infra § 6.1 (schools); § 6.2 (prisons and jails);
§ 6.3 (borders).
5.31

WarrantlessSearches and Seizures of Objects in the
Public and PrivateMails

First-class mail and packages transported by private carrier may be seized without a warrant when law enforcement
officers have probable cause to believe that the mail or package
contains contraband. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S.
249, 251, 25 L. Ed. 2d 282, 90 S. Ct. 1029 (1970); see also United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 99, 104 S.
Ct. 1652, 1661 (1984). The contents of such mail or packages
may not be examined without a warrant, however, unless the
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents no longer
exists or the examination consists of a test that will only disclose the presence of contraband. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121, 80
L. Ed. 2d at 99, 104 S. Ct. at 1660-61; see State v. Morgan, 32
Wash. App. 764, 650 P.2d 228 (1982); State v. Wolohan, 23
Wash. App. 813, 598 P.2d 421 (1979), review denied, 93 Wash.
2d 1008 (1980). The constitutionality of a canine sniff to determine the presence of contraband, requires a separate analysis
under the state and federal constitutions. See State v Gunwall,
106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), for a discussion of the
relationship of the state and federal constitutions and the factors involved in determining whether article I, section 7 offers,
in the context at issue, more or less protection than the fourth
amendment. See also State v. Boyce, 44 Wash. App. 724, 723
P.2d 28 (1986) (the canine sniff of suspect's safe deposit box not
a search under article I, section 7).
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CHAPTER 6:

SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS

6.0 Special Environments and Purposes: Searches and
Seizures at Schools, Prisons,and Borders;
Administrative Searches and Seizures
This chapter discusses differences in reasonable expectations of privacy, burdens of proof, and warrant requirements in
three special environments: public schools, detention and correction facilities, and the international border. The section
also discusses special considerations in administrative searches.
For a brief discussion of warrantless searches in airports,
courthouses, and public concerts, see supra § 5.30.
6.1

Schools

Schools are considered a special environment in search
and seizure law, with the result that the usual burdens of proof
and warrant requirements are relaxed.
The reasonable suspicion standard and the balancing
approach of Terry have been used to justify the warrantless
search of a student's purse by a school official. New Jersey v.
T.L 0., 469 U.S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). The
special problem of school discipline and the special environment of the school permit a standard of proof of less than
probable cause. This is true even when the intrusion is more
substantial than a frisk, and the objective of the intrusion is
the discovery of evidence of violation of a school r-ile and not
the prevention of physical harm. Id. at 341, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 734,
105 S. Ct. at 743.
The protection afforded students against searches by
school officials under article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution is no greater than that provided under the fourth
amendment. State v. Brooks, 43 Wash. App. 560, 568, 718 P.2d
837, 841 (1986). Washington has recognized the school as a special environment and consequently permits a search of a student's person based on less than probable cause. State v.
McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781, 784 (1977). Using
the Terry reasonable suspicion standard, and the balancing test
articulated in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967), the McKinnon court set forth
several factors for determining the reasonableness of a search:
"the child's age, history, and school record, the prevalence and
seriousness of the problem in the school to which the search
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was directed, the exigency to make the search without delay,
and the probative value and reliability of the information used
as a justification for the search." McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at 81,
558 P.2d at 784 (citations omitted). See also State v. Brooks, 43
Wash. App. 560, 567-68, 718 P.2d 837, 841 (1986) (finding that
the search of a student's school locker, and locked container
therein, was reasonable in light of the factors expounded in
State v. McKinnon).
Although the reduced standard of proof of reasonable suspicion will justify the search of a student or his or her belongings, the school must still possess particularized suspicion with
respect to each individual searched. A statistical probability
that some students possess contraband will not justify a search.
Kuehn v. Renton School District, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 599, 694
P.2d 1078, 1081 (1985). But cf New Jersey v. TL.O., 469 U.S. at
342, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 735, 105 S. Ct. at 744 (dicta) (individualized
suspicion may not be required). See generally 4 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 10.11(b).
6.2

Prisons, CustodialDetention, and Post-Conviction
Alternatives to Prison

Incarceration affects all aspects of an individual's search
and seizure protections: the reasonable expectation of privacy,
the levels of proof required for intrusions, and the warrant
requirements. This section will provide a sampling of some of
the ways incarceration or even conviction alone alters search
and seizure protections. See generally 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, §§ 10.9(a)-(d).
6.2(a)

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

A prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
or her prison cell. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 393, 400-01, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3200-01 (1984).
Pre-trial detainees, on the other hand, appear to have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells, for the government must show legitimate reasons for instituting searches of
their cells. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589-91, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 438, 449-50, 104 S. Ct. 3227, 3234 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 555-57, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 479-80, 99 S. Ct. 1861,
1882-84 (1979).
A probationer has a diminished expectation of privacy.
Griffin v. Wisconsin, - U.S. -, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 107 S. Ct.
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3164 (1987) (probationers have fewer privacy rights than members of the public at large); State v. Lampman, 45 Wash. App.
228, 233, 724 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1986). See State v. Campbell, 103
Wash. 2d 1, 22-23, 691 P.2d 929, 941 (1984) (person in a work
release program), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).
6.2(b)

Levels of Proof

Neither probable cause nor individualized suspicion is
required for searches of prisoners, pre-trial detainees, or prison
cells. See State v. Baker, 28 Wash. App. 423, 424-25, 623 P.2d
1172, 1173 (1981) (prisoners); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 55560, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 479-82, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1882-85 (1979) (pretrial detainees).
A parolee does not have the same search and seizure protections as an ordinary citizen, and thus police may search a
parolee's vehicle based only on a "well founded" suspicion of
criminal activity. State v. Coahran,27 Wash. App. 664, 666, 620
P.2d 116, 118 (1980).
6.2(c)

Warrantless Searches and Seizures

Warrants are not required for the search of a prisoner or
pretrial detainees. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 438, 104 S. Ct. 3227 (1984).
Warrants are also not required for searches of parolees,
probationers, or work-release inmates or their homes and
effects. See State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 22-23, 691 P.2d
929, 941-42 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985); see also
State v: Coahran,27 Wash. App. 664, 620 P.2d 116 (1980); State
v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 85, 516 P.2d 1088, 1094 (1973).
6.2(d)

Strip and Body Cavity Searches Following Custodial
Arrests for Minor Offenses

Recent litigation has focused on routine strip and body
cavity searches of persons arrested for minor offenses who are
detained pending posting bond. See, e.g., Giles v. Ackerman,
746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984); cJf Durfin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084
(6th Cir. 1983) (felony offense). The test of reasonableness
requires a balancing of the need for the particular search
against the invasion of any personal rights that the search
entails. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 481,
99 S. Ct. 1861, 1884 (1979) (Officials must have a reasonable
suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or other con-
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traband based on the crimes charged, particular characteristics
of the arrestee, or the circumstances of arrest; a policy of conducting a strip-body cavity search of an arrestee charged with a
misdemeanor or minor offense is precluded by the fourth
amendment.); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3263 (1987); Cruz v. Finney, 656 F. Supp. 1001
(D. Kan. 1987).
In Washington, routine strip searches are governed in part
by statute and administrative regulation. See WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 10.79.060-.170 (1987); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 289-02-020;
289-16-100; 289-16-200 (1986). Probable cause and a warrant are
required for strip and body cavity searches conducted prior to a
detainee's first court appearance unless: (1) the detainee is
charged with a violent offense; (2) the detainee is charged with
an offense involving escape, burglary, use of a deadly weapon,
or contraband; or (3) police possess a reasonable suspicion that
the detainee is concealing on his or her person contraband,
weapons, or fruits or instrumentalities of crime. WASH.
ADMIN. CODE 289-16-100, -200 (1986). Cf. State v. Brown, 33
Wash. App. 843, 848, 658 P.2d 44, 47-48 (1983) (strip search of
prisoner permitted after prisoner had contact with visitor);
State v. Hartzog, 26 Wash. App. 576, 583-84, 615 P.2d 480, 484-85
(1980) (visual and body cavity searches of prisoners leaving
penal institution for court appearance are permissible, but second search at courthouse impermissible unless hearing conducted to determine if second search necessary).
6.3 Borders
Searches and seizures of travelers at or near the international border fall within the scope of the fourth amendment,
but such intrusions generally do not have to meet the strict
levels of proof and warrant requirements required for ordinary
searches and seizures. This section will briefly describe some
of the situations in which traditional proof and warrant
requirements have been relaxed.
A border search need not be conducted at the border.
United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 629 (9th Cir. 1985)
(court upheld the search of a package placed with courier service for shipment 24 hours before its scheduled border crossing
and 3,000 miles from the border when it was all but certain the
parcel's condition would remain unchanged until it crossed the
United States border); United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361,
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365 (3d Cir. 1985) (border searches allowed at point of destination rather than point of entry when there is no evidence the
package has been materially changed and when the package's
transportation to its stated final destination has been under a
customs board). See generally 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE,
§§ 10.5(a)-(k).
6.3(a)

Permanent Checkpoints: Illegal Aliens

Law enforcement officers may conduct routine brief questioning of travellers at permanent checkpoints to identify illegal aliens, provided the intrusion does not exceed the scope of
a Terry stop. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
566-57, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1133, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3087 (1976). No
warrant is required for such stops. See id. See also 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 10.5(i).
6.3(b)

Roving Patrols: Illegal Aliens

Officers conducting roving patrols near international borders must have a reasonable suspicion, based on "specific
articulable facts," that a vehicle contains illegal aliens before
stopping the vehicle. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S.
873, 884, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 618, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582 (1975). For a
roving patrol to search a vehicle, reasonable suspicion that the
vehicle contains illegal aliens is insufficient; the officers must
have probable cause. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 269-70, 37 L. Ed. 2d 596, 600-01, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 2537-38
(1973). See 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 10.5(h).
6.3(c)

Smuggling

The scope of a Terry stop at the border may be relatively
intrusive when smuggling of narcotics is suspected. See United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544, 87 L. Ed. 2d
381, 393, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 3312-13 (1985) (individual fitting courier profile of alimentary canal smuggler may be detained for
16 hours pending bowel movement; reasonable suspicion standard adopted); cf. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686688, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 615-17, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1574-75 (1985)
(twenty minute detention of suspect based only on reasonable
suspicion held permissible; Terry stop is unconstitutional in
duration only when police do not act with due diligence, not at
expiration of any particular time period); but cf. Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502-503, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 239-240, 103 S. Ct.
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1319, 1326-27 (1983) (officers having only reasonable suspicion
that airport traveler was smuggling narcotics could not detain
traveler in special room and seize his tickets and luggage);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110,
122, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2645 (1983) (90 minute detention of luggage
at international airport unreasonable when law enforcement
officers only had reasonable suspicion of smuggling).
6.4 Administrative Searches
Whether or not criminal prosecution is anticipated,
searches conducted for administrative purposes are governed
by the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464
U.S. 287, 293-94, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 483-84, 104 S. Ct. 641, 646-47
(1984) (fourth amendment applies to inspection of home that
was partially damaged by fire, even when purpose of inspection
was to determine fire's origin, and no criminal conduct was
suspected).
6.4(a)

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

The fact that a search is part of an administrative or regulatory program or has a purpose other than criminal prosecution does not affect an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy in the premises being searched. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 938, 87 S. Ct. 1727,
1733 (1967) (search of home for housing code violations); See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 948, 87 S. Ct.
1737, 1741 (1967) (search of commercial premises for fire code
violations). Although a few pervasively regulated industries
are permitted no reasonable expectations of privacy, the general rule is that the fourth amendment protections apply to
civil, as well as criminal, searches and to commercial, as well as
residential, premises. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
312-13, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305, 311-12, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1820-21 (1978)
(except for particular industries such as those involving liquor
and firearms, where no reasonable expectation of privacy
exists, the fourth amendment protects against unreasonable
administrative searches of commercial premises); see also
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293-94, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 48384, 104 S. Ct. 641, 646-47 (1984); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,
56 L. Ed. 2d 486, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978).
The right to challenge a warrantless investigation of firedamaged property by the state fire marshall depends on
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whether the individual making the challenge had an expectation of privacy in the property that was subject to the search.
The test for an expectation of privacy in such premises is
objective-that is, whether the expectation of privacy under
the circumstances is reasonable, whether the property is the
challenger's home and continues as such, the extent of the fire
damage, and whether the challenger has attempted to secure
or safeguard the premises. State v. Carey, 42 Wash. App. 840,
854, 714 P.2d 708, 715 (defendant had no expectation of privacy
when he had moved out of his motor home, which was partially fire-damaged, and had made no effort to secure the
premises although he had the opportunity to do so), review
denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1003 (1986).
6.4(b)

Warrant Requirements

Warrants are generally required for administrative
searches of both private and commercial premises. Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 937-38,
87 S. Ct. 1727, 1732-33 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,
545-46, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 947-48, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 1740-41 (1967).
When the traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement
apply, however, a warrant is unnecessary. Michigan v. C7ifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293-94, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 483-84, 104 S. Ct.
641, 646-47 (1984) (warrant not required for entry onto premises when consent given or exigent circumstances present:
"evidence of criminal activity... discovered during the course
of a valid administrative search . . . may be seized under the
'plain view' doctrine" (citation omitted)).
Warrants are not required in certain limited situations
when searches are made pursuant to comprehensive and predictable legislative schemes. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,
69 L. Ed. 2d 262, 101 S. Ct. 2534 (1981). Such situations are
characterized by a substantial federal interest in inspection, as
in the case of hazardous industries, and by the necessity of a
warrantless inspection to enforce the legislative purpose. Id. at
598-99, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 269, 101 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (congressional
scheme authorizing warrantless inspections of mines found
constitutional). In addition, the scheme must prove to be an
adequate substitute for a warrant by imposing certainty and
regularity in the inspections and by accommodating special privacy concerns. Id. at 600-01, 69 L. Ed. 2d at 270, 101 S. Ct. at
2539.
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A warrantless inspection of a commercial premise of a pervasively regulated business is deemed reasonable only if the
following criteria are met: first, a substantial governmental
interest must form the regulatory scheme; second, warrantless
inspections must be necessary to fulfill the regulatory scheme;
and third, the inspection program, in terms of certainty and
regularity of application, must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. New York v. Burger,- U.S. -,
-, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601, -, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2643-44 (1987). Even a
business person in a pervasively regulated industry, however,
should not be subjected to unreasonable searches based on the
theory that consent is a condition of licensing by the state.
Rather, there must be a balancing of the need to search against
the invasion that the search entails. State v. Rome, 47 Wash.
App. 666, 669, 736 P.2d 709, 711 (1987) (a warrantless inspection
of fish conducted in a reasonable manner by Department of
Fisheries personnel aboard a commercial fishing boat to obtain
biological and statistical information does not violate the fisherman's constitutional rights; the state's interest in preserving
a natural resource, and the limitation in the purpose, place,
and scope of the inspection rendered the inspection reasonable), review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1025 (1988). See 3 LAFAvE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 10.2(c). Thus, a warrantless search of an
automobile junkyard, conducted pursuant to a statute authorizing such a search, falls within the exception to the warrant
requirement for administrative inspections of pervasively regulated industries, despite the fact that the inspections are conducted by police officers and that the ultimate purpose of the
regulatory statute pursuant to which the search is done is the
same as that of penal laws. New York v. Burger, - U.S. -, 96
L. Ed. 2d 601, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987). The Ninth Circuit has
recently declined to extend the Burger test to searches of the
person. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Burnlay, 839 F.2d
575 (9th Cir. 1988) (urinalysis).
Warrants may also not be required for license, registration,
and equipment spot checks of vehicles. See Delaware v.
Prouse,440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673-74, 99 S. Ct. 1391,
1401 (1979). Cf. State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d
225 (1985). Although vehicle spot checks have not been
approved except when conducted near international borders,
see supra § 6.3, and truck weigh-in stations and inspection
checkpoints, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 n.26, 59 L.
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Ed. 2d 660, 673-74, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, (1979), the minimum
requirements of such checks have been discussed in dicta by
both the United States and Washington Supreme Courts and
are set out infra § 6.4(c). See also supra § 5.24.
Police officers may enter a private residence without a
warrant when officials of another governmental agency have
validly entered the residence and validly discovered contraband. The police may not, however, exceed the scope of the
prior intrusion. State v. Bell, 108 Wash. 2d 193, 201, 737 P.2d
254, 259 (1987) (firefighters, after entering premises to extinguish a fire, discovered a marijuana growing operation in plain
view, and requested police assistance in seizing the
contraband).
6.4(c)

Level of Proof Requirements

To obtain an administrative warrant to search commercial
or residential premises, law enforcement officers must either
offer specific proof of a violation or show that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an . . .
inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment]." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 56 L. Ed.
2d 305, 316, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 1824 (1978) (brackets in original)
(citation omitted).
When officers seek a warrant based on a general administrative program they must set forth sufficient details of the
program to enable a magistrate to determine whether the program is reasonable. Seattle v. Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 85, 627
P.2d 159, 162 (1981). Conclusory statements are inadequate. Id.
When an administrative warrant is sought to determine
the cause of a recent fire, "fire officials need show only that a
fire of undetermined origin has occurred on the premises, that
the scope of the proposed search is reasonable and will not
intrude unnecessarily on the fire victim's privacy, and that the
search will be executed at a reasonable and convenient time."
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477, 484,
104 S. Ct. 641, 647 (1984).
The constitutionality of vehicle spot checks depends in
part upon two factors: whether the purpose is satisfied by the
procedure-that is, whether spot checks are "a sufficiently productive mechanism to justify the intrusion"--and whether the
checks "do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion" by officers conducting the stops. Delaware v. Prouse, 440
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U.S. 648, 659, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 671, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (1979);
see Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, - P.2d - (1988); State
v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 437, 706 P.2d 225, 226 (1985).
As with the "area" warrants that authorize housing and fire
code inspections, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967), individualized
suspicion is not necessarily required for spot checks. See
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 673-74, 99 S. Ct. at 1401
(dicta) ("Questioning of all in-coming traffic at roadblock-type
stops is one possible alternative."). It is unclear, however,
whether any spot check procedure would be constitutional
under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. See
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, - P.2d - (1988); State v.
Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d at 441, 706 P.2d at 228; cf. supra § 6.3
(border checkpoints).
A governmental employee may have reasonable expectation of privacy in a work area. O'Connorv. Ortega, 480 U.S. -,
-, 94 L. Ed. 2d 714, 723, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1499 (1987) (fourth
amendment was invoked by state hospital supervisor's reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinet). The
governmental employer will only be required to meet the reasonable suspicion standard to conduct a warrantless search.
The fourth amendment does not require the "government
agency to learn the subtleties of the probable cause standard."
Id. at -, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 728, 107 S. Ct. at 1502. Thus, the
search must be justified at its inception, and the search as conducted must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id.
at -, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 728-29, 107 S. Ct. at 1503 (quoting New
Jersey v. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 735, 105 S. Ct. at
744).
CHAPTER

7:

ADMINISTRATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

70

Introduction

The exclusionary rule has traditionally provided that if a
search or seizure violates a person's fourth amendment rights,
any evidence found as a result of the search or seizure must be
suppressed in the criminal trial of that defendant. When physical evidence must be suppressed, testimony regarding that
physical evidence must also be suppressed if such testimony is
the fruit of the unlawful search or seizure. 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH

1988]

1988 Search and Seizure

& SEIZURE, § 11.6. To invoke the exclusionary rule, a defendant must make a timely objection and have standing to object.
State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962). The
rule applies both to federal and state violations of the fourth
amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S.
Ct. 1684 (1961).
Historically, the exclusionary rule has had several purposes: (1) to deter unreasonable searches and seizures, id. at
656, 6 L. Ed. 2d at 1090-91, 81 S. Ct. at 1692; (2) to preserve judicial integrity-that is, to prevent courts from becoming accomplices to willful disobedience of the constitution, id. at 659, 6 L.
Ed. 2d at 1092, 81 S. Ct. at 1694; and (3) to sustain the public's
belief that the government will not profit from lawless behavior, United States v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338, 357, 38 L. Ed. 2d
561, 576-77, 94 S. Ct. 613, 624 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In a 1984 case, the United States Supreme Court identified
deterrence of police misconduct as the principal justification
for the rule; the Court declined to employ the rule to deter
magistrates from improper probable cause determinations or to
serve as a method of demonstrating judicial integrity. United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 104 S. Ct. 3405
(1984).
Although most of the discussion in this section centers
upon the exclusion of evidence compelled by the federal constitution, state law can compel the exclusion of evidence from
state courts that federal law would hold admissible in federal
courts. E.g., State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 541, 617 P.2d
1012, 1018 (1980) (recordings made in violation of Washington
privacy statute, although permitted under federal wiretap statute, inadmissible in state court proceedings); see infra § 7.4(f)
(state may compel exclusion of illegally seized evidence from
civil proceedings even when federal constitution does not
require such exclusion).
The difference in wording and intent between article I,
section 7 and the fourth amendment has led to a difference in
exclusionary rules. See, e.g., State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92,
110-12, 640 P.2d 1061, 1071-72 (1982) (Washington provision
places emphasis on protecting individual rights, not on curbing
governmental action). For example, the Washington Supreme
Court has recognized deterrence of legislative misconduct as a
legitimate purpose for excluding illegally obtained evidence.
Id. at 112, 640 P.2d at 1072. Under the fourth amendment the
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application of the rule will depend largely on whether the
exclusion of evidence will deter future police misconduct;
under article I, section 7, however, the application of the rule
may be automatic. White, 97 Wash. 2d at 109-12, 640 P.2d at
1071-72. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 82 L. Ed. 2d
at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 3418 (1984) (sole purpose of exclusionary
rule is to deter police misconduct).
7.1

Criticisms of the Rule

A number of judges and legal scholars have opposed a
broad-reaching exclusionary rule. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465, 484 n.21, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1082, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3047-48,
(1976); see generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 1.2(a)-(f).
The reasons include the following:
(1) The rule handcuffs the police, handicapping the
detection and prosecution of crime. Counterargument: The
fourth amendment itself, not the rule, has that effect. When
the amendment was adopted, that very argument was rejected.
See 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 1.2(a). For citations to
studies on the effects of the exclusionary rule on felony prosecutions, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-908 n.6, 82 L.
Ed. 2d at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 3413.
(2) The rule aids only the guilty. Counterargument:
Because of the rule's deterrent effect, innocent persons are
spared unreasonable searches and seizures.
(3) The rule does not deter. Counterargument: After creation of the rule, there was a dramatic increase in the number
of warrant applications and in the number of police academy
classes offering instruction on obtaining evidence in a manner
that does not violate the fourth amendment. Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 492, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1086-87, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3051
(1976).
Suggested alternatives to the exclusionary rule include
providing civil damages as the sole remedy, limiting the rule to
knowing or substantial violations, or limiting the rule to minor
crimes. See generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 1.2(a)(f). See also Gottlieb, Feedback from the Fourth Amendment"
Is the Exclusionary Rule an Albatross Around the Judicial
Neck?, 67 Ky. L.J. 1007 (1979) (suggesting remedy solely in
tort, with damages paid either through insurance or governmental reimbursement).
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72 Limitations in the Application of the Rule
7.2(a)

Unlawful Searches and Seizures Conducted
in Good Faith

This section discusses two general categories of exceptions
to the exclusionary rule: exceptions based on the good faith of
the police and exceptions based on nonsubstantive use of the
illegally obtained evidence. Subsequent sections will discuss
additional limitations on the application of the rule. The limitations pertain to: (1) the type of judicial proceeding, see infra
§§ 7.3, 7.4; (2) the public or private status of the party conducting the unlawful search and seizure, see infra §§ 7.5, 7.6;
and, (3) the nexus between the unlawful search or seizure and
the evidence sought to be suppressed, see intfra §§ 7.9, 7.10.
The exclusionary rule does not apply, in federal courts at
least, when evidence is seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance
on a search warrant that is later found to be unsupported by
probable cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-921, 82
L. Ed. 2d 677, 696-97, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3419 (1984). "[T]he marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence
obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently
invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs
of exclusion." Id. at 922, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 3420.
Similarly, evidence seized under the authority of a technically invalid warrant may be admitted when the police reasonably believed that the search they conducted was authorized by
a valid warrant. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 737, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984). "Suppressing evidence
because the judge failed to make all the necessary clerical corrections despite his assurances that such changes would be
made will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve." Id. at 990-91, 82 L. Ed. 2d at
745, 104 S. Ct. at 3429.
Federal courts may also admit evidence obtained during a
search incident to an unlawful arrest when the arrest is made
in good faith reliance on an ordinance subsequently declared
unconstitutional. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 40, 61 L.
Ed. 2d 343, 351, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2633 (1979). This good faith
exception has its own exception: the evidence is inadmissible
when the ordinance at issue is so similar to an ordinance or
statute that previously was declared unconstitutional and as a
consequence is "so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that

594

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 11:411

any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its
flaws." Id. at 38, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 350, 99 S. Ct. at 2632.
When an unlawful arrest was based partly on a provision
of a statute that had not yet been construed and as a result was
presumptively valid at the time of the arrest, evidence
obtained as a result of the arrest is nevertheless inadmissible if
the valid section of the statute could not be enforced without
incorporating the "grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional" section. State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 104, 640 P.2d 1061, 1067-68
(1982).
The DeFillippo good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule is inapplicable to claims brought under article I, section 7
of the Washington Constitution. State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d
92, 109-12, 640 P.2d 1061, 1070-72 (1982). Thus, when an arrest
is made pursuant to an unlawful statute, the good faith of the
police and the presumptive validity of the statute at the time of
arrest will not render the fruits of the arrest admissible. Id.
(automatic application of exclusionary rule "will add stability
to the rights of individual citizens, discourage the Legislature
from passing provisions akin to [the unlawful statute], and will
make law enforcement more predictable").
7.2(b)

Non-Substantive Use of Illegally Seized Evidence

Illegally obtained evidence may be used to impeach a
defendant's direct testimony at trial even when the evidence is
inadmissible in the government's case-in-chief. Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62, 98 L. Ed. 503, 74 S. Ct. 354 (1954). A
defendant's statements made in response to proper cross-examination are also subject to impeachment by illegally obtained
evidence that is inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt.
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559, 100 S.
Ct. 1912 (1980); see also State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 17980, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206 (1980).
7.3 Applications of the Rule in CriminalProceedings Other
Than Trial
7.3(a)

Grand Jury Testimony

A person testifying before a grand jury may not refuse to
answer questions on the ground that the questions are based
on evidence derived from an illegal search. United States v.
Calandra,414 U.S. 338, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974).
The exclusionary rule is not applied to grand jury proceedings
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because its application would have only a marginal deterrent
effect. In determining whether to employ the rule, the court
weighs the deterrent value of applying the rule against the
costs of excluding the type of evidence in question. Id. at 351,
38 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 94 S. Ct. at 621.
7.3(b)

Indictment

The rule does not apply to indictments based on illegally
obtained evidence. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 2 L.
Ed. 2d 321, 78 S. Ct. 311 (1958). Again, the rationale is that
excluding the evidence, even if it means dismissing an indictment, would have only marginal deterrent value.
7.3(c)

Probable Cause Hearing

Illegally seized evidence may be considered in determining
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused
committed the crime charged. Giordenello v. United States,
357 U.S. 480, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503, 78 S. Ct. 1245 (1958); State v.
O'Neill, 103 Wash. 2d 853, 867-72, 700 P.2d 711, 719-21 (1985)
(recordings by federal agents made in a manner inconsistent
with state law and thus inadmissible at trial nevertheless may
be used to furnish probable cause for court-ordered search).
7.3(d)

Bail Hearing

Several cases in other jurisdictions suggest that illegally
seized evidence may be suppressed at bail hearings. See
Steigler v. Superior Court, 252 A.2d 300 (Del.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 880 (1969); State v. Tucker, 101 N.J. Super. 380, 244 A.2d
353 (1968). The questioned has not yet been presented to the
Washington Supreme Court.
7.3(e)

Sentencing

The exclusionary rule has been applied in sentencing hearings only when the illegal search was conducted "for the
express purpose of improperly influencing the sentencing
judge." United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971); Verdugo v. United
States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961
(1971).
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Revocation of Conditional Release

There is a split of authority as to whether the exclusionary
rule extends to parole or probation revocation hearings. Compare United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir.
1975) (exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation
proceedings when officers conducting search did not know, and
had no reason to believe, suspect was probationer) with United
States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978) (rule applies
to probation revocation) and Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399
(Okla. Crim. 1973) (rule applies to suspended sentence
revocations).
Some courts have suggested that the exclusionary rule
should apply when the arresting officer knows that the victim
is on conditional release; otherwise, a zealous officer would
have less incentive to obey the Constitution, knowing that illegally seizing the evidence could send the parolee back to
prison. See generally United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205
(4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019
(9th Cir. 1975).
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution must be
applied in parole revocation hearings. A parolee, however, has
a diminished right to privacy under article I, section 7, and a
warrantless search of the parolee may be made by a law
enforcement officer with a well-founded suspicion that a probation violation has occurred. State v. Lampman, 45 Wash.
App. 228, 235, 724 P.2d 1092, 1096 (1986) (fact of parolee's
flight, in light of officer's knowledge, created a well-founded
suspicion that a parole violation had occurred). See supra
§ 6.2(a).
7.3(g)

Federal Habeas Corpus Proceeding

The exclusionary rule does not require habeas corpus
relief when the state granted the defendant a full and fair
opportunity to litigate all fourth amendment claims. Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
7.3(h)

Perjury

Illegally seized evidence may be used to support a perjury
conviction. See United States v. Raftery, 534 F.2d 854, 857 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976); United States v. Turk,
526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.) (cautioning against per se admissibility,

1988]

1988 Search and Seizure

suggesting that exclusion may sometimes have deterrent
effect), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
7.4 Application of the Rule in Quasi-Criminal,Civil, and
Administrative Proceedings
The exclusionary rule has been applied in forfeiture proceedings, requiring the suppression of any illegally seized evidence used to prove the criminal violation justifying the
forfeiture. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170, 85 S. Ct. 1246 (1965); accord People v.
Zimmerman, 44 Ill. App. 3d 601, 358 N.E.2d 715 (1976).
7.4(a)

Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings

The exclusionary rule has generally been applied in juvenile delinquency proceedings. See, e.g., Hyde v. Robert T., 8
Cal. App. 3d 990, 993, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37, 38 (1970); In re Marsh,
40 Ill. 2d 53, 55, 237 N.E.2d 529, 531 (1968); see also In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 30-31, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1445
(1967).
7.4(b)

Narcotics Addict Commitment Proceedings

The exclusionary rule has been applied in narcotics addict
commitment proceedings. See People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674,
682, 446 P.2d 800, 805, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805 (1968).
7.4(c)

Civil Tax Proceedings

The exclusionary rule is not applied in civil tax proceedings when state officials turn over illegally seized tax records
to the IRS. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458, 49 L. Ed.
2d 1046, 1063, 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3034 (1976). But see Pizarello v.
United States, 408 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir.) (tax assessment invalid if based substantially on illegally obtained evidence), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969); see generally 1 LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE,

§ 1.5(a)-(g).
7.4(d)

Administrative Proceedings

Most courts apply the rule in administrative hearings
when the disposition is relatively significant and when application of the rule is likely to deter unlawful searches and
seizures. See, e.g., Governing Board of Mountain View School
District v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 549-51, 111 Cal. Rptr.
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724, 727-28 (1974) (recognizing rule may be applied in administrative hearings, but holding that rule is not applicable in
teacher dismissal proceeding based on immoral conduct
because primary purpose of proceeding is to protect school
children); New Brunswick v. Speights, 157 N.J. Super. 9, 20-21,
384 A.2d 225, 231 (1978) (policy of deterring unlawful governmental conduct may be significant when subsequent disciplinary hearing, directed at police officer charged with criminal
violations, was foreseeable at time of search or seizure); Cf.
Thanhauser v. Milprint, Inc., 9 A.D.2d 833, 833, 192 N.Y.S.2d
911, 912 (1959) (claimant's statement, taken while claimant
under sedation and in severe pain, admissible in workman's
compensation hearing).
7.4(e)

Legislative Hearings

Whether the rule applies in a legislative hearing depends
on whether the evidence was seized with the intent to use it at
the hearing; if it was, then application of the rule will have
some significant deterrent value. United States v. McSurely,
473 F.2d 1178, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (when defendant prosecuted for contempt of Congress, court must exclude evidence
derived from unlawful search and seizure by congressional
committee investigator); see also Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 205, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1273, 1294, 77 S. Ct. 1173, 1188 (1957)
(protective freedoms should not be placed in danger in absence
of clear determination by House or Senate that particular
inquiry is justified by specific legislative need).
7.4(f)

Private Litigation

The exclusionary rule is not applied in suits between private parties. Honeycutt v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 F.2d 340, 348 (7th
Cir.) (fourth and fourteenth amendments do not require exclusion of evidence obtained illegally by state police when private
parties seek to introduce evidence in civil proceeding), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40,
44, 203 N.E.2d 481, 482, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 84 (1964) (evidence of
wife's adultery obtained by illegal entry into wife's home by
husband and private investigators admissible in divorce action).
Evidence illegally seized by the government may be introduced
into a private proceeding because the rule would have little
deterrent value: since the state is not a party to the proceeding,
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it would have nothing to gain from a fourth amendment violation. Honeycutt, 510 F.2d at 348.
States, however, may rely on their own laws to bar the use
of illegally seized evidence in private litigation and thereby
promote the following policies: (1) depriving transgressors of
the fruits of their wrongs; (2) deterring lawless behavior; and
(3) discouraging violence. See Kassner v. Frement Mutual Ins.
Co., 47 Mich. App. 264, 266, 209 N.W.2d 490, 492 (1973) (unlawful search of premises destroyed by fire represents significant
invasion of privacy; thus, evidence seized as result of search
not admissible in civil case); Badde, Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases: A ComparativeStudy of a
Classic Mismatch, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1325, 1353 (1973). The issue
has not been reviewed under the Washington State
Constitution.
Z5

Application of the Rule to Searches by Private
Individuals: General Principle

Because the fourth amendment is a limitation on the government only, federal courts do not exclude the fruits of a private search. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 65 L. Ed.
1048, 1051, 41 S. Ct. 574, 576 (1921) (papers obtained through
theft by private individual and delivered to federal prosecutors
admissible against defendant); see United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 117, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 96, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 (1984)
(A private freight carrier notified government agents that
damaged package contained white powdery substance; information held admissible, for "when an individual reveals private
information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant
will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that
occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental
use of that information.").
The Washington Constitution, article I, section 7 does not
apply to searches by private citizens acting on their own initiative. State v. Clark, 48 Wash. App. 850, 855, 743 P.2d 822, 826,
review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1015 (1987). The protection from
private searches afforded by article I, section 7 is, thus, coextensive with the protection afforded by the fourth amendment. State v. Dold, 44 Wash. App. 519, 524, 722 P.2d 1353, 1357
(1986). The fact that the person conducting the search may be
a public employee does not lend an element of state action to
the search if the search is not related to the employee's official
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duties, and is undertaken solely in his capacity as a private citizen. State v. Ludvik, 40 Wash. App. 257, 263, 698 P.2d 1064,
1068 (1985) (state game warden, residing across the street from
defendant, observed suspected drug transactions and informed
police).
When a private party acting independently of the government conducts a search and delivers the material to the police,
neither the fourth amendment, nor article I, section 7 require
the police to obtain a search warrant before examining the
material so long as the government search does not exceed the
scope of that previously conducted by the private party. State
v. Bishop, 43 Wash. App. 17, 20, 714 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1986)
(police re-opened packets found by private security personnel
in the mouthpiece of defendant's telephone in his hospital
room, and had the substance in the packets chemically analyzed); State v. Dold, 44 Wash. App. 519, 522, 722 P.2d 1353,
1355 (1986) (police investigation of defendant based on receipt
of a letter addressed to defendant, but delivered to a private
party who forwarded it to police); cf. Kuehn v. Renton School
District, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 600, 694 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1985)
(when private person acts under authority of state, fourth
amendment applies; thus, lawfulness of school search of students' luggage is not dependent upon whether person conducting search is band director, principal, or parent).
7.6

Searches by PrivateIndividuals: ParticularApplications

A private search becomes a state search if the private
party acts as an agent for the government or the two are
engaged in a joint endeavor. A private search may also be considered a state search when the party conducting the search
acts on behalf of the public or with the purpose of aiding the
government. See, e.g., Hyde v. Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 88
Cal. Rptr. 37 (1970) (entry by deceit considered government
action when landlord introduced plainclothes officer as companion in order to gain access to apartment to search for stolen
goods). A criminal defendant has the burden of proving that a
private citizen search was conducted as an agent or instrumentality of the state. No agency relationship exists unless the
state actively encourages or instigates the citizen's actions.
Factors to be considered include the state's knowledge of and
acquiescence in the search, and whether the citizen's intent
was to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own
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ends. State v. CZark, 48 Wash. App. 850, 856, 743 P.2d 822, 826
(1987) (friend of defendant who had entered into an immunity
agreement in return for testimony was not acting as agent of
state when he turned over incriminating evidence belonging to
defendant to police).
A minority of jurisdictions hold that any illegally obtained
evidence is inadmissible, regardless of who performed the
unlawful act. See Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 45-48, 203
N.E.2d 481, 484-86, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86-89 (1964) (Van Voorhis,
J., and Bergan J., dissenting). For a discussion of the admissibility of evidence illegally obtained by a private person, see
Annotation, Admissibility, in Criminal Case, of Evidence
Obtained by Search by Private Individual, 36 A.L.R.3d 553,
575-84 (1971).
7.6(a)

Agency Theory

Under agency theory, a search is not private if ordered or
requested by a government officer. Thus, evidence is admissible when obtained as a consequence of postal authorities' opening of a package to see if the proper postage rate was paid, but
is inadmissible when the postal authorities open the package
upon the request of a police officer seeking evidence. United
States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert denied, 419
U.S. 901 (1974); Thacker v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 702, 221
S.W.2d 682 (1949); State v. Blackshear, 14 Or. App. 247, 511 P.2d
1272 (1973); Commonwealth v. Dembo, 451 Pa. 1, 301 A.2d 689
(1973); see United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 80 L. Ed. 2d
85, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984) (DEA agent's removal of plastic bags
from rubber tubing inside damaged package and agent's visual
inspection of contents enabled him to learn nothing more than
had been learned from private search conducted earlier by private courier employees who called DEA after observing white
powdery substance). See generally New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (school officials
act as representatives of the state, not as surrogates for parents, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from fourth
amendment strictures).
-

7.6(b)

Joint Endeavor Theory

Under a joint endeavor theory, when the police accompany
a citizen on a search, it becomes a government search. State v.
Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 415, 189 A.2d 23, 25-26 (1963). It is imma-
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terial whether the official originates the idea, or simply joins
the search while it is in progress. Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74, 79, 93 L. Ed. 2d 1819, 1823, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 1374 (1949).
Tacit governmental approval of a private entry may also convert a private search into state action. State v. Becich, 13 Or.
App. 415, 419-20, 509 P.2d 1232, 1234 (1973).
A search is private, however, if it is undertaken in direct
contravention to police instructions. United States v. Maxwell,
484 F.2d 1350, 1352 (5th Cir. 1973). And even if the police are
summoned before the search begins and are present as it
occurs, the search may still be considered private if a private
purpose is served. United States v. Lamar, 545 F.2d 488, 490
(5th Cir. 1977) (heroin discovered by airline agent who opened
unclaimed bag to determine its owner is admissible even when
officer was present during search), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959
(1977); see also United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.
1976) (allegedly obscene books discovered by shipping manager
and delivered to FBI admissible); Berger v. State, 150 Ga. App.
166, 169, 257 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1979) (contraband discovered in briefcase by hotel manager and security personnel admissible
because purpose of search was to determine owner of lost or
misplaced property admissible), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980); cf. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 5-6 (9th Cir.
1966) (contraband discovered by airline agents inadmissible
when government agents joined actively in search).
7.6(c)

Public Function Theory

Evidence obtained by store detectives, security officers,
and insurance investigators is generally admissible. See United
States v. Lima, 424 A.2d 113 (D.C. App. 1980); Annotation,
Admissibility, in Criminal Case, of Evidence Obtained by
Search by Private Individual, 36 A.L.R.3d 553, 567-71 (1971).
Searches by off-duty police officers are considered private if
the officers acted as private citizens and if the search or seizure
was unconnected with their duties as police officers. People v.
Wachter, 58 Cal. App. 3d 911, 920-21, 130 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285
(1976) (deputy sheriff acted as private citizen when he notified
law enforcement officials of defendant's marijuana plants).
But when a private party acts as a police officer, has a
strong interest in obtaining convictions, and is familiar with
search and seizure law, the purposes of the exclusionary rule
are served by suppression, and the rule will apply. See Staple-
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ton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 100, 447 P.2d 967, 970, 73
Cal. Rptr. 575, 578 (1968) (police participation in planning car
search that was conducted by credit card agent obtained subsequent actions of agent with imprimatur of state action); Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 93, 100-01, 383 A.2d 838, 842
(1978) (off-duty police officer considered acting as government
agent when he trespassed, seized suspicious looking package
from car, and handed package over to police).
For examples of private action constituting state action in
contexts other than search and seizure cases, see Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477, 95 S.
Ct. 449 (1974); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 90 L. Ed. 265, 66
S. Ct. 276 (1946).
7.6(d)

Ratified Intent and Judicial Action Theory

A majority of jurisdictions have decided that when evidence is seized to aid the government and when the government had prior knowledge that the seizure would occur, the
taint of the illegal action is transferred to the government. See
United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1327-28 (5th Cir. 1975)
(copies of fraudulent claims allowed into evidence because
defendant failed to prove that federal investigators knew nurse
had illegally copied records for government use).
7.7 Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: GeneralRule
The extent to which evidence related to an illegal search
or seizure may be suppressed depends on the extent to which
the evidence derives from exploitation of the illegality. Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455, 83
S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963); SilverthorneLumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 64 L. Ed. 319, 40 S. Ct. 182 (1920) (when police
unlawfully seized documents, made copies of the documents,
and returned the originals, copies inadmissible); State v. Byers,
88 Wash. 2d 1, 10, 559 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1977), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 741 n.5, 689 P.2d
1065, 1070 (1984). The following sections discuss three tests
that have been used to determine whether a given piece of evidence constitutes "fruit of the poisonous tree" that should be
suppressed. See generally Comment, Custodial "Seizures" and
the Poison Tree Doctrine:Dunaway v. New York and Its Aftermath, 13 MARQ. L. REV. 733 (1980).
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Attenuation Test

The attenuation test suggests that at some point the taint
of evidence becomes so dissipated as to preclude suppression.
That point arises when the detrimental consequences of the
illegal police action becomes so attenuated that the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 430-31,
95 S. Ct. 2254, 2264-65 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); State v.
Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 213, 687 P.2d 861, 868 (1984). For
example, in Reid, the police stopped the defendant's car and
arrested him shortly after he left his apartment building.
When the defendant refused to identify which apartment unit
he had exited, police seized the defendant's keys from the car,
entered the building, and used the keys to unlock the door to
one of the apartments. The police then entered the apartment,
observed evidence in plain view, and later returned and seized
the evidence pursuant to a warrant. The court reasoned that
even if the initial seizure of the keys was unlawful, the evidence taken from the apartment would be admissible; the
seizure of the evidence "was so attenuated that the taint of the
seizure of the keys had dissipated." Reid, 38 Wash. App. at
205-09, 687 P.2d at 864-66 (moreover, "bystanders had identified
the door through which the defendant had often entered and
existed. [Thus,] [t]he keys were not utilized in the manner of a
divining rod to locate [the defendant's] apartment but rather to
facilitate access to [the] residence and to confirm from which
door the defendant had exited.").
One commentator has suggested the following criteria for
establishing whether the fruit of the unlawful search or
seizure is too attenuated to be suppressible:
(1) When "the chain between the challenged evidence
and the primary illegality is long or the linkage can be shown
only by 'sophisticated argument' .... In such a case it is highly
unlikely that the police officers foresaw the challenged evidence as a probable product of their illegality; thus [the discovery of the evidence would] not have been a motivating force
behind [the search]." Consequently, the threat of exclusion
would not operate as a deterrent.
(2) When the evidence "is used for some relatively insignificant or highly unusual purpose. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that, at the time the primary illegality
was contemplated, the police foresaw or were motivated by the
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potential use of the evidence and the threat of exclusion
would, therefore, effect no deterrence."
(3) When the unlawful police conduct is minimally offensive. Because "the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
undesirable police conduct, where that conduct is particularly
offensive the deterrence ought to be greater and.., the scope
of exclusion broader." Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree-A Plea For Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1136,
1148-51 (1967).
7.7(b)

Independent Source Test
When evidence has been obtained lawfully, the fact that
police also came by the evidence unlawfully does not make it
suppressible. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 81 L. Ed. 2d
377, 387-388, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984); State v. O'Bremski, 70
Wash. 2d 425, 429-30, 423 P.2d 530, 533 (1967) (when missing
child found during unlawful search of apartment, child's testimony admissible because she was not discovered solely as
result of unlawful search; witness had informed. police he
knew where child was).
The case for admitting the evidence is stronger when the
independent source is known prior to the police illegality.
United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1966) (testimony of witness found on premises of gambling casino during
illegal search admissible when witness' identity as casino
patron was previously learned from observation by federal
agents), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967); see also United
States v. Giglio, 263 F.2d 410, 413 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 820 (1959).
Finally, when the unlawful search or seizure results only
in the police "focusing" their investigation on a particular individual, subsequently obtained evidence is not suppressible even
if police would not have been able to focus the investigation
but for the illegality. United States v. Friedland,441 F.2d 855,
859 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050, 105657 (9th Cir.) (even when evidence can be traced to leads resulting from illegal search, evidence admissible if government in
fact learned of evidence from independent source), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
7.7(c)

Inevitable Discovery Test
Evidence obtained as a result of unlawful police action
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nevertheless is admissible when the police inevitably would
have obtained the evidence lawfully. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 444, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 387-388, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984);
see also State v. Reid, 38 Wash. App. 203, 209 n.6, 687 P.2d 861,
866 (1984); Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790, 792 (2d Cir.
1943); Clough v. State, 92 Nev. 603, 555 P.2d 840 (1976); State v.
Crossen, 21 Or. App. 835, 536 P.2d 1263 (1975). The burden of
proving the inevitability of a lawful discovery is on the state.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 444, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 387, 104 S. Ct.
at 2509. The state must sustain their burden by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
The inevitable discovery test applies even when the state
cannot show that the police acted in good faith in accelerating
the discovery of the evidence. Id. at 445, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 388,
104 S. Ct. at 2510 (under inevitable or ultimate discovery
exception to exclusionary rule, prosecution not required to
prove absence of bad faith). But see Maguire, How to Unpoison
the Fruit-TheFourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule,
55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 307, 315 (1964). The Washington
Supreme Court has not yet adopted the inevitable discovery
test, however.
78

ParticularApplications of the Fruitof the Poisonous
Tree Doctrine
7.8(a) Confession as Fruit of Illegal Arrest

Generally, a court may admit a defendant's confession into
evidence consistent with the fifth amendment when the
defendant confessed voluntarily. When a confession is the
fruit of an illegal search or seizure, however, the court must
also ensure that the distinct policies of the fourth amendment
are satisfied. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-03, 45 L. Ed.
2d 416, 425-27, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2260-61 (1975). A confession made
immediately upon an illegal entry and arrest is excludable, but
when a suspect is released after an illegal arrest and later
returns to the police station to make a confession, the confession is admissible because its taint has dissipated. Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963).
The factors dissipating the taint of a confession are the
following(1) the giving of Miranda warnings, although the warnings taken alone do not constitute a per se break in the causality between the illegality and the confession;
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(2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession;
(3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and
(4) the purpose and egregiousness of the official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603-05, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 428,
95 S. Ct. at 2262; accord State v. Byers, 88 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 559
P.2d 1334, 1338 (1977), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 741 n.5, 689 P.2d 1065, 1070 (1984);
see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110, 65 L. Ed. 2d
633, 645, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2564 (1980); State v. Johnston, 38
Wash. App. 793, 690 P.2d 591 (1984).
When a person is detained but not formally arrested, and
the detention is unlawful because probable cause is lacking, his
or her confession, if causally connected to the detention, is not
admissible, even though the person was first given Miranda
warnings. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218, 60 L. Ed.
2d 824, 839-40, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2259 (1979).
7.8(b)

Confession as Fruit of Illegal Search

Dissipation of the taint and the Brown factors do not apply
to a confession following an unlawful search as opposed to one
following an unlawful arrest because a suspect is more likely
to confess as a result of a search. People v. Robbins, 54 Ill.
App. 3d 298, 305, 369 N.E.2d 577, 581 (1977). Thus, a confession
is suppressible if it would not have been made but for the illegal search. See State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 102-04, 640 P.2d
1061, 1067-68 (1982). But qf United States v. Green, 523 F.2d
968, 972 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendant's admission allowed into evidence when admission followed government agents' confronting defendant with both legally and illegally seized
products of search); United States v. Trevino, 62 F.R.D. 74, 77
(S.D. Tex. 1974) (defendant's admissions allowed into evidence
even though they were result of an illegal search; defendant
testified at pre-trial hearing that he "probably would have"
made admissions even in absence of search).
7.8(c)

Search as Fruit of Illegal Arrest or Detention

When a search is incident to an illegal arrest, the fruits of
the search are suppressible unless intervening factors such as a
valid arrest occur between the illegal arrest and the search.
United States v. Walker, 535 F.2d 896, 898 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976).
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A search following an illegal arrest may be purged of the
taint by voluntary consent to the search; the voluntariness of
the consent may be determined by reference to the Brown factors. 4 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 11.4(d); see State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332, 335, 553 P.2d 1206, 1209 (1976); see also State
v. Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d 207, 212, 533 P.2d 123, 125 (1975); cf.
supra § 5.12.
Some courts have held that when the execution of a search
warrant has been preceded by an illegal arrest of the person
who lives at the place searched, the evidence derived from the
illegal arrest is automatically excluded. See, e.g., People v.
Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 850, 533 P.2d 211, 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83,
94 (1975). But see State v. Fenin, 154 N.J. Super. 282, 381 A.2d
364 (1977) (evidence of possession and of possession with intent
to distribute controlled substance is admissible although preceded by illegal search because evidence was obtained pursuant
to valid warrant and not as result of illegal search).
7.8(d)

Search as Fruit of Illegal Search

When the issuance of a search warrant is based upon
untainted evidence, the fact that an illegal search took place
prior to securing the warrant will not invalidate the execution
of the warrant, and evidence seized during the execution will
be admissible. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 599, 614-15, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3391 (1984) (second search of
home not tainted by prior illegal entry).
Generally, warrants are considered valid if they could have
been issued based upon the untainted information in the affidavit. See United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1001-02, (2d
Cir. 1977) (when lawfully obtained evidence is sufficient to justify issuance of warrant, fact that officer might not have sought
warrant but for receipt of illegally obtained evidence does not
require suppression of fruits of search made pursuant to warrant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v.
Dimuro, 540 F.2d 503, 515 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1038 (1977); United States v. Nelson, 459 F.2d 884, 889 (6th Cir.
1972).
7.8(e)

Arrest as Fruit of Illegal Search

If an arrest is based solely on information derived from an
illegal search, the arrest is tainted and void. United States v.
Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 1002 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434

1988]

1988 Search and Seizure

U.S. 1015 (1978); see Sheff v. State, 329 So.2d 270, 272 (Fla.
1976).
7.8(f)

Identification of Suspect as Fruit of Illegal Arrest

Courts differ as to whether to exclude suspect identifications made as a result of an illegal arrest.
(1) Line-up identjfcation. Courts have reached conflicting conclusions on the suppression of line-up identifications
resulting from illegal arrests. Compare Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 265-66, 293 A.2d 33, 37-38 (1972) (permissible
to introduce line-up evidence obtained as result of illegal
arrest) with Garner v. State, 314 A.2d 908, 912 (Del. Super. Ct.
1973)
(line-up evidence derived from illegal arrest
suppressible).
Some courts have used the Brown factors in determining
whether such identifications are admissible. See Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 32 L. Ed. 2d 152, 161, 92 S. Ct.
1620, 1626 (1972) (defendant may consent to line-up and hence,
break taint); State v. McMahon, 116 Ariz. 129, 133, 568 P.2d
1027, 1031 (1977) (post-arrest discovery of information connecting defendant with another crime dissipates taint of illegal
line-up if new information comes to light before line-up occurs
and illegal arrest is not made with intent to obtain line-up evidence). Courts have also examined the purpose and flagrancy
of the official misconduct. See generally 4 LAFAVE, SEARcH &
SEIZURE, § 11.4(a)-(j).
(2) At-trial identification. When both the police officer's
knowledge of the accused's identity and the victim's independent recollection of the accused antedate the unlawful arrest, an
in-court identification of the accused by the victim is untainted
by either the arrest or the pre-trial identification arising therefrom. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 63 L. Ed. 2d
537, 547-48, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1251 (1980); State v. Mathe, 102
Wash. 2d 537, 546-47, 688 P.2d 859, 864 (1984). Other factors to
be considered in determining whether the at-trial identification
is admissible include:
(a) the witness' prior opportunity to observe the alleged
criminal act;
(b) the existence of any discrepancy between any preline-up description and the defendant's actual description;
(c) any identification of another person as the perpetrator prior to the line-up;
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(d) the identification of the defendant by picture prior to
the line-up;
(e) the failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and
(f) the length of time between the alleged act and the
line-up identification. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242,
18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 1166, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1940 (1967). Compare
Payne v. United States, 294 F.2d 723, 725 (D.C. Cir.) (no taint),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961), with Garner v. State, 314 A.2d
908, 912 (Del' 1973) (in-court identification inadmissible when
based solely upon line-up identification that was result of illegal arrest) and In re Woods, 20 Ill. App. 3d 641, 649, 314 N.E.2d
606, 611 (1974) (in-court identification obtained by identification made pursuant to illegal arrest despite lapse of six
months).
When police have made flagrantly illegal arrests for the
purpose of securing identifications that otherwise could not
have been obtained, the identifications are inadmissible.
United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1970).
(3) Photo identifcation. A photo identification produced
by an unlawful arrest is not admissible. United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537, 547-48, 100 S. Ct.
1244, 1251 (1980). But see Johnson v. State, 496 S.W.2d 72, 74
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (photo identification not fruit of illegal
arrest when discovery of outstanding warrant was intervening
circumstance).
Courts have allowed photos taken during illegal arrests to
be used on subsequent occasions to connect suspects with additional, unrelated crimes when the suspects were not originally
arrested for the sole purpose of acquiring the photo. See People v. McInnis, 6 Cal. 3d 821, 826, 494 P.2d 690, 693, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 618, 621 (use of photo identification permitted when illegal arrest by law enforcement agency was not related to crime
with which defendant ultimately was charged by another
agency), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 106 (1972); cf. People v. Pettis, 12
Ill. App. 3d 123, 127-28, 298 N.E.2d 372, 376 (1973) (testimony
identifying defendant as perpetrator of offense admissible
when testimony resulted from photo taken after illegal arrest
for different offense).
(4) Fingerprints. Fingerprints may be suppressed when
arrest was for the purpose of obtaining and using
unlawful
the
the fingerprints for prosecuting the suspect for the crime that
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he or she was arrested for. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,
727, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676, 681, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 1397-98 (1969); see
Paulson v. State, 257 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(because police did not arrest defendant for sole purpose of
obtaining fingerprints, fingerprints obtained from arrest for
public drunkenness not suppressible at trial for grand larceny).
7.8(g)

Identification of Property as Fruit of Illegal Search
Testimony concerning an object seized during an illegal
search is inadmissible when the identification of the object has
no basis independent of the illegal search. People v. Dowdy, 50
Cal. App. 3d 180, 187, 123 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 (1975).
7.8(h)

Testimony of Witness as Fruit of Illegal Search
Testimony and physical evidence are treated differently
for purposes of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 280, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268, 279, 98 S. Ct. 1054,
1062 (1978). Verbal testimony carries with it an exercise of free
will, and the costs of excluding the evidence are great. Consequently, the suppresibiity of derivative witness testimony
depends on several of the following factors:
(1) whether the witness testifiedfreely. See United States
v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 35 (2d Cir. 1976) (testimony by illegal aliens obtained as result of illegal search inadmissible
begause testimony was prompted by government statements
concerning future prosecution);
(2) whether the physical fruits of the illegal search were
used in questioning the witness. See State v. Rogers, 27 Ohio
Op. 2d 105, 114, 198 N.E.2d 796, 806 (1963) (testimony about gun
suppressed because witness would not have been questioned
about gun but for unlawful search);
(3) whether the search and testimony were close in time;
(4) whether the witness' identity and location were
known before the search. See State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash. 2d
425, 529-30, 423 P.2d 530, 533 (1967) (when parents had sought
help from police, police questioned boy and boy stated girl was
in apartment, girl's testimony admissible although girl found in
apartment during illegal search); and
(5) whether the search was made with the intent to find
witnesses. See Karathanos, 531 F.2d at 35; see also People v.
Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 202-03, 46 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (1942) (testimony of witnesses suppressed when witness' names obtained
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from papers found during illegal search of defendant's premises). See generally Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 273-79, 55 L. Ed. 2d at
275-79, 98 S. Ct. at 1059-062.
7.8(i)

Crime Committed in Response to Illegal
Arrest or Search

Generally, evidence that the defendant attacked or
attempted to bribe an officer is admissible even if the arrest
was illegal. United States v. Perdiz, 256 F. Supp. 805, 806
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); State v. Aydelotte, 35 Wash. App. 125, 132, 665
P.2d 443, 447 (1983); see People v. Puglisi, 51 A.D.2d 695, 380
N.Y.S.2d 221 (1976). Evidence of a suspect speeding away from
an unlawful traffic stop has been considered sufficiently distinguishable from the intrusion to be admissible at trial. State v.
Owens, 39 Wash. App. 130, 135, 692 P.2d 850, 853 (1984).
The rationale for admitting the evidence is that acts of
free will purge the taint; application of the exclusionary rule
would only marginally further deterrence. In addition, exclusion would permit persons unlawfully arrested to assault
officers without risk of criminal liability. Aydelotte, 35 Wash.
App. at 132-33, 665 P.2d at 447-48. The evidence would be inadmissible, however, if it were the product of police exploitation.
See People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 324 N.E.2d 872, 365
N.Y.S.2d 509 (1975) (when, without identifying themselves,
officers encircled defendant, evidence of defendant pulling gun
inadmissible).
Z9

Waiver or Forfeiture of Objection

A defendant may waive or forfeit his or her constitutional
objection and thus render the objectionable evidence admissible. A waiver can be made in several ways, including failure to
make a timely objection, defendant's testimony at trial about
the evidence, and entry of a guilty plea.
7.9(a)

Failure to Make Timely Objection

Jurisdictions have their own rules for what constitutes a
timely objection. Washington court rules provide that a
defendant's failure to object at the omnibus hearing may constitute a waiver of the error if the party had knowledge of the
illegality of the search or seizure prior to the hearing. WASH.
R. CR. P. 4.5. The defendant's failure to object at trial will constitute a waiver unless the illegality is of such a flagrant or

1988 Search and Seizure

1988]

prejudicial nature that curative measures would have been
futile. State v. Van Auken, 77 Wash. 2d 136, 143, 460 P.2d 277,
282 (1969); State v. Allman, 19 Wash. App. 169, 172, 573 P.2d
1329, 1331 (1977).
7.9(b)

Testimony by Defendant Concerning
Suppressed Evidence

A defendant may not raise a fourth amendment claim on
appeal challenging the admission of evidence, notwithstanding
a timely objection, if the defendant gave testimony at trial
admitting the possession of that evidence. State v. Peee, 10
Wash. App. 58, 67, 516 P.2d 788, 793 (1973); Jones v. State, 484
S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Crim. 1970). A claim may be raised, however,
if the defendant's testimony was induced by the erroneous
admission of the evidence. See Harrison v. United States, 392
U.S. 219, 225, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047, 1053, 88 S. Ct. 2008, 2011 (1968);
Peele, 10 Wash. App. at 67-68, 516 P.2d at 794. The rationale
for the general rule is that the testimony may make the admission of the illegal evidence harmless error. See Peele, 10 Wash.
App. at 66, 516 P.2d at 793; See also LaRue v. State, 137 Ga.
App. 762, 224 S.E.2d 837 (1976); infra § 7.10.
7.9(c)

Guilty Plea

A defendant who has knowingly and voluntarily entered a
guilty plea may not thereafter obtain post-conviction relief on
fourth amendment grounds even though he or she made a
timely motion to suppress in advance of the plea. Sanders v.
Craven, 488 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir. 1973); see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608
(1973). Because the conviction is based on the plea, the defendant cannot directly challenge the evidence. Sanders, 488 F.2d
at 479. But if the plea itself can be characterized as the fruit of
illegally obtained evidence and consequently should have been
suppressed upon the defendant's timely motion, then the plea
was not entered voluntarily or knowingly. The defendant in
such a case is permitted to go to trial, and, if convicted, to
appeal the admission of the evidence. See Annotation, Plea of
Guilty as Waiver of Claim of Unlawful Search and Seizure, 20
A.L.R.3d 724, 732-35 (1968).
7.10 Harmless Error
Even when illegally seized evidence has been improperly
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admitted at trial, a conviction will not be reversed if the
defendant would have been convicted without its admission.
See State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329, 352-53, 610 P.2d 869, 883,
cert denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980); State v. Fricks, 91 Wash. 2d
391, 396, 588 P.2d 1328, 1332 (1979).
CONCLUSION

Search and seizure law in Washington State continues to
undergo both minor modifications and major revisions. The
Washington Supreme Court's action in State v. Gunwall, 106
Wash. 2d 54, 120 P.2d 808 (1986), set forth the minimum matters that must be considered in making arguments under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. The court's
refusal to consider arguments that at a minimum do not
address the Grunwall factors discussed in State v. Wethered,
110 Wash. 2d 466, -

P.2d -

(1988), stress the court's continu-

ing insistence on quality legal thought, briefing, and argument
by the lawyers appearing before the court.
Particulars of search and seizure law may change, but
types of issues raised and considered are likely to remain much
the same. While the Survey is not comprehensive and will
require continuous updating, it will hopefully be a useful tool
for lawyers and judges who must assess the scope of protection
Washington affords against unlawful searches and seizures.
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Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1688, 80 S. Ct.
1431 (1960) § 1.3(g)
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 96 L.Ed. 183, 72 S. Ct. 205
(1952) §§ 3.13(b), 5.2(a), 5.18(a)
Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d
83 (1964) §§ 7.4(f), 7.6(d)
Sanders v. Craven, 488 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1973) § 7.10
Schmerber v. California,384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S.
Ct. 1826 (1966) §§ 1.3(f), 2.9(c), 3.13(b), 5.2(a), 5.16, 5.18,
5.18(a)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S.
Ct. 2041 (1973) §§ 5.12, 5.12(c), 5.12(e)
Seattle v. Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 627 P.2d 159 (1981) §§ 3.3(b),
3.3(d)
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, - P.2d - (1988) § 1.4(b),
2.2(c), 2.9(a), 5.24, 6.4(c)
Seattle v. Sage, 11 Wash. App. 481, 523 P.2d 942 (1974) §§ 1.5,
4.2(b)
See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 87 S. Ct. 1737
(1967) §§ 1.3(d), 6.4(a), 6.4(b), 6.4(c)
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 82 L. Ed. 2d 595, 104 S.
Ct. 3380 (1984) §§ 1.5, 7.8(e)
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 32 L. Ed. 2d 783, 92 S.
Ct. 2119 (1972) § 3.2(a)
Sheff v. State, 329 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1976) § 7.8(d)
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 41, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88 S.Ct. 1889
(1968) § 2.4(d)
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 5 L. Ed. 2d 734, 81 S.
Ct. 679 (1961) § 1.2
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247, 88 S.
Ct. 967 (1968) § 2.6(c)
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 99 S.Ct. 2577
(1979) §§ 1.1, 1.3(a)
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Snohomish v. Swoboda, 1 Wash. App. 292, 461 P.2d 546 (1969)
§ 4.2(b)
Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943) § 7.7(c)
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96
S. Ct. 3092 (1976) §§ 5.4(b), 5.27, 5.28
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 89 S.
Ct. 584 (1969) §§ 2.3(b), 2.5, 2.6(b)
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 13 L. Ed. 2d 431, 85 S. Ct. 506
(1965) § 3.5(b)
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542, 89 S. Ct. 1243
(1969) § 3.10(b), 5.7(a)
Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1968) § 7.6(c)
State v. Adame, 37 Wash. App. 94, 678 P.2d 1299 (1984), on
remand, 39 Wash. App. 574, 694 P.2d 676 (1985) §§ 2.5,
2.5(b)
State v. Agee, 89 Wash. 2d 416, 573 P.2d 355 (1977) § 2.5(e)
State v. Alexander, 33 Wash. App. 271, 653 P.2d 1367 (1982)
§ 5.26
State v. Alexander, 41 Wash. App. 152, 704 P.2d 618 (1985)
§§ 1.3(a), 3.4(b)
State v. Allen, 12 Or. App. 633, 508 P.2d 472 (1973) § 5.19
State v. Allen, 93 Wash. 2d 170, 606 P.2d 1235 (1980) §§ 3.8(a),
4.9(a)
State v. Allman, 19 Wash. App. 169, 573 P.2d 1329 (1977) § 7.10
State v. Allun, 40 Wash. App. 27, 696 P.2d 45 (1985) § 3.7(c)
State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981) § 1.4
State v. Anderson, 41 Wash. App. 85, 702 P.2d 481 (1985)
§§ 2.5(a), 3.2(b), 3.9, 3.9(c), 5.7(a), 5.13
State v. Andrich, 135 Wash. 609, 238 P. 638 (1925) § 3.4(a)
State v. Aydelotte, 35 Wash. App. 125, 665 P.2d 443 (1983)
§ 7.8(i)
State v. Baker, 28 Wash. App. 423, 623 P.2d 1172 (1981) § 6.2(b)
State v. Baker, 68 Wash. 2d 517, 413 P.2d 965 (1966) § 2.6(c)
State v. Bakke, 44 Wash. App. 830, 723 P.2d 534 (1986), review
denied, 107 Wash. 2d 1033 (1987) § 5.5
State v. Bales, 15 Wash. App. 834, 552 P.2d 688 (1976) § 5.26
State v. Bantam, 163 Wash. 598, 1 P.2d 861 (1931) § 2.6(b)
State v. Baxter, 68 Wash. 2d 416, 413 P.2d 638 (1966) §§ 2.2(b),
2.4(d)
State v. Bean, 89 Wash. 2d 467, 572 P.2d 1102 (1978) §§ 2.5(b),
2.5(c)
State v. Becich, 13 Or. App. 415, 509 P.2d 1232 (1973) § 7.6(b)
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State v. Belanger, 36 Wash. App. 818, 677 P.2d 781 (1984) §§ 1.4,
1.4(a), 4.6(d)
State v. Belieu, 50 Wash. App. 834, 751 P.2d 321 (1988) § 1.6
State v. Bell, 108 Wash. 2d 193, 737 P.2d 254 (1987) §§ 3.10, 5.5,
6.4(b)
State v. Bellows, 72 Wash. 2d 264, 432 P.2d 654 (1967) §§ 5.12(a),
5.14(d)
State v. Berber, 48 Wash. App. 583, 740 P.2d 863 (1987) § 1.3(h)
State v. Berlin, 46 Wash. App. 587, 731 P.2d 548 (1987) § 3.7(b)
State v. Bertram, 18 Ariz. App. 579, 504 P.2d 520 (1972) § 5.27
State v. Biggs, 16 Wash. App. 221, 556 P.2d 247 (1976) § 3.9(b)
State v. Bishop, 43 Wash. App. 17, 714 P.2d 1199 (1986)
§§ 1.3(g), 5.20, 7.5
State v. Blackshear, 14 Or. App. 247, 511 P.2d 1272 (1973)
§ 7.6(a)
State v. Blackshear, 44 Wash. App. 587, 723 P.2d 15 (1986)
§ 3.12(b)
State v. Bockman, 37 Wash. App. 474, 682 P.2d 925 (1984)
§§ 1.4(a), 1.5(a), 2.4(d), 4.1
State v. Boyce, 44 Wash. App. 724, 723 P.2d 28 (1986) § 2.4(b),
5.20, 5.31
State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash. App. 289, 654 P.2d 96 (1982)
§§ 2.2(c), 4.9(a)
State v. Brooks, 3 Wash. App. 769, 479 P.2d 544 (1970) § 4.9
State v. Brooks, 43 Wash. App. 560, 718 P.2d 837 (1986) § 6.1
State v. Brown, 33 Wash. App. 843, 658 P.2d 44 (1983) § 6.2(d)
State v. Brown, 9 Wash. App. 937, 515 P.2d 1008 (1973) § 1.2
State v. Bullock, 71 Wash. 2d 886, 431 P.2d 195 (1967) § 1.3(f)
State v. Burgess, 43 Wash. App. 253, 716 P.2d 948 (1986) § 5.27
State v. Butterworth, 48 Wash. App. 152, 732 P.2d 1297 (1987)
§ 3.5(b)
State v. Byers, 85 Wash. 2d 783, 539 P.2d 833 (1975) § 4.7(a)
State v. Byers, 88 Wash. 2d 1, 559 P.2d 1334 (1977) §§ 1.4(a),
1.5(a), 7.7, 7.8(a)
State v. Byrd, 25 Wash. App. 282, 607 P.2d 321 (1980) § 2.4(e)
State v. Cabigas, 3 Wash. App. 740, 477 P.2d 648 (1970) § 2.4(c)
State v. Callahan, 31 Wash. App. 710, 644 P.2d 735 (1982)
§ 5.7(a)
State v. Cameron, 47 Wash. App. 878, 737 P.2d 688 (1987) § 4.5
State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 691 P.2d 929 (1984) §§ 5.7(b),
6.2(c)
State v. Campbell, 103 Wash. App. 2d 1, 691 P.2d 929 (1984)
§§ 6.2(a), 6.2(c)
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State v. Campbell, 15 Wash. App. 98, 547 P.2d 295 (1976) §§ 5.5,
5.7(b)
State v. Carey, 42 Wash. App. 840, 714 P.2d 708 (1986) § 6.4(a)
State v. Carner, 28 Wash. App. 439, 624 P.2d 204 (1981)
§§ 4.4(d), 5.1(a), 5.4(a)
State v. Carson, 21 Wash. App. 318, 584 P.2d 990 (1978) § 3.7(c)
State v. Casal, 103 Wash. 2d 812, 699 P.2d 1234 (1984) § 3.12(a)
State v. Chasengnou, 43 Wash. App. 379, 717 P.2d 288 (1986)
§§ 2.3, 3.3(b)
State v. Chatmon, 9 Wash. App. 741, 515 P.2d 530 (1973)
§§ 2.6(b), 2.8, 4.6(b)
State v. Chichester, 48 Wash. App. 257, 738 P.2d 329 (1987)
§§ 3.7(c), 5.14, 5.14(a), 5.14(d)
State v. Chisholm, 7 Wash. App. 279, 499 P.2d 81 (1972) § 3.4(b)
State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984) §§ 4.1,
5.1(b)
State v. Christian,95 Wash. 2d 655, 628 P.2d 806 (1981) § 5.14(e)
State v. Clark, 13 Wash. App. 21, 533 P.2d 387 (1975) § 4.6(d)
State v. Clark, 48 Wash. App. 850, 743 P.2d 822 (1987) § 7.5
State v. Coahran, 27 Wash. App. 664, 620 P.2d 116 (1980)
§§ 4.9(b), 6.2(b), 6.2(c)
State v. Coates, 107 Wash. 2d 882, 735 P.2d 64 (1987) § 3.12(b)
State v. Coates, 107 Wash. 2d 882, 735 P.2d 64 (1987) § 2.3
State v. Coburne, 10 Wash. App. 298, 518 P.2d 747 (1973)
§ 1.3(c)
State v. Cockrell, 102 Wash. 2d 561, 689 P.2d 32 (1984) § 1.3(c),
3.4(a)
State v. Cockrell, 102 Wash. App. 561, 689 P.2d 32 (1984)
State v. Cohen, 19 Wash. App. 600, 576, P.2d 933 (1978)
§§ 3.4(a), 3.4(b), 3.5(a)
State v. Cole, 31 Wash. App. 501, 643 P.2d 675 (1982) § 5.2(b)
State v. Collier, 270 So.2d 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) § 3.7(a)
State v. Compton, 13 Wash. App. 863, 538 P.2d 861 (1975)
§§ 2.2(a), 2.4(b), 5.9(b)
State v. Corbett, 15 Or. App. 470, 516 P.2d 487 (1973) § 1.3(c)
State v. Cord, 103 Wash. 2d 361, 693 P.2d 81 (1985) §§ 1.3(c),
2.2(a), 2.4(b), 3.3(b), 3.12(b)
State v. Cottrell, 86 Wash. 2d 130, 542 P.2d 771 (1975) §§ 2.2(a),
3.8(a), 3.9, 3.9(a)
State v. Counts, 99 Wash. 2d 54, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983) §§ 4.1, 5.16,
5.17(a)
State v. Courcey, 48 Wash. App. 326, 739 P.2d 98 (1987)
§§ 5.2(b), 5.6, 5.20
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State v. Cowles, 14 Wash. App. 14, 538 P.2d 840 (1975) § 3.5(a)
State v. Coyle, 95 Wash. 2d 1, 621 P.2d 1256 (1980) §§ 3.7(a),
3.7(c)
State v. Crespo Aranguren, 42 Wash. App. 452, 711 P.2d 1096
(1985) § 1.4
State v. Crossen, 21 Or. App. 835, 536P.2d 1263 (1975) § 7.7(c)
State v. Cuzick, 21 Wash. App. 501, 585 P.2d 485 (1978) § 5.13
State v. Dalton, 43 Wash. App. 279, 716 P.2d 940 (1986)
§§ 1.3(a), 5.16
State v. Daugherty, 94 Wash. 2d 263, 616 P.2d 649 (1980)
§§ 1.3(b), 1.3(c), 5.7(a)
State v. Davis, 12 Wash. App. 32, 527 P.2d 1131 (1974) § 4.7(a)
State v. Davis, 165 Wash. 2d 652, 5 P.2d 1035 (1931) § 3.4(a)
State v. Day, 50 Ohio App. 2d 315, 362 N.E.2d 1253 (1976)
§ 5.9(a)
State v. Dearinger,73 Wash. 2d 563, 439 P.2d 971 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1102 (1969) § 3.9
State v. Dold, 44 Wash. App. 519, 722 P.2d 1553 (1986) § 7.5
State v. Donohoe, 39 Wash. App. 778, 695 P.2d 150 (1985),
review denied, 103 Wash. 2d 1032 (1985) § 5.3
State v. Dorsey, 40 Wash. App. 459, 698 P.2d 1109 (1985)
§§ 4.6(b), 4.9, 5.4(a)
State v. Douglas S., 42 Wash. App. 138, 709 P.2d 817 (1985)
§§ 3.4(c), 3.8(a)
State v. Douglas, 71 Wash. 2d 303, 428 P.2d 535 (1967) § 3.3(a)
State v. Dresker, 39 Wash. App. 136, 692 P.2d 846 (1984) §§ 5.12
(b), 5.17 (b)
State v. Drumhiller, 36 Wash. App. 592, 675 P.2d 631 (1984)
§§ 1.1, 1.3(a), 5.7(b), 5.17(b)
State v. Dugger, 12 Wash. App. 74, 528 P.2d 274 (1974) §§ 3.7,
3.7(b), 3.7(c)
State v. Dumas, 9 Cal.3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208 109 Cal. Rptr. 304
(1973) § 3.7(c)
State v. Dunlap, 395 A.2d 821 (Me. 1978) § 5.20
State v. Dunn, 22 Wash. App. 362, 591 P.2d 782 (1979) § 4.6(d)
State v. Edwards, 20 Wash. App. 648, 581 P.2d 154 (1978)
§ 3.7(c)
State v. Eisele, 9 Wash. App. 174, 511 P.2d 1368 (1973) § 3.9
State v. Ellis, 21 Wash. App. 123, 584 P.2d 428 (1978) §§ 3.7(a),
3.7(b), 3.7(c)
State v. Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556, 196 S.E.2d 706 (1973) § 4.2(b)
State v. Fenin, 154 N.J. Super. 282, 381 A.2d 364 (1977) § 7.8(c)
State v. Ferguson, 3 Wash. App. 898, 479 P.2d 114 (1970) § 4.6(d)
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State v. Fields, 85 Wash. 2d 126, 530 P.2d 284 (1975) § 3.0
State v. Fisher, 96 Wash. 2d 962, 639 P.2d 743, cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1137, (1982) §§ 2.3, 2.5(b), 2.6(b), 3.4(b)
State v. Fortier,113 Ariz. 332, 553 P.2d 1206 (1976) § 7.8(c)
State v. Franklin, 41 Wash. App. 409, 704 P.2d 666 (1985)
§§ 4.6(b), 4.9(a), 4.9(d)
State v. Franklin,49 Wash. App. 106, 741 P.2d 83 (1987) § 2.8
State v. Fredrick, 45 Wash. App. 916, 729 P.2d 56 (1986)
§ 3.12(a)
State v. Freeman, 47 W¢ash. App. 870, 737 P.2d 704 (1987) §§ 2.3,
2.5(b)
State v. Fricks, 91 Wash. 2d 391, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979) §§ 2.4(e),
7.11
State v. Frye, 26 Wash. App. 276, 613 P.2d 152 (1980) § 2.5(b)
State v. Gallo, 20 Wash. App. 717, 582 P.2d 558 (1978) § 5.17(a)
State v. Galloway, 14 Wash. App. 200, 540 P.2d 444 (1975)
§§ 3.8(a), 3.8(b), 4.9
State v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 984 (1980) § 5.5
State v. Gillespie, 18 Wash. App. 313, 569 P.2d 1174 (1977)
§ 5.14(a)
State v. Glasper, 84 Wash. 2d 17, 523 P.2d 937 (1974) §§ 2.4(a),
5.22(a)
State v. Gluck, 83 Wash. 2d 424, 518 P.2d 703 (1974) §§ 2.1,
4.6(a), 5.27
State v. Gonzales, 46 Wash. App. 388, 731 P.2d 1101 (1986)
§§ 3.10, 4.7(a), 5.7(a), 5.12(d), 5.13
State v. Greene, 75 Wash. 2d 519, 451 P.2d 926 (1969) § 4.2(b)
State v. Grundy, 25 Wash. App. 411, 607 P.2d 1235 (1980) § 1.6
State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 120 P.2d 808 (1986) §§ intro,
1.3(a), 2.5(c), 5.31
State v. Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wash. App. 326, 734 P.2d 966
(1987) § 4.9
State v. Hackett, 4 Wash. App. 360, 481 P.2d 466 (1971) § 5.17(a)
State v. Haggarty, 20 Wash. App. 335, 579 P.2d 1031 (1979)
§ 3.7(b)
State v. Halverson, 21 Wash. App. 35, 584 P.2d 408 (1978)
§§ 3.4(a), 3.8(a), 5.9(b), 5.18(b)
State v. Hammond, 24 Wash. App. 596, 603 P.2d 377 (1979)
§§ 2.2(b), 5.9(b)
State v. Hansen, 42 Wash. App. 755, 714 P.2d 309 (1986) § 1.3(c),
2.29(a)
State v. Harker, 5 Wash. App. 381, 486 P.2d 1162 (1971) § 2.5(e)
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v. Harper, 33 Wash. App. 507. 655 P.2d 1199 (1982) § 4.9
v. Harris,12 Wash. App. 481. 530 P.2d 646 (1975) § 3.7(c)
v. Harris,44 Wash. App. 401, 722 P.2d 867 (1986) § 2.5(b)
v. Hartnell, 15 Wash. App. 410, 550 P.2d 63 (1976)
§§ 3.7(a), 5.14(a)
State v. Hartzog, 26 Wash. App. 576, 615 P.2d 480 (1980) § 6.2(d)
State v. Harvey, 41 Wash. App. 870, 707 P.2d 146 (1985) § 4.9
State v. Hashman, 46 Wash. App. 211, 729 P.2d 651 (1986)
§§ 3.7(a), 5.12(g)
State v. Hayden, 28 Wash. App. 935, 627 P.2d 973 (1981) § 1.6
State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45, 578 P.2d 627 (1978) §§ 4.4(d),
5.1(a), 5.2(a)
State v. Helmka, 86 Wash. 2d 91, 542 P.2d 115 (1975) §§ 3.5, 3.10
State v. Hendricks, 25 Wash. App. 775, 610 P.2d 940 (1980)
§§ 4.1, 5.17 (a)
State v. Higby, 26 Wash. App. 457, 613 P.2d 1192 (1980) §§ 2.3
3.3(b), 3.6
State v. Hill, 17 Wash. App. 678, 564 P.2d 841 (1977) §§ 3.2(b),
3.2(c)
State v. Hobart, 94 Wash. 2d 437, 617 P.2d 429 (1980) §§ 2.3(b),
4.9, 4.9(a)
State v. Hoffpauir, 44 Wash. App. 195, 722 P.2d 113 (1986)
§ 4.7(a)
State v. Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 693 P.2d 89 (1985) §§ 1.2,
1.3(a), 1.4, 4.1, 5.17(a)
State v. Hornaday, 105 Wash. 2d 120, 713 P.2d 71 (1986) § 4.2(b)
State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980) §§ 5.0,
5.27, 5.28
State v. Howard, 7 Wash. App. 668, 502 P.2d 1043 (1972) § 4.9
State v. Huckaby, 15 Wash. App. 280, 549 P.2d 35 §§ 2.4(b),
3.7(a), 3.7(b), 5.9(b), 5.12(g)
State v. Huft, 106 Wash. 2d 206, 720 P.2d 838 (1986) §§ 2.3 (c),
2.5, 2.5(a), 2.6(b)
State v. Hunt, 15 Or. App. 76, 514 P.2d 1363 (1973) § 2.4(b)
State v. Hutton, 19 Ariz. App. 95, 505 P.2d 263 (1973) opinion
vacated by 110 Ariz. 339, 519 P.2d 38 (1974) § 2.5(b), 2.6(c)
State v. Hutton, 7 Wash. App. 726, 502 P.2d 1037 (1972) § 2.6(c)
State v. Hyem, 630 P.2d 202 (Mont. 1981) § 7.5
State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984) §§ 2.5,
2.5(a), 2.5(b)
State v. Jansen, 15 Wash. App. 348, 549 P.2d 32 (1976) § 3.3(a)
State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash. 2d 398, 717 P.2d 722 (1986) §§ 1.3(c),
5.14(d)
State
State
State
State
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State v. Jensen, 44 Wash. App. 485, 723 P.2d 443 (1986)
§ 5.12(d), 5.13
State v. Jeter, 30 Wash. App. 360, 634 P.2d 312 (1981) §§ 3.7(c),
5.17(b)
State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633 (La. 1976) § 5.28
State v. Johnson, 12 Wash. App. 309, 529 P.2d 873 (1974)
§ 2.7(b)
State v. Johnson, 17 Wash. App. 153, 561 P.2d 701 (1977)
§§ 5.7(a), 5.12
State v. Johnson, 40 Wash. App. 371, 699 P.2d 221 (1985) § 5.13
State v. Johnson, 64 Wash. 2d 613, 393 P.2d 284 (1964) § 2.6(c)
State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 239, 427 P.2d 705 (1967) §§ 5.1(a),
5.10, 5.13
State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. App. 530, 398 P.2d 732 (1965) § 5.13
State v. Johnston, 38 Wash. App. 783, 690 P.2d 591 (1984)
§§ 4.7(a), 7.8(c)
State v. Jones, 15 Wash. App. 165, 547 P.2d 906 (1976) § 3.7(b)
State v. Jones, 22 Wash. App. 447, 591 P.2d 796 (1979) § 5.14(c)
State v. Jordan, 29 Wash. App. 924, 631 P.2d 989 (1981) § 1.2
State v. Jordan,50 Wash. App. 170, 747 P.2d 1095 (1987) § 5.1(a)
State v. Judge, 100 Wash. 2d 706, 675 P.2d 219 (1984) §§ 1.3(f),
3.13(b), 5.15
State v. Keefe, 13 Wash. App. 829, 537 P.2d 795 (1975) § 5.7(a)
State v. Keller, 35 Wash. App. 455, 667 P.2d 139 (1983) § 1.4
State v. Kender, 60 Hawaii 301, 588 P.2d 447 (1978) § 5.8
State v. Kendrick, 47 Wash. App. 620, 736 P.2d 1079 (1987)
§ 5.14(g)
State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 726 P.2d 445 (1986) §§ 4.6(a),
4.6(b), 4.7(a), 4.9(b), 4.9(c), 4.9(d), 5.2(b), 5.7(a)
State v. Keyser, 29 Wash. App. 120, 627 P.2d 978 (1981) § 4.9(a)
State v. Klinker, 85 Wash. 2d 509, 537 P.2d 268 (1975) §§ 1.4(d),
3.2(a), 3.3(b), 4.4(d)
State v. Koepke, 47 Wash. App. 897, 738 P.2d 295 (1987) § 5.13,
5.14(d)
State v. Kohler, 70 Wash. 2d 599, 424 P.2d 656 (1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968) § 2.6(c)
State v. Komoto, 40 Wash. App. 200, 697 P.2d 1025 (1985)
§§ 1.3(f), 2.9(c), 3.13(b), 5.18(a)
State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 542 P.2d 782 (1975) § 5.14(e)
State v. Kuhn, 81 Wash. 2d 648, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972) § 7.3(f)
State v. Lair, 95 Wash. 2d 706, 630 P.2d 427 (1981) §§ 2.5(c),
5.7(a)

19881

1988 Search and Seizure

State v. Lampman, 45 Wash. App. 228, 724 P.2d 1092 (1986)
§§ 2.4(d), 6 .2(a), 7.3(f)
State v. Larson, 93 Wash. 2d 638, 611 P.2d 771 (1980) §§ 2.2(c),
2.4(c), 4.6(d), 4.9(b), 4.8(b), 4.8(c), 7.7
State v. LaTourette, 49 Wash. App. 119, 741 P.2d 1033 (1988)
§§ 4.4(d), 5.2(a)
State v. Laursen, 14 Wash. App. 692, 544 P.2d 127 (1975) § 2.3(a)
State v. Legas, 20 Wash. App. 535, 581 P.2d 172 (1978) § 3.5(b),
State v. Lehman, 40 Wash. App. 400, 698 P.2d 606 (1985) §§ 3.7,
3.7(b)
State v. Lesnick, 84 Wash. 2d 940, 530 P.2d 243, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 891 (1975) §§ 4.6(b), 5.7(a), 7.4
State v. Lewis, 19 Wash. App. 35, 573 P.2d 1347 (1978) § 5.19
State v. Lingo, 32 Wash. App. 638, 649 P.2d 130 (1982) § 3.5
State v. Lodge, 42 Wash. App. 380, 711 P.2d 1078 (1985)
§§ 2.3(a), 3.12(b)
State v. Loewen, 97 Wash. 2d 562, 647 P.2d 489 (1982) § 5.5
State v. Lowrie, 12 Wash. App. 155, 528 P.2d 1010 (1974) § 3.7(b)
State v. Ludvik, 40 Wash. App. 257, 698 P.2d 1064 (1985)
§§ 3.12(b), 7.5
State v. Luellen, 17 Wash. App. 91, 562 P.2d 253 (1977) §§ 2.3(a),
2.5, 2.6(b), 4.1
State v. Lyons, 76 Wash. 2d 343, 458 P.2d 30 (1969) § 5.12(c)
State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 718 P.2d 407 (1986) § 5.14(b)
State v. Marshall, 47 Wash. App. 322, 737 P.2d 265 (1987) § 4.5
State v. McAlpin, 36 Wash. App. 707, 677 P.2d 185 (1984) §§ 5.5,
5.7(a)
State v. McClung, 66 Wash. 2d 654, 404 P.2d 460 (1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966) § 2.6(c)
State v. McIntosh, 42 Wash. App. 579, 712 P.2d 319 (1986)
§§ 4.4(d), 4.5, 4.9(b), 4.9(d), 5.1(a)
State v. McPherson, 40 Wash. App. 298, 698 P.2d 563 (1985)
§ 2.4(f)
State v. Mercer, 45 Wash. App. 769, 727 P.2d 676 (1986) §§ 4.5,
4.6(d), 4.7(a)
State v. Moon, 45 Wash. App. 692, 726 P.2d 1263 (1986) § 4.7(a)
State v. Mangold, 82 N.J. 575, 414 A.2d 1312 (1980) § 5.28
State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985)
§§ 1.4(b), 2.2(c), 2.9(a), 4.6(a), 5.24, 6.4(b), 6.4(c), 7.8(d),
7.8(e)
State v. Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d 537, 688 P.2d 859 (1984) §§ 1.6,
5.14(d), 5.14(e), 7.8(f)
State v. Mathiesen, 27 Wash. App. 257, 616 P.2d 1255 (1980),
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review denied, 94 Wash. 2d 1025, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 914
(1981) § 3.12(a)
State v. Matlock, 27 Wash. App. 152, 616 P.2d 684 (1980) § 2.4(b)
State v. McCord, 19 Wash. App. 250, 576 P.2d 892 (1978), review
denied, 90 Wash. 2d 1013 (1978) §§ 2.3, 4.6(b)
State v. McCrea, 22 Wash. App. 526, 590 P.2d 367 (1979) § 5.7(a)
State v. McKenzie, 12 Wash. App. 88, 528 P.2d 269 (1974) § 5.19
State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977) § 6.1
State v. McMahon, 116 Ariz. 129, 568 P.2d 1027 (1977) § 7.8(f)
State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 612 P.2d 795 (1980)
§ 3.13(b)
State v. Melin, 27 Wash. App. 589, 618 P.2d 1324 (1980) § 3.8(b)
State v. Melrose, 2 Wash. App. 824, 470 P.2d 552 (1970) § 2.0
State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638 374 P.2d 989 (1962) § 7.0
State v. Miller, 7 Wash. App. 414, 499 P.2d 241 (1972) § 3.7(a)
State v. Morehouse, 41 Wash. App. 334, 704 P.2d 168 (1985) § 2.5
State v. Moreno, 21 Wash. App. 430, 585 P.2d 481 (1978), review
denied, 91 Wash. 2d 1014 (1979) §§ 4.6(b), 4.6(c), 4.7(a)
State v. Morgan, 32 Wash. App. 764, 650 P.2d 228 (1982)
§§ 1.3(g), 5.30
State v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975) §§ 1.3(a), 5.7(a), 5.12(a), 5.13
State v. Myers, 102 Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38 (1984) §§ 3.7,
3.7(a), 3.7(b), 3.7(c), 5.12(g)
State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984) § 1.3(c)
State v. Neff, 10 Wash. App. 713, 519 P.2d 1328 (1974) § 3.7(c)
State v. Nelson, 47 Wash. App. 159, 734 P.2d 516 (1987) § 5.12
State v. Neslund, 103 Wash. 2d 79, 690 P.2d 1153 (1984) § 3.2(b)
State v. Ng, 104 Wash. 2d 763, 713 P.2d 63 (1985) § 1.5
State v. Niedergang, 43 Wash. App. 656, 719 P.2d 576 (1986)
§§ 1.3(b), 1.3(c)
State v. Northness, 20 Wash. App. 551, 582 P.2d 546 (1978)
§ 2.6(b)
State v. O'Bremski, 70 Wash. 2d 425, 423 P.2d 530 (1967) 7.7(b),
7.8(h)
State v. O'Herron, 153 N.J. Super. 570, 380 A.2d 728 (1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1032 (1978) §§ 5.6, 5.7(b)
State v. ONeill, 103 Wash. 2d 853, 700 P.2d 711 (1985) § 7.3(c)
State v. Orcutt, 22 Wash. App. 730, 591 P.2d 872 (1979) § 5.28
State v. Osborne, 18 Wash. App. 318, 569 P.2d 1176 (1977),
review denied, 89 Wash. 2d 1016 (1978) §§ 1.3(f), 2.3
State v. Owens, 39 Wash. App. 130, 692 P.2d 850 (1984) §§ 1.4(b)
1.5(b), 7.8(i)
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State v. Palmer, 73 Wash. 2d 462, 438 P.2d 876 (1968), cert
denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968) § 2.6(c)
State v. Paradiso,43 Wash. App. 1, 714 P.2d 1193 (1986) § 2.5(b)
State v. Parker,79 Wash. 2d 326, 485 P.2d 60 (1971) § 5.22(a)
State v. Patterson,8 Wash. App. 177, 504 P.2d 1197 (1973) § 5.27
State v. Patterson, 83 Wash. 2d 49, 515 P.2d 496 (1973) §§ 2.3,
2.5
State v. Peele, 10 Wash. App. 58, 516 P.2d 788 (1973) §§ 5.19,
7.10
State v. Perez, 41 Wash. App. 481, 704 P.2d 625 (1985) § 2.9(b),
4.9, 4.9(d), 5.2(b), 5.7(a)
State v. Petty, 48 Wash. App. 615, 740 P.2d 879 (1987) § 3.2(b)
State v. Porter,5 Wash. App. 460, 488 P.2d 773 (1971) §§ 5.14,
5.14(d)
State v. Porter,88 Wash. 2d 512, 563 P.2d 829 (1977) § 3.2(a)
State v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 96 S. Ct. 3037
(1976) § 7.3(G)
State v. Pristell,3 Wash. App. 962, 478 P.2d 743 (1970) § 2.4(b)
State v. Proctor,12 Wash. App. 274, 529 P.2d 472 (1974) § 4.7(a)
State v. Randall, 116 Ariz. 371, 569 P.2d 313 (1977) § 5.20
State v. Ranglitsch, 40 Wash. App. 771, 700 P.2d 382 (1985)
§ 2.2(c)
State v. Reid. 38 Wash. App. 203, 687 P.2d 861 (1984) §§ 3.5,
3.7(b), 5.7(a), 5.17(b), 5.23, 7.7(a), 7.7(c)
State v. Reynoso, 41 Wash. App. 113, 702 P.2d 1222 (1985) § 5.27
State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983) §§ 3.9(c),
3.10, 5.1(a), 5.2(b), 5.16, 5.21, 5.23
State v. Robinson, 58 Ohio St. 2d 478, 391 N.E. 2d 317, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979) § 5.12(c)
State v. Rodriguez, 20 Wash. App. 876, 582 P.2d 904 (1978)
§§ 5.11, 5.12(b), 5.12(c)
State v. Rogers, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796 (1963)
§ 7.8(h)
State v. Rogers, 37 Wash. App. 728, 683 P.2d 608 (1984) § 5.15
State v. Rollie M, 41 Wash. App. 55, 701 P.2d 1123 (1985)
§ 3.4(c)
State v. Rome, 47 Wash. App. 666, 736 P.2d 709 (1987) § 6.4(b)
State v. Rood, 18 Wash. App. 740, 573 P.2d 1325 (1977) § 3.4(a)
State v. Sabbott, 16 Wash. App. 929, 561 P.2d 212 (1977) § 5.12(f)
State v. Sainz, 23 Wash. App. 532, 596 P.2d 1090 (1979) § 3.7(b)
State v. Salinas, 18 Wash. App. 455, 569 P.2d 75 (1977) § 3.5(a)
State v. Samsel, 39 Wash. App. 564, 694 P.2d 670 (1985)
§§ 1.4(a), 4.9(a)

634

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 11:411

State v. Sanders, 8 Wash. App. 306, 506 P.2d 892 (1973) §§ 5.5,
5.16
State v. Scott, 21 Wash. App. 113, 584 P.2d 423 (1978) § 3.9(b)
State v. Scott, 93 Wash. 2d 7, 604 P.2d 943 (1980), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 920 (1980) § 2.2(b)
State v. Scrotsky, 39 N.J. 410, 189 A.2d 23 (1963) § 7.6(b)
State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 632 P.2d 44 (1981) §§ 1.3(b),
1.3(c), 2.0, 3.10, 3.12(b), 5.6
State v. Serrano, 14 Wash. App. 462, 544 P.2d 101 (1975)
§§ 4.6(d), 4.7(b), 4.9(a)
State v. Shoemaker, 28 Wash. App. 787, 626 P.2d 538 (1981)

§ 5.20
State v. Shoemaker, 85 Wash. 2d 207, 533 P.2d 123 (1975)
§§ 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.12(c), 5.12(e), 7.8(c)
State v. Sieler, 95 Wash. 2d 43, 621 P.2d 1272 (1980) §§ 2.6(a),
2.8, 4.6(b)
State v. Silverman, 48 Wash. 2d 198, 292 P.2d 868 (1956) § 4.2(b)
State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash. App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279, review
denied, 93 Wash. 2d 1021, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 rehearing denied, 449 U.S. 1026 (1980) §§ 2.2(c), 4.5, 5.22(a), 5.24
State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 516 P.2d 1088 (1973) § 6.2(c)
State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980)
§§ intro, 1.3(c), 1.6, 5.0, 5.4(a), 5.27, 7.2(b), 7.9(a)
State v. Sinclair, 11 Wash. App. 523, 523 P.2d 1209 (1974)
§§ 2.4(a), 4.6(d), 4.7(a)
State v. Singleton, 9 Wash. App. 327, 511 P.2d 1396 (1973) § 5.26
State v. Smith, 102 Wash. 2d 449, 688 P.2d 146 (1985) §§ 1.4,
2.2(c), 4.9
State v. Smith, 15 Wash. App. 716, 552 P.2d 1059 (1976) §§ 3.6,
3.11
State v. Smith, 16 Wash. App. 425, 558 P.2d 265 (1976) §§ 3.2(b),
3.3(b), 3.5(b)
State v. Smith, 39 Wash. App. 642, 694 P.2d 660 (1984) §§ 2.3,
2.5(c), 3.4(a), 3.4(b)
State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 559 P.2d 970 cert. denied, 434
U.S. 876 (1977) §§ 5.1, 5.3, 5.14(f), 5.18, 5.20
State v. Smith, 9 Wash. App. 279, 511 P.2d 1032 (1973) §§ 4.6(d),
4.7(a)
State v. Smith, 93 Wash. 2d 329, 610 P.2d 869, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 873 (1980) §§ 2.2(a), 7.11
State v. Steenerson, 38 Wash. App. 722, 688 P.2d 544 (1984) § 2.5
State v. Sterling, 43 Wash. App. 846, 719 P.2d 1357 (1986)
§§ 2.3(b), 2.4(f)
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State v. Stock, 44 Wash. App. 467, 722 P.2d 1330 (1986) §§ 2.6(b),
3.2
State v. Stone, 294 A.2d 683 (Me. 1972) § 5.8
State v. Stringer, 4 Wash. App. 485, 481 P.2d 910 (1971)
§ 5.17(a)
State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986) §§ intro,
1.4(b), 5.1(a), 5.1(b), 5.2(b), 5.16, 5.21, 5.23
State v. Sturgeon, 46 Wash. App. 181, 730 P.2d 93 (1986) § 3.7(b)
State v. Sweet, 36 Wash. App. 377, 675 P.2d 1236 (1984)
§§ 4.7(a), 5.27
State v. Sweet, 44 Wash. App. 226, 721 P.2d 560 (1986) §§ 4.6(d),
4.7(a), 4.9, 5.28
State v. Sykes, 27 Wash. App. 111, 615 P.2d 1345 (1980) § 4.6(b)
State v. Talley, 14 Wash. App. 484, 543 P.2d 348 (1975) §§ 3.7(a),
5.14(e)
State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985) § 1.3(g)
State v. Taplin, 36 Wash. App. 664, 676 P.2d 504 (1984)
§§ 5.2(a), 5.19
State v. Taras, 19 Ariz. App. 7, 504 P.2d 548 (1972) § 5.28
State v. Terravona, 105 Wash. 2d 632, 716 P.2d 295 (1986)
§§ 3.9(c), 5.70, 5.19, 5.27
State v. Teuber, 19 Wash. App. 651, 577 P.2d 147 (1978)
§§ 4.2(b), 4.4(b)
State v. Thetford, 109 Wash. 2d 392, 745 P.2d 496 (1987) § 3.12

(b)
State v. Thompson, 17 Wash. App. 639, 564 P.2d 820 (1977),
review denied, 89 Wash. 2d 1018 (1978) § 5.14(b)
State v. Thompson, 58 Wash. 2d 598, 364 P.2d 527 (1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 945, rehearingdenied, 371 U.S. 855 (1962)
§§ 2.6(c), 4.4(b)
State v. Thompson, 93 Wash. 2d 838, 613 P.2d 525 (1980)
§§ 2.4(c), 4.6(a), 4.6(d), 4.7(b)
State v. Thornton, 41 Wash. App. 506, 705 P.2d 271 (1985)
§§ 1.4(a), 4.7(a)
State v. Todd, 78 Wash. 2d 362, 474 P.2d 542 (1970) § 2.2(a)
State v. Trasvina, 16 Wash. App. 519, 557 P.2d 368 (1976)
§ 3.4(b)
State v. Tucker, 101 N.J. Super. 380, 244 A.2d 353 (1968) § 7.3(d)
State v. Turner, 18 Wash. App. 727, 571 P.2d 955 (1977) § 5.7(a)
State v. Uhthoff, 45 Wash. App. 261, 724 P.2d 1103 (1986) §§ 3.2,
3.12(a)
State v. Van Auken, 77 Wash. 2d 136, 460 P.2d 277 (1969) § 7.10
State v. Vangen, 72 Wash. 2d 548, 433 P.2d 691 (1967) § 4.4(b)
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State v. Vanzant, 14 Wash. App. 679, 544 P.2d 786 ((1975)
§§ 2.2(a), 2.3(a), 2.5(b), 2.7(a)
State v. Vidor, 75 Wash. 2d 607, 452 P.2d 961 (1969) § 5.14
State v. Walker, 119 Ariz. 121, 579 P.2d 1091 (1978) § 5.27
State v. Walker, 24 Wash. App. 823, 604 P.2d 514 (1979)
§§ 4.6(d), 4.7(a)
State v. Ward, 24 Wash. App. 761, 603 P.2d 857 (1979), review
denied, 93 Wash. 2d 1019, cert denied, 449 U.S. 984 (1980)

§ 5.3
State v. Weaver, 38 Wash. App. 17, 683 P.2d 1136 (1984) § 3.5
State v. Werth, 18 Wash. App. 530, 571 P.2d 941, review denied,
90 Wash. 2d 1010 (1977) §§ 5.12(b), 5.12(c), 5.12(d), 5.19
State v. Wethered, 110 Wash. 2d 466, - P.2d - (1988) §§ intro,
5.12
State v. Wetherell, 82 Wash. 2d 865, 514 P.2d 1069 (1973)
§§ 1.3(f), 5.18(a)
State v. Whatcom County, 92 Wash. 2d 35, 593 P.2d 546 (1979)
§ 4.2(b)
State v. Wheeler, 108 Wash. 2d 230, 737 P.2d 1005 (1987)
§§ 1.4(a), 4.7(a)
State v. White, 10 Wash. App. 273, 518 P.2d 245 (1973) review
denied, 83 Wash. 2d 1009 (1973) §§ 2.5(a), 2.5(e)
State v. White, 40 Wash. App. 490, 699 P.2d 239 (1985) § 5.2(b)
State v. White, 44 Wash. App. 276, 722 P.2d 118 (1986) §§ 5.1(a),
5.2(a)
State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982) §§ 2.4(e),
4.8, 7.0, 7.2(a), 7.8(b), 7.8(c)
State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984)
§§ 1.4(a), 4.7(a), 4.9, 5.27, 5.28
State v. Williams, 16 Wash. App. 868, 560 P.2d 1160 (1977)
§ 5.2(a)
State v. Williams, 90 Wash. 2d 245, 580 P.2d 635 (1978) § 3.8(a)
State v. Williams, 94 Wash. 2d 531, 617 P.2d 1012 (1980) §§ 1.6,
5.9(a), 7.0
State v. Williamson, 42 Wash. App. 208, 710 P.2d 205 (1985)
§§ 3.7(a), 5.12(g)
State v. Withers, 8 Wash. App. 123, 504 P.2d 1151 (1972) § 3.5(a)
State v. Wolfe, 5 Wash. App. 153, 486 P.2d 1143 (1971) § 5.20
State v. Wolken, 103 Wash. 2d 823, 700 P.2d 319 (1985) §§ 2.5(a),
2.5(b), 3.12(a)
State v. Wolohan, 23 Wash. App. 813, 598 P.2d 421 (1979),
review denied, 93 Wash. 2d 1008 (1980) §§ 1.1, 2.4(b), 5.9(b),
5.31
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State v. Wood, 45 Wash. App. 299, 725 P.2d 435 (1986) § 4.1
State v. Woodall, 32 Wash. App. 407, 647 P.2d 1051 (1982) revd
on other grounds, 100 Wash. 2d 74, 666 P.2d 364 (1983)
§§ 2.6(b), 3.7(b)
State v. Worth, 37 Wash. App. 889, 683 P.2d 662 (1984) §§ 3.8(a),
3.9, 3.9(b), 5.18(b)
State v. Wraspir, 20 Wash. App. 626, 581 P.2d 182 (1978) § 3.11
State v. Young, 15 Wash. App. 581, 550 P.2d 689, review denied,
87 Wash. 2d 1012 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931 (1977)

§ 5.18(a)

State v. Young, 28 Wash. App. 412, 624 P.2d 725, review denied,
95 Wash. 2d 1024 (1981) §§ 4.6(d), 5.8
State v. Young, 76 Wash. 2d 212, 455 P.2d 595 (1969) § 3.7(c)
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38, 101 S.
Ct. 1642 (1981) § 1.3(a)
Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 69 L. Ed. 757, 45 S. Ct. 414
(1925) § 3.4(a)
Steigler v. Superior Court, 252 A.2d 300 (Del. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 880 (1969) § 7.3(d)
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 96 S. Ct. 3037
(1976) §§ 7.1, 7.3(g)
Stoner v. California,376 U.S. 483, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 84 S. Ct. 889
(1964) §§ 1.3(a), 5.14(h)
Tacoma v. Harris,73 Wash. 2d 123, 436 P.2d 770 (1968) § 4.2(b)
Tate v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 516 P.2d 1088 (1973) § 6.2(c)
Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 76 L. Ed. 2d 951, 52 S. Ct.
466 (1932) § 5.7(b)
Tennessee v. Garner,471 U.S. 1, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694
(1985) § 4.4(a)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)
§§ 1.4, 2.9(b), 3.8(a), 4.5, 4.6(a), 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.9(a), 5.7(a),
5.18(b)
Thacker v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 702, 221 S.W.2d 682 (1949)
§ 7.6(a)
Thanhauser v. Milprint, Inc., 192 N.Y.S.2d 911, 9 A.D.2d 833
(1959) § 7.4(d)
Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 83 L. Ed. 2d 246, 105 S. Ct.
409 (1984) §§ 5.5, 5.16
Tolett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 93 S. Ct.
1602 (1973) § 7.10
Tyler v. United States, 302 A.2d 748 (D.C. 1973) § 5.8
United States ex rel. Hurley v. Delaware, 365 F. Supp. 282 (D.
Del. 1973) § 2.5(b)
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United States v. Bacall, 443 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) § 7.7(b)
United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1001 (1967) § 7.7(b)
United States v. Berrett, 513 F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1975) § 1.3(d)
United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1979) § 5.28
United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1972) § 5.8
United States v. Boswell, 347 A.2d 270 (D.C. App. 1975) § 1.3(g)
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. 873, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607,
95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975) §§ 2.9(b), 4.6(a), 6.3(b)
United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974) §§ 3.7, 5.17(a)
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733, 99 S. Ct.
1465 (1979) § 1.1
United States v. Calandra,414 U.S. 338, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 94 S.
Ct. 613 (1974) §§ 7.0, 7.3(a)
United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1976) § 5.17(a)
United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1985) § 6.3
United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1985) § 6.3
United States v. Carmichael,489 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973) § 2.5
United States v. Carriger,541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1976) § 1.3(a)
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268, 98 S.
Ct. 1054 (1978) § 7.8(h)
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 97 S.
Ct. 2476 (1977) §§ 1.1, 1.3(e), 1.3(g), 5.4(b), 5.20, 5.22(c)
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 101 S. Ct.
690 (1981) § 4.6(a)
United States v. Cortina,630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980) § 7.6(d)
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537, 100 S. Ct.
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CIRCUMSTANCES
Bodily intrusions, 5.18(a)
Burden of proof, 5.16
Container, warrantless
search and seizure of,
5.20
Destruction or removal of
evidence, 5.17(b)
Generally, 5.16
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Hot pursuit,
Determining validity of,
5.17(a)
Generally, 5.17(a)
Washington cases, 5.17(a)
Premises search,
Destruction of evidence,
5.17(b)
Search of person on
premises being searched,
5.18(b)
Warrantless entry to search
or arrest, 5.17(b)
EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY
Adjoining lands and, 1.3(c)
Apartments, 1.3(a)
Curtilage structures and,
1.3(b)
Fourth amendment and,
1.3(c)
Hotel rooms, 1.3(a)
Legitimate, 1.1
Open beaches, reservoirs,
1.3(c)
Open fields, wooded areas,
deserts and 1.3(c)
Position in room as
affecting, 1.3(a)
Possession of, requirements
for, 1.1
Prisoners or pre-trial
detainees, 6.2(a)
Telephone use and, 1.3(a)
EXPERTISE OF OFFICER
Plain view, smell and
hearing, 2.4(b)
FELLOW OFFICER RULE
See: Police, Probable
Cause, Directive to
Arrest

FILMS
Search warrant for, 3.5(b)
FINGERNAIL SCRAPING
Expectation of privacy in,
1.3(f)
FINGERPRINTS
Expectation of privacy in,
1.3(f)
FIRE SCENES
See: Inspection of Fire
Scenes
FLASHLIGHT
As aid to observation, 5.8
FRISK

See: Stop and Frisk
FRUIT OF THE

POISONOUS TREE
See: Exclusionary Rule
Arrest as fruit of illegal
search, 7.8(d)
Attenuation test, 7.7(a)
Confession as fruit of
illegal arrest, 7.8(a)
Confession as fruit of
illegal search, 7.8(b)
Crime committed in
response to illegal arrest,
as fruit, 7.8(i)
Evidence of, as affecting
probable cause, 2.3(b)
Generally, 7.7
Identification of person as
fruit of illegal arrest,
7.8(f)
Identification of property as
fruit of illegal search,
7.8(g)
Independent source test,
7.7(b)
Inevitable discovery test,
7.7(c)

650

University of Puget Sound Law Review

Search as fruit of illegal
arrest or detention, 7.8(c)
Search as fruit of prior
illegal search, 7.8(e)
Testimony as a fruit, 7.8(h)
Use of illegally seized
evidence at trial, 7.9
FURTIVE GESTURES
Observation of, as probable
cause, 2.4(d)
GOOD FAITH
Exclusionary rule, 7.2(a)
Warrantless searches, 5.5,
5.29
HARMLESS ERROR
On appeal, 7.11
HEARING
See: Plain View, Smell,
and Hearing
HEARSAY
Informant's information
establishing probable
cause, 2.5
Information establishing
probable cause, 2.3(a)
Police officer, multiple,
2.7(b)
HOMOSEXUAL ACTIVITY
Expectation of privacy and,
1.1
HOT PURSUIT
See: Exigent
Circumstances
HOTEL ROOM
Expectation of privacy in,
1.3(a)
HOUSES
See: Premises
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IMMEDIATE CONTROL
STANDARD
Search incident to arrest,
5.1(b)
IMPOUNDMENT
Vehicles, 5.26
INDIVIDUALIZED
SUSPICION
Administrative searches,
6.4(b), 6.4(c)
Prisons, 6.2(b)
Probable cause, 2.2(c)
School searches, 6.1
Special environments, 5.30
Vehicle searches, 6.4(c)
IN THE PRESENCE
REQUIREMENT
See: Arrest
INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
TEST
Fruit of the poisonous tree,
7.7(c)
INFORMANTS
Admissions against interest,
2.5(c)
Aguilar-Spinelli test, 2.5
Basis for knowledge, 2.5(a)
Citizens as, 2.6
Partial corroboration, 2.5(e)
Police as, 2.7
Self-verifying detail, 2.5(d)
Veracity, 2.5(b), 2.5(c)
INSPECTION OF FIRE
SCENES
Level of proof requirement,
6.4(c)
Search warrant,
requirement for, 1.3(a),
6.4
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INTOXICATION
Detention in cases of, 4.4(d)
INVENTORY
Containers, secured by
warrantless search, 5.2(b)
Impounded vehicles, 5.27
JOINT OCCUPANT
Consent to search by,
5.14(d)
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS
Exclusionary rule,
applicability, 7.4(a)
KATZ TEST
See: Expectation of
Privacy; Constitutionally
Protected Areas
KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE
REQUIREMENT
See: Execution of Search
Warrants
KNOCK AND WAIT RULE
See: Execution of Search
Warrants
LANDLORD
Consent to search by,
5.14(e)
LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY
See: Expectation of Privacy
MAILS
Expectation of privacy in,
1.3(g)
Warrantless searches, 5.31
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Probable cause as subject
to, 2.0

NEUTRAL AND
DETACHED MAGISTRATE
Burden of proof as to
neutrality, 3.2(c)
Magistrate-shopping, 3.2(b)
Neutrality, 3.2(b)
Nonlawyer, 3.2(a)
Potential witness as, 3.2(b)
Prosecutor as, 3.2(b)
Qualifications for, 3.2(a)
NEWS-GATHERING
ORGANIZATION
Description of evidence in
search warrant for, 3.5(b)
NONLAWYER
As magistrate, 3.2(a)
NONSUSPECT
Warrants directed at,
3.13(c)
OATH
See: Affidavit for Search
Warrant
OBSCENE MATERIALS
Public availability of, as
affecting privacy
expectation, 1.3(g)
ODOR
See: Plain View, Smell,
and Hearing
OPEN FIELDS
Expectation of privacy in,
1.3(c)
OPEN VIEW
Plain View, Smell and
Hearing
OUTBUILDINGS
Expectation of privacy in,
1.3(b)
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PAPERS
See: Private papers
Expectation of privacy in,
1.3(g)
Special warrant
requirements for, 3.5(b),
3.13(a)
PAROLE REVOCATION
Exclusionary rule,
applicability, 7.3(f)
PARTIAL
CORROBORATION
Informants, 2.5(e)
PARTICULARITY
See: Search Warrants
PAST PERFORMANCE
Informants, 2.5(b)
PAT-DOWN
See: Stop and Frisk
PERSON
Consensual encounter as,
1.5(a)
For civil offenses, 1.5(d)
In automobile, 1.5(b)
In home, 1.5(c)
What constitutes, 1.5
PERSONAL
CHARACTERISTICS
Expectation of privacy in,
Face, 1.3(f)
Fingernails, 1.3(f)
Voice, 1.3(f)
PERSONAL PRIVACY
INTEREST
Banking documents, 1.4
Evidence seized from third
party as having, 1.4
Generally, 1.4
Interior of purse as, 1.4
Motor vehicle and, 1.4
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Personal Possessions, 5.2(a)
Sealed container in stolen
car as, 1.4
Search and seizure as
challenged by, 1.4
PLAIN HEARING
See: Plain View, Smell,
and Hearing
PLAIN SMELL
See: Plain View, Smell,
and Hearing
PLAIN VIEW, SMELL, AND
HEARING
Binoculars and telescopes,
5.8
Contraband, sight of, as
probable cause, 2.4(b)
Exigent circumstances as to
plain view, 5.7(b)
Expertise of officer, 2.4(b)
Flashlights, 5.8
Hearing generally, 5.9(a)
Immediate knowledge of
incriminating character,
5.7(a)
Observation by officer of
object in a protected
area, 5.7(b)
Odor as probable cause,
2.4(b)
Open view as distinguished,
5.6
Plain smell, generally,
5.9(b)
Plain view, generally, 5.6
Prior justification for
intrusion, 5.7(a)
Requirements as to plain
view, 5.7(a)
Seizure of unnamed items,
3.10
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POISONOUS TREE
See: Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree
POLICE
Probable cause,
Directive to arrest, 2.7(b)
Facts known by other
officer, 2.7(b)
Reliability of officer,
2.7(a)
PRE-TRIAL DETAINEES
See: Prisoners or Pre-Trial
Detainees
PREMISES
See: Business and
Commercial Premises,
Inspection of Fire Scenes
Adjoining lands,
Access area used as,
1.3(c)
Driveways, and parking
lots, 1.3(c)
Open fields, 1.3(c)
Walkways, 1.3(c)
Apartments, personal
privacy interest in, 1.4
Arrest entry requiring
warrant, 1.3(a)
Buildings in curtilage,
Entry by police of, 1.3(b)
Expectation of privacy in,
1.3(b)
Porches, 1.3(c)
Pre-Katz, 1.3(b)
Structures outside of,
1.3(b)
Homes,
Administrative Searches
in, 6.4
Arrest in, 4.1
Expectation of Privacy
in, 1.3(a)
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Generally, 1.2
Knock and Announce
Requirements, 3.7
Warrant requirement,
entry into, 4.1, 5.17(a),
5.17(b), 5.19
PRISONERS OR PRETRIAL DETAINEE
Expectation of privacy,
6.2(a)
Level of proof necessary
for search of, 6.2(b)
Warrantless searches or
seizures, 6.2(c)
PRIVACY
See: Expectation of Privacy
PRIVATE PAPERS
Right against selfincrimination and, 1.3(f)
Seizure of, 1.3(g), 3.13(a)
PROBABLE CAUSE
See: Informants
Administrative searches,
2.8(a)
Border Searches, 6.3(b)
Criminal reputation, 2.3(b)
Custodial detention, 2.8(b)
Determination of, as
judicially considered, 2.0
Evidence of, 2.1
First-hand observation,
Association with another
person, 2.4(c)
Association with place,
2.4(c)
Furtive gestures and
flight, 2.4(d)
Illegal substance
possession, 2.4(b)
Nature of area, 2.4(c)
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Response to questioning,
2.4(e)
Stolen property, 2.4(a)
For arrest without warrant,
2.2(b)
Generally, 2.0
Hearsay, 2.3(a)
Individualized suspicion,
reasonable grounds for,
2.2(c)
Informant's information,
Admissions against
interest, 2.5(c)
Basis of knowledge, 2.5,
2.5(a),
Corroborated by officer,
2.5(e)
Generally, 2.5
Partial corroboration,
2.5(e)
Past performance, 2.5(b)
Self-verifying detail,
2.5(d)
Veracity, 2.5, 2.5(b)
Informant, reliability of,
2.3(a)
Information considered,
Admissibility at trial, as
to, 2.3(a)
Basis of facts, 2.3
Basis of knowledge, 2.3
Increased Power
Consumption, 2.3(c)
Prior arrests and
convictions, 2.3(b)
More probable than not,
2.2(b)
Objective test, 2.2(a)
Police information,
Directive to arrest, 2.7(b)
Facts known by other
officer, 2.7(b)
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Reliability of officer,
2.7(a)
Prior arrests and
convictions establishing,
2.3(b)
Probability, degree of,
2.2(b), 2.2(c)
Reputation establishing,
2.3(b)
Stale information, 2.3
Totality of circumstances
standard, 2.5
Victim-witness information,
Anonymously given,
2.6(b)
Basis of knowledge, 2.6(a)
Generally, 2.6
Sufficiency of, 2.6(c)
Veracity, 2.6(b)
Warrantless actions, 2.0
PROPERTY THEORY
Expectation of privacy and,
1.1
PROTECTED AREAS AND
INTERESTS
Commercial property,
1.3(d)
Garbage, 1.3(g)
Home, 1.2
Mail use, 1.3(g)
PROTECTIVE SEARCHES
See: Stop and Frisk
QUESTIONING
Responses and probable
cause, 2.4(e)
REASONABLE BELIEF
See: Stop and Frisk
REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY
See: Expectation of Privacy
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RESIDENCE
See: Premises
SAFETY INSPECTIONS
See: Inspection of
Businesses
SCHOOLS
Searches in, 6.1
SEARCH
See: Protected Areas and
Interests; Warrantless
Searches.
SEARCH INCIDENT TO
ARREST
Bodily intrusions, 5.2(a)
Criteria for coming within
rule, 5.1
Immediate control
standard, 5.1(b)
Lawful arrest, as
predicating, 5.1(a)
Person,
As a result of lawful
arrest, 5.2(a)
Use of force, 5.2(a)
Strip search for minor
offense, 6.2(d)
Vehicles, immediate control
test, 5.2(b)
SEARCH WARRANTS
See: Affidavit for Search
Warrant; Execution of
Search Warrants; Neutral
and Detached Magistrate
Bodily intrusions, 3.13(b)
Description of place, 3.4(a)
Multiple occupancy
building, 3.4(b)
Rural areas, 3.4(b)
Urban areas, 3.4(b)
First amendment
implications, 3.13(a)

Generally, 3.0
Marital privilege, 2.3(a)
Media in miscellaneous
forms, 3.5(b)
Mere evidence as object, 3.1
News-gathering
organization, 3.5(b)
Nighttime, 3.6
Nonsuspects searched,
3.13(c)
Persons, 3.4(b)
Sufficient information,
3.4(a)
Targets to be seized, 3.4(a)
Description, 3.5, 3.5(a)
Documents, telephone
conversations, 3.5(b)
Timeliness of execution,
3.6
Vehicles, 3.4(b)
SECONDARY EVIDENCE
See: Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree
SEIZURE
See: Protected Areas and
Interests; Warrantless
Searches
For civil offenses, of
person, 1.4(d)
In automobile, of person,
1.4(b)
In home, of person, 1.4(c)
Person, what constitutes,
1.4
Possessory interest as
affecting liberty interest,
1.5
Possessory interest of
person as affected by, 1.5
SELF-VERIFYING DETAIL
Basis of knowledge, 2.5(d)
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SMELL
See: Plain View, Smell,
and Hearing
STALE INFORMATION
Probable cause, 2.3
STANDING
Automatic, 1.6
Generally, 1.6
Injury in fact as
prerequisite to, 1.6
STOLEN PROPERTY
POSSESSION
Standing, 1.6
Probable cause, 2.4(a)
STOP AND FRISK
Balancing test, 4.5
Frisk,
During execution of
search warrant, 3.8(a)
Permissible dimensions,
4.8(a)
Post pat-down search,
4.8(a)
Protective search beyond
suspect, 4.8(b), 4.9(c)
Search of area within
suspect's control, 4.8(d)
Standards generally, 4.8
Generally, 4.5
Grounds for permissible
stop,
Factual basis and
individualized suspicion
requirements, 4.6(a)
Illegal aliens, 6.3(a)
Information from an
informant, 4.6(b)
Miscellaneous situations,
4.6(d)
Reasonable suspicion that
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vehicle contains illegal
aliens, 6.3(b)
Standards generally, 2.8(b)
Reasonable belief or suspicion
standard 4.5, 4.6(a), 4.6(b),
4.6(c)
Stop dimensions,
Generally, 4.7
Nature of offense, 4.6(c)
Other persons in proximity
to suspect, 4.7(b)
Time, place and method,
4.7(a)
STORE
See: Premises
STREET ENCOUNTERS
See: Stop and Frisk
STRIP SEARCH
See: Bodily Intrusions
SUPRESSION MOTION
See: Motion to Suppress
SUPPRESSION OF
CONFESSIONS AND
ADMISSIONS
See: Exclusionary Rule
TELESCOPE
As aid to observation, 5.8
TERRY STOP
See: Stop and Frisk
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS
Arrest for, 4.4(d)
USELESS GESTURE
EXCEPTION
See: Execution of Search
Warrants, Notice
Requirement, Exceptions
VEHICLES
Administrative searches of,
2.8(a)
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Examination of container
based on probable cause,
5.23(c)
Exigent circumstances
search of, based on
probable cause, 5.22(a)
Expectation of privacy in,
1.3(c)
Homes, as distinguished
from, 1.3(e)
Impoundment of, 5.26
Inventory searches, 5.27
Warrantless search after,
5.22(b)
Scope of warrantless
search, 5.22(c)
Search of, generally, 1.3(e)
Seizure of person, 1.5(b)
Spot checks, 5.24, 6.4(b),
6.4(c)
Warrantless search based
on generalized suspicion,
5.24
Warrantless search during
medical emergency, 5.29
Warrantless searches, See
Generally, 5.2(b), 5.21,
5.23
Weapons, papers and
suspects, 5.28
Warrantless seizure as
evidence, 5.26
Warrantless seizure for
forfeiture or levy, 5.25
VICTIM-WITNESS
INFORMATION
Probable cause,
Anonymously given,
2.6(b)
Basis of knowledge, 2.6(a)
Generally, 2.6
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Sufficiency of, 2.6(c)
Veracity, 2.6(b)
VIEW
See: Plain View, Smell,
and Hearing
WAIVER OF OBJECTION
Guilty plea, 7.10
No timely objection, 7.10
Testimony by defendant re
fruits, 7.10
WARRANTLESS ARREST
When permissible, 4.1
WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES
See: Consent Searches;
Stop and Frisk
Administrative searches, 6.4
Aid to person in distress,
5.5
Borders, 6.3, 6.3(c)
Containers, 5.5
Inventory, 5.2(b)
Mail inspections, 5.31
Post-detention search,
5.4(a)
Prior to arrest, 5.3
Requirements generally, 5.0
Schools, 6.1
Search incident to arrest,
5.2(b)
Special situations, 5.5, 5.30
WARRANTS
See: Arrest Warrants;
Search Warrants
WITNESS-VICTIM
INFORMATION
See: Victim-Witness
Information

